

2005
Mark C. Anarumo
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

| Report Documentation Page | | | Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 | | |
|--|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|---|------------------------------------|
| Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. | | | | | |
| 1. REPORT DATE 24 MAR 2005 | | 2. REPORT TYPE N/A | | 3. DATES COVERED - | |
| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE What Are We Really Afraid Of? The Practitioner View Of The Terrorist Threat In The United States | | | | 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER | |
| | | | | 5b. GRANT NUMBER | |
| | | | | 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER | |
| 6. AUTHOR(S) | | | | 5d. PROJECT NUMBER | |
| | | | | 5e. TASK NUMBER | |
| | | | | 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER | |
| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Rutgers University Newark | | | | 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER | |
| 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) | | | | 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) | |
| | | | | 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) | |
| 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited | | | | | |
| 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The original document contains color images. | | | | | |
| 14. ABSTRACT | | | | | |
| 15. SUBJECT TERMS | | | | | |
| 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: | | | 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU | 18. NUMBER OF PAGES 268 | 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON |
| a. REPORT unclassified | b. ABSTRACT unclassified | c. THIS PAGE unclassified | | | |

WHAT ARE WE REALLY AFRAID OF? THE PRACTITIONER VIEW OF THE
TERRORIST THREAT IN THE UNITED STATES

By Mark C. Anarumo

A dissertation submitted to the
Graduate School-Newark
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
in partial fulfillment of requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Graduate Program in Criminal Justice
Written under the direction of
Doctor Leslie W. Kennedy
and approved by

Newark, New Jersey
May, 2005

So What Are We Afraid Of?

The Practitioner View of the Terrorist Threat in the United States

By Mark C. Anarumo

Thesis Director: Doctor Leslie W. Kennedy

The field of terrorism has seen a large spike in interest since the events of September 11, 2001. Unfortunately, this interest has not created much in the way of empirically based research to help inform anti-terrorism policy. The void of research has contributed to the generally weak levels of understanding current terrorist threats within the United States. The recency and severity of the 9-11 attacks led to the perception of a “national” threat from Islamists, although other groups, such as anti-abortionists and ethnic supremacists, were identified in pre-9-11 literature as more of a threat to the nation. Proper identification of local threats is critical to the policy debate, since each group type has disparate goals that drive very different tactics and target selection. Reported group presence and attack forecasts should thus dictate resource allocation and first responder training content.

Because of the unique legal traditions of the United States, the challenge of facing the terrorist threat within the U.S. will fall squarely on the shoulders of local civilian law enforcement. Federal-level agencies, most notably the Federal Bureau of Investigation, will provide some expertise and manpower in this endeavor. But just as threats should be viewed in a local context, the majority of terrorism prevention and, when necessary, disaster response tasks will fall on local police agencies. Individuals serving in these agencies are most in tune with their jurisdictions, know local criminal actors, and will be

the first on-scene to any incident. For these reasons, the perceptions of the heads of these local agencies were collected via a web-based instrument, resulting in 1,883 responses. In addition to questions regarding local terrorist group presence, respondents were asked what kinds of groups they feared would attempt violence in or near their jurisdiction, what kinds of targets were available, and general agency characteristics. Respondent telephone area codes were also collected to allow for spatial analysis. This range of information identified where certain groups were present, and most importantly showed that there are strong predictors of fear of terrorism, including target availability and agency training characteristics.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to many people without whom I could not have completed this dissertation. First I must thank my wife and our four children. There were many late nights and days away necessary to complete this project. Without my wife's understanding and support, and my children's patience when I was away or tied to the computer, this project would not have been possible. I love all of you so very much. The love and encouragement of my father and step-mother were also instrumental in the completion of this work. From encouraging my application to a doctoral program to proofreading the final dissertation, their support was critical and deeply appreciated.

It is difficult for me to adequately articulate my appreciation for Dr. Leslie Kennedy, Dean of the Rutgers School of Criminal Justice, chair of this dissertation committee, and my mentor. The time and guidance Dr. Kennedy provided for this project and my entire graduate school career were more than I could have hoped for and certainly more than I deserved. Likewise, Dr. Norman Samuels and Dr. George Kelling provided invaluable guidance and advocacy as members of my dissertation committee. Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Harvey Kushner, who served as the outside reader for this dissertation. Dr. Kushner's written works and academic presentations were the foundation of this work and my interest in terrorism generally. I consider myself fortunate beyond words for Dr. Kushner's time not only as a member of my committee but also for his guidance at every step of my academic career.

I would also like to thank my friends at Rutgers, especially the members of my cohort that started in 1997. My entire graduate school experience was truly enjoyable

because of them. I would like to especially acknowledge Dr. Christine Tartaro and Dr. Chris Sedelmaier, two dear friends who provided hours of assistance so this study would work. I am deeply grateful for their help and the friendship we share.

Finally, I would like to thank Phyllis Schultze, librarian of the world-renowned Don M. Gottfredson Library of Criminal Justice of the Rutgers University Law Library. Phyllis regularly found books and articles without my asking, knowing what I needed to succeed. Her attention and assistance were as valuable as any in my successful completion of this demanding doctoral program.

Dedication

For my 4 children and the hope that they inherit a world where terrorism is neither condoned nor necessary.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|-----|
| LIST OF TABLES | ix |
| LIST OF FIGURES | x |
| CHAPTER I: PROBLEM STATEMENT | |
| Overview | 1 |
| Terrorism Defined | 13 |
| CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW | |
| Introduction | 16 |
| Characteristics of Terrorist Actors and Groups | 19 |
| Classifying the Individual Terrorist | 22 |
| Psychological Perspective | 23 |
| Political Idealism | 29 |
| Financial Stimuli | 32 |
| Is there a Profile? | 34 |
| Trends of Group Study | 36 |
| Typologies | 38 |
| Early Typologies | 40 |
| Incident-based Typologies | 41 |
| Fait Accompli or Negotiated | 43 |
| Cyber-terrorism | 48 |
| The Criminality of Terrorism | 57 |
| Terrorism vs. Guerilla Warfare..... | 58 |
| Interstate Warfare | 60 |
| Legal Distinctions of Political Violence | 61 |
| Terrorism vs. Ordinary Crime | 66 |
| Media Effects | 69 |
| CHAPTER III: THEORY | |
| Introduction | 74 |
| The Routine Activity Approach | 75 |
| The Chemistry of Terrorism | 77 |
| Suitable Target | 79 |
| Capable Guardian/Security Force | 83 |
| Motivated Terrorist | 88 |
| Application of the Theory | 92 |
| CHAPTER IV: METHODOLOGY | |
| Data Collection | 96 |
| Internet Survey Overview | 98 |
| Sampling | 102 |
| Survey Implement Overview | 104 |
| Confidentiality | 105 |
| Hypotheses Background Data | 106 |
| Research Questions | 107 |
| The Dataset | 112 |
| CHAPTER V: GROUP PRESENCE | |
| Overview..... | 116 |
| Frequencies | 117 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| National | 117 |
| Regional Breakdown | 119 |
| Northeast..... | 120 |
| South | 122 |
| Midwest..... | 123 |
| Central..... | 125 |
| Southwest..... | 127 |
| West | 129 |
| Frequency Summary | 131 |
| Crosstabulations..... | 133 |
| Northeast..... | 135 |
| South | 138 |
| Midwest..... | 140 |
| Central..... | 141 |
| Southwest..... | 143 |
| West | 144 |
| Crosstabulation Summary | 146 |
| Spatial Analysis | 148 |
| Chapter Summary | 153 |
| CHAPTER VI: WHO ARE WE AFRAID OF...AND WHY? | |
| Overview | 155 |
| Crosstabulations..... | 156 |
| National | 158 |
| Regional Breakdown | 160 |
| Northeast..... | 161 |
| South | 164 |
| Midwest..... | 166 |
| Central..... | 168 |
| Southwest..... | 170 |
| West | 172 |
| Crosstabulation Summary | 176 |
| Regression Models | 178 |
| Local Actors | 180 |
| Left Wing | 180 |
| Right Wing..... | 182 |
| Islamists..... | 184 |
| Eco-terrorists..... | 185 |
| Anti-Abortionists | 187 |
| Ethnic Supremacists..... | 188 |
| Foreign | 191 |
| Summary of Fear/Presence Regression | 192 |
| Local Targets | 193 |
| Left Wing | 195 |
| Right Wing..... | 196 |
| Islamists..... | 198 |
| Eco-terrorists..... | 200 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| Anti-Abortionists | 202 |
| Ethnic Supremacists..... | 203 |
| Foreign | 204 |
| Summary of Fear/Target Regression | 206 |
| Capable Guardians | 207 |
| Left Wing | 210 |
| Right Wing..... | 211 |
| Islamists..... | 213 |
| Eco-terrorists..... | 215 |
| Anti-Abortionists | 217 |
| Ethnic Supremacists..... | 218 |
| Foreign | 219 |
| Summary of Fear/Guardian Regression | 220 |
| Spatial Analysis | 222 |
| Chapter Summary | 226 |
| CHAPTER VII: DISCUSSION | |
| Summary of Findings | 230 |
| Policy Implications | |
| Limitations | |
| Future Research | |
| Conclusion | |
| APPENDIX A: FULL SIZE MAP OF LEFT WING GROUP PRESENCE | |
| APPENDIX A: FULL SIZE MAP OF RIGHT WING GROUP PRESENCE | |
| REFERENCES | |
| VITA | |

LIST OF TABLES

| | | |
|-----------|---|-----|
| Table 5.1 | National Reporting of Group Presence..... | 118 |
| Table 5.2 | Northeast Region Group Presence | 120 |
| Table 5.3 | South Region Group Presence | 122 |
| Table 5.4 | Midwest Region Group Presence | 124 |

| | |
|-----------------|-----|
| Table 2 –..... | 78 |
| Table 3 –..... | 55 |
| Table 4 – | 93 |
| Table 5 –..... | 100 |
| Table 6 –..... | 119 |

LIST OF FIGURES

| | |
|---|----|
| Figure 1 – Felson’s “Chemistry for Crime” | |
| Figure 2 – The “Chemistry of Terrorism” | |
| Figure 3 – Maps of Terrorist Group Presence | 58 |
| Figure 4 – Maps of Fear that Terrorists Will Act..... | 60 |

Chapter 1: Overview

Anti-terrorism is fast becoming an integral part of policing in the United States. To meet the unique challenges posed by the threat of terrorism, new skill sets are being added to the traditional functions of professional police organizations. This is happening without much assistance from academia. Professional organizations like the International Association of Chiefs of Police and sections of the Department of Justice have attempted to fill the void, but the law enforcement community still requires guidance via sound empirical research if they are to succeed in meeting this threat to public safety. After all, the threat of terrorism in the United States is not new, it has only gained prominence due to world events.

Police executives are being forced to ask the most basic of questions to assess the threat of terrorism in their jurisdictions. Simply put, they need to know of whom they should be afraid. The wide range of unique terrorist groups operating in the United States today, all with very specific goals and tactics, makes the correct identification of the threat the key component to developing an effective anti-terrorism strategy. This question of “who” can be addressed through the employment of police skills already possessed by professional police organization, such as surveillance and the use of informants. Group identification is only the first, albeit most crucial, step in evaluating local threat. The identification of which groups are predicted to act, and the discovery of why these groups are feared, is also key to developing a true understanding of terrorism.

The ultimate value of this research project to policy makers is the illustration of the fact that the answer to the question, “Do I have an effective local anti-terrorism

program?” is addressed by first answering the question, “Who do I think is the local threat, and why?”

Terrorism has long been a phenomenon without an academic discipline. It belongs in the field of criminal justice, though even here it has been considered a “fringe” area. This status is due in part to the paucity of empirically based research on terrorism specifically and on political violence in general. The watershed events of 9-11 have given birth to volumes of “new” research on the subject. Unfortunately, even these updates to the body of research have done little to address academic shortcomings. Two specific issues are to blame for the lack of progress in the field. First, there is the divisive and thoroughly published issue of how one defines terrorism. Second, and arguably most important, is the lack of attention given to the unique identity, goals, and tactics of the distinctive terrorist groups operating in the world today. The majority of existing research addresses terrorism in the frame that there is a common goal and purpose of all terrorist groups. This is a false assumption. The distinctions among terrorist groups are necessary when addressing the threats to public safety posed by terrorism. These group distinctions are thoroughly addressed by this dissertation.

The list of disciplines that have explored terrorism is long and varied. It includes psychology, political science, economics, and even philosophy, all of which have contributed to an increased understanding of the phenomena. However, this research project is based on the belief that the study of terrorism should reside primarily within criminal justice, primarily because civilian law enforcement agencies will ultimately be responsible for the prevention of and recovery from terrorist acts. Law enforcement

executives are quickly realizing that terrorism is a phenomenon worthy of their concern and resource allocation, and that it can be defeated through an informed focus of their professional organizations. Reliance on federal agencies and the military has never been well founded. While organizations like the Federal Bureau of Investigations did and continue to do much to support local agencies, they ultimately are too small and their missions too broad to meet the threat conclusively.

Beyond the challenges associated with federal law enforcement organizations, there are numerous legal and ideological reasons why the role of the armed forces has been so limited. A cornerstone of Western democracy is the trust in civilian law enforcement to handle even the most serious domestic threats without involving the military. In the United States, the removal of the military from domestic security is formalized in the Posse Comitatus Act. Although this once-sacred tenet is being reconsidered post-9-11, the American public (and courts) would not stand for any military augmentation of civilian police other than technological and logistical support. Civilian police will have to meet the challenges of terrorism within the borders of the United States.

The literature, especially post-9/11, suggests that civilian police agencies possess unique capabilities to deal with terrorism. These capabilities have been identified in several practitioner publications, most notably by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS). Two recent publications, the IACP's *Project Response- Leading from the Front: Law Enforcement's Role in Combating and Preparing for Domestic Terrorism*, and the 2002 issue of *COPS Innovations*, identify examples of local agency

capabilities, guidelines for first responders, suggested enhancements, and available resources. These publications also cite the views of several chiefs of police regarding their capabilities to deal with terrorism. One view that perfectly captures their value follows:

“We’re the ones out in the street. We talk to everyone in the community. We know what’s happening in every block in every city. People need to reach out and get that information.” Ed Norris, Baltimore City Police Commissioner (COPS 2002: introduction).

The acknowledgement of local law enforcement organizations as viable entities to counter terrorism is very recent. There are two main reasons for the delay in this recognition. First, terrorist events occur very infrequently, so much so that they have rarely been “on the scope” of law enforcement leaders who were focused on traditional crime and allocated their thin resources accordingly. The second reason is tied to the necessity to view terrorism in the United States in a historical context. A large-scale terrorist attack on U.S. soil was inconceivable fifteen years ago. Even the limited engagements of the 1960s had no lasting effects. The first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 was strategically a failure. It should have served as a wake-up call to the country, but in many circles it instead only reinforced the idea that no mass casualty event could be successfully perpetrated. The most significant pre-9-11 event was the 1995 bombing of the Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City. Lost in the atrocity of the act was the fact an Oklahoma highway patrolman, not the FBI or other federal agency, actually caught the perpetrator eighty minutes after the bombing. Even after this

event, efforts by law enforcement to deal with terrorism were under-funded and relegated to far less importance than traditional police tasks.

The most significant terrorist events of the late 1990s- the 1996 bombing of U.S. military barracks in Saudi Arabia, the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa, and the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole off the coast of Yemen- all contributed to the perception of terrorism once again as a threat “somewhere else.” Of course, the events of 9/11/01 changed that perception again, but for how long is impossible to gauge.

These issues of non-traditional policing and non-domestic threat have also contributed to the under-development of academic applications in terrorism, notably the development and exploration of typologies. The importance of this subset of the body of research has often been overlooked. A sound focus on the development of typologies would do much to improve the study of terrorism. Due partially to the general failures of academia in researching terrorism, as mentioned earlier, few typologies have applicability to empirical research. This shortcoming can be traced to the fact that typologies of the past have been built for general conceptual applications, while only a handful have been constructed to address specific research questions. The most prevalent past typologies are identified and explored in this study, and departures from them are explained. Primary among these departures is the major flaw in many typologies that exist in the base of literature; they do not address the disparate goals and thus tactics of the various groups likely to be identified in the survey. The typology for this study will use these distinctions as its major feature.

The typology section is important also because the disparities between terrorist groups and goals are key elements in the construction of effective anti-terrorism policy and strategy. Unfortunately, the body of research, both pre- and post-9/11, attempts to explain terrorism in terms that do not account for these distinctions. For example, consider anti-abortionists and right wing extremists, two group types that have been active in the United States for the latter half of the 20th century. Their goals are quite different, and goals defined their tactics. Anti-abortionists have targeted individuals that work in abortion clinics or those whom support abortion as a legal right. Right wing groups have sought to directly attack agents and symbols of the United States government. The scope of their respective operations is also much different. Anti-abortionists limit their operations to clinics and individuals, while anti-government extremists have no set parameter for their targets' size or the possibility that innocent bystanders may be harmed. They have conducted every conceivable type of operation from the assassination of police officers to large-scale attacks on government facilities (i.e. Timothy McVeigh's infamous attack in Oklahoma City), with resulting mass casualties.

Beyond these issues with typologies, this study departs from the existing literature in other ways. Most prevalent of these is the identification of terrorism as a criminal event, which is not how terrorism has been defined or operationalized in past research. For this reason, the case will be made that terrorism can and should be viewed in the context of its criminality, not political or moral justifications. An overview of the debate on the criminality of terrorism will be provided in the literature review and the position that terrorism must be viewed in a criminal context will be explained.

The actual survey instrument collected data from law enforcement agency executives to identify what they viewed as the terrorist threat in their jurisdictions. The survey also identified variables that predicted fear that certain groups would act. The identification of predictive variables was necessary to show what police chiefs value when weighing their local threats, specifically whether more emphasis is placed on local actors, local targets, or the capabilities of their own police agencies.

These three factors- local actors, local targets, and local agency- comprise a trilogy that is a cornerstone of opportunity-based theories of crime. Marcus Felson, in his Routine Activity Approach to crime, developed a “basic crime triangle” through which crime can be explained. The points of the triangle in Felson’s approach are represented by a suitable target, capable guardian, and likely offender, all elements with features that affect whether a crime takes place. There is a logical partnering of these three elements and the elements tested via the survey to discover “why” chiefs of police feared certain groups over others. The partnering was local target/suitable target, local agency/capable guardian, and local actor/likely offender. Thus, the Routine Activity Approach to crime guided the structure of this study, and is explained in detail in Chapter 4.

To measure the concepts set forth above, a unique data collection tool was devised. Its creation was necessary since the options available for data collection of terrorism variables are severely limited due to the infrequency of terrorist events in this country, especially relative to other crimes. The several databases of terrorist events that exist are either in their infancy or list only international events, limitations that reduce their worth to this study and its hypotheses. Traditional measures in criminal justice,

such as call for service, court records, and direct subject interviews, are similarly restrictive in that they are so scarce. The infrequency of calls for service and the very small number of court cases involving terrorism eliminates these as viable tools for the study. Clearly, much could be gained through direct subject interviews, but unfortunately many incarcerated terrorists are secluded and not presently available to researchers. The elimination of these and other traditional forms of data collection in criminal justice research leave us with the survey as the most appropriate tool.

Of course, there are inherent problems with all surveys generally. Most important among the threats to validity and reliability of surveys are the questions asked, the sample size, and the survey population. The questions to be used in this survey were very direct and easily coded. For example, some questions listed specific terrorist groups by name, and the respondent was asked whether that group was present in that specific jurisdiction. Data on agency characteristics were collected via simple questions on what training had been conducted, what equipment was available, and Likert scale questions on the respondent's subjective assessment of their agency anti-terrorism program. Finally, there were questions on local targets. Lists were presented and the respondent was asked to identify the proximity of certain targets relative to his/her jurisdiction. These simple lists provided great insight into not only target locations but also whether respondents understood which targets were viable for the groups identified as threats to their jurisdictions. For example, if the only listed local threat was an anti-abortion group, but the only variable that predicted fear of anti-abortionists was a local shopping mall, this would indicate a poor understanding of the local actor's goals and tactics.

The survey population was law enforcement executives, the professionals whom are charged with the implementation and at times the development of anti-terrorism programs. They are the experts on criminality and criminal actors in their jurisdictions, and thus best qualified to identify their local terrorist threat and to identify jurisdictional features that contribute to the viability of these threats.

The survey instrument and subsequent data analysis attempted to address the lack of empirically based research on terrorism by identifying what groups the experts view as local threats, and checking to see what variables are predictors of this identification. The main hypothesis is that terrorism, like politics, is local. The study will explain that there are distinctive types of terrorism, and that local anti-terrorism or first responder programs must take these distinctions into account.

Specifically, the study survey population was asked specific questions regarding what groups were present in their local jurisdictions and which groups were likely to attempt an act of terrorist violence. In this context, the role of the presence of local actors, the first of Felson's three elements, was examined. There is little doubt that the perceived threat at the federal level is currently from Islamists; however, at the local level, this is not likely to be the case. It was hypothesized that respondent's would consider the threat of international terrorism fairly insignificant when compared to groups such as anti-abortionists and ethnic supremacists. The significant distinctions between these groups and others used in the study's typology have considerable importance to policy makers that are charged with developing and implementing anti-terrorism strategies. Variables identifying group presence and fear of certain groups were also

applied to discover whether the mere presence of a group was enough to generate fear that they would act. Surprisingly, this was not always the case, and in some situations fear of certain groups overrode the presence of others.

Hypotheses addresses the local agency, Felson's second element, were also presented in an attempt to discover what caused respondents to identify certain groups and not others as threats. These variables included agency demographics, department size, department resources, and the department's current anti-terrorism capabilities, if any. An exploration of these variables provided an overall view of the role an agency's capabilities played in identifying groups as likely to attempt an act of terrorist violence. The capable guardian element was unique from the other two in that it contains the subjective notion of capability. Thus, to provide an effective measurement, the concept of "capable" had to be evaluated in some way. To answer this issue the survey included several questions regarding agency training rates and equipment. Beyond these fairly obvious core measurements, other questions that asked for subjective assessments of capabilities were included.

The third and final subject area, the value of local targets in explaining why respondents identified certain groups as likely to act, was also addressed. Available targets in a given jurisdiction were among the several survey items identified as potential predictors of fear of certain groups. Regarding the predictive value of available targets to perceived group threat, some hypotheses are obvious; for example, jurisdictions with abortion clinics will be more likely to fear anti-abortionist terrorist groups than those without clinics. Other hypotheses are less intuitive, such as that the presence of communications nodes or specific forms of national infrastructure will predict fear of

Islamist groups. The survey attempted to capture the predictive value of these target variables, both to compare among other target variables and to test against other reasons “why” police chiefs fear certain groups.

The study’s primary worth is to provide law enforcement professionals with an empirical study that could broaden their understanding of terrorism generally and their own processes of designating their local threat. This is especially important to police leaders who have to decide how to formulate an anti-terrorism strategy and allocate resources to meet their designated local threat. Problems with resource allocation are exacerbated by the fact many police agencies have not received the manpower or technology needed to execute their anti-terrorism tasks. These new tasks are simply another drain on already stretched resources.

Given these issues, it is not difficult to envision how an agency can be distracted from homeland security tasks. Consider a jurisdiction with an active anti-government extremist group that is considered a threat by the local police chief. If the department is reactive to a national event and allocates its resources toward the surveillance and protection of abortion clinics, the anti-terrorism strategy will have little chance for success. Success will be similarly elusive if the goals and identity of the local group are treated as “universal,” in other words, if the unique goals of the local threat are not accounted for in the local anti-terrorism plan.

The misunderstanding of how group identity and tactics should drive an effective program extends to response operations. It is in this critical area of emergency management/disaster control that a serious incident can claim additional lives and

community resources. As an illustration, it has become a tactic of certain types of terrorists to target first responders and curious bystanders as they gather around an incident sight. So-called “secondary devices” are designed to explode at a set time after the primary device detonates, the intention being to kill or injure police, fire, and rescue personnel responding to a scene. This tactic both removes the capability of first responders to tend to survivors and control the physical scene, and delays further response efforts until the area can be swept for additional devices.

The consideration of these secondary devices reinforces the criticality of knowing the local threat. A leftist group is not likely to attempt this level of carnage, as their operations have always been a means to gain notoriety and sympathy from a given population, and to transmit their message. Tactics like the employment of secondary devices only serve to enrage the public, removing any chance for sympathy and the furthering of “the message.” Conversely, Islamist groups would be very likely to employ such tactics. Their operations, such as al-Qaeda’s World Trade Center attacks in 1993 and 2001, have been geared toward mass destruction and mass casualties. They would happily target first responders and bystanders, as their goals have been to provoke massive or disproportionate retaliation and to embarrass the target government.

The overall implications of this study are the identification of the terrorist threat in the United States at the local level and the identification of features that predict what experts view as their local terrorist threat. This information should aid local police chiefs in developing more effective local anti-terrorism strategies and provide them with additional points to consider when evaluating or revising their existing plans or authoring

initial plans. It will ultimately allow us to know what we are afraid of, and answer the more elusive question, “why?”

Terrorism Defined for This Study

No study of terrorism is complete without an explanation of what exactly will be studied. A universally accepted definition of terrorism has been elusive and will likely never be truly accepted. The lack of consensus on what terrorism is has severely hampered its study, since the few empirical studies that exist cannot be formed into policy because they simply do not accurately portray terrorism as it exists today.

Academics and policy makers have overwrought the issue of definition to near exhaustion. The point of all arguments is that the lack of an agreed-upon, working definition of the phenomena has limited both understanding and counter-measures. The failure of the United Nations, which **MUST** be involved in the discouragement and defeat of terrorist violence, is due to its “inability to reach a consensus over a working definition of terrorism” (Lodge 1988:49).

Beyond defining the event, the international community has also failed to agree on identifying who the terrorists are. Specific incidents are addressed as they appear on the world scope, but the problem is ignored as a comprehensive issue. States supporting terrorism, who hold standing in the U.N. equal to states that do not support terrorism, refuse to ratify any resolution or convention that goes against their aims (Mickolus 1983:240).

Despite the political hand-wringing, a working definition can be formed. There are certain consistent concepts, most notably “violence, fear, and political change” (Barkan and Snowden 2001:65). Keeping these features in mind, the definition of terrorism for this study is as follows:

Use or threat of violence or chaos by individuals or groups against a government or civilian population for the purpose of promoting fear and intimidation to further the political, ideological, or social goals of the individual terrorist or terrorist group.

There are major distinctions in this definition from others that can be found in the literature. A reason for this is that “what is called terrorism...often depends on one’s point of view” (RAND 1995:2). This concept is based on the idea that individuals and nations will form definitions of *anything*, including terrorism, based on individual or collective agendas. It would be naïve to think otherwise; however, it is up to the academic community to rise above politics and assign a sound definition to terrorism so it can be appropriately studied.

An important feature of any working definition is that it displays some exclusivity. Stated differently, if terrorism is everything, then it has no distinguishing features. Removing government itself as a perpetrator of terrorist violence is an important facet of this definition. It is true that state violence against innocents has historically counted for more death and human misery than terrorism has or likely ever will, but this phenomenon is simply not terrorism.

Regarding the exclusion of state violence as terrorism, the current body of research is rife with arguments contrary to this study’s definition (most notably Crenshaw

1992). Regardless, developing an understanding of genocide as state policy, violent political oppression, and other forms of state violence is better served if studied as they are- as crime by government. To lump these events with “true” terrorism, as it should be studied, severely hampers the study of all violent phenomena.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

While very few empirical studies on terrorism exist, volumes of thought pieces have been published. Indeed, many concepts employed by this study were developed from debates that are still being conducted in the body of terrorism literature. To best conceptualize this study, and to effectively frame the discussion on theory in the next chapter, these debates are examined and positions taken and explained.

The problem statement and overview comments listed in the preceding chapter contain positions that stem from the seminal debates in the existing base of literature. The origins of these positions are provided through a review of what has already been written. In the interest of a fair presentation of the debates, the arguments from both sides are presented where appropriate.

Among these debates, the most contentious in the literature has to do with the characteristics and motivations of individual terrorists. This area is where the largest volume of pre-9-11 literature is based. Drawing mostly from the discipline of psychology, the debate centers on whether terrorists are rational and driven by ideology, or if they suffer from some level of mental deficiency that leads to their participation in violent acts. This has direct bearing on the proposed study since it is being framed with the assumption that terrorists are rational criminal actors. Also, the study's survey respondents were asked questions that attempted to measure their understanding of the actors in their jurisdictions. Thus, the answers must be compared against the standard set forth in the literature to measure practitioner knowledge.

After evaluating what has been said about specific actors, a background on terrorism typologies will be provided. This important step will add clarity to the typology developed for this study and will also provide the base of knowledge to be tested in the data analysis section. This area is especially important because, as mentioned earlier, there are features of the study's typology of terrorist groups and actors that are unique. This uniqueness must be explained in the context of what others have said in the literature. The explanation is important because all survey responses regarding specific *local actors* were aggregated into the study's typology for data analysis.

The discussion of terrorism typologies will extend from group characteristics to incident types. Among the incident types that will be discussed, the scope and potential of the relatively new phenomenon of cyber-terrorism will be explored in greatest detail. Greater detail is required in this area since cyber-terrorism, as compared to more traditional incident types like bombing and assassination, is the newest and least understood terrorist tactic. Without this starting point, analyses of survey responses will not be as useful or applicable to policy.

After the review of typologies is concluded, the legal characteristics of terrorist violence will be discussed, leading to the argument that terrorist violence is best countered by civilian law enforcement professionals. This section stems directly from the development of the definition of terrorism for this study as presented in the previous chapter. Entire books and countless articles have been published with the sole purpose of exploring the debate on defining terrorism. Due to the existing volume of literature on this important but exhaustively published area, further explanation of this study's

definition will not be provided. Instead, to complement the succinct and direct manner in which the definition was presented, the background issues that formed the definition will be discussed. Most critical among these issues is how the author arrived at the conclusion that terrorism should be considered a criminal event, and thus best addressed by the law enforcement leaders that served as the study's survey population. This study used police executives as the expert population for its survey population because it is this author's opinion that they are the professionals that will be meeting the threat- the *criminal* threat.

It should be clear from previous statements that this study will proceed with the perspective that terrorism is a crime, not a legitimate means of struggle or revolution. This position must be explained in some detail, as it is a central point of this project and is a break from much of past research. Past studies have often argued for the legitimacy of terrorism and equated it to guerilla warfare and conventional military conflict, both of which are recognized under most legal auspices as legitimate forms of violence. Previous research and legal standards will be presented that show the suppositions of these arguments for legitimacy to be false.

This identification of terrorism as crime also requires distinctions to be drawn between terrorism and mainstream criminal events. There are features of terrorism that make it unique from more traditional forms of violence, the most notable being its inherently political nature. But while these features do not make it less criminal, they remind us that there are unique features of terrorist violence that distinguish it from other crimes. These factors must be considered when developing responses to the threat.

Finally, the importance of the media and its relationship to terrorism will be discussed. Survey respondents will be asked questions that test their understanding of the importance the media plays in the pre-event, during event, and post-event time periods. The review of the literature in this area will establish how the media's importance has evolved and how different media models have worked in some European nations during the height of domestic terrorist activity. This will further establish the concepts that were measured by the survey instrument.

This chapter will present what has already been written and argued in specific areas of the general field of terrorism. The subsequent chapter on theory will develop hypotheses and establish the framework in which the study tested the assumptions gleaned from a review of the literature. Thus, it is imperative that the applicable areas of the existing literature be reviewed and the author's positions explained. In this way the transition to theoretical issues integral to the study will proceed with much more clarity.

Characteristics of Terrorist Actors and Groups

A critical portion of this study asked survey respondents questions regarding the presence of local actors, or local terrorists, in their respective jurisdictions. To better understand the importance of the presence of local actors and fear of them, the debate over characteristics of terrorists must be explored. Fortunately, in this area the literature is both multidisciplinary and plentiful. The debate over the characteristics of individual terrorists, and to a lesser extent of terrorist groups, has been well presented and well

documented. The debate continues to recent publications, but for the most part the argument on the rationality of terrorist actors can be concluded.

The study of terrorism draws on past and current research in political science, anthropology, sociology, philosophy, psychology, history, and economics (Crenshaw 1992:5). Increasingly, the field of criminal justice is providing guidance and insight, especially via the concepts of crime prevention and environmental design. This interdisciplinary base of literature is both a blessing and a curse, providing a wide range of knowledge that is at once imaginative, but also potentially confusing and at worst contradictory.

For example, the field of psychology attempts to explain terrorism through analyzing the mental capacities of the actors involved. Unfortunately, this approach has led to a very limited typology of acts and actors in which terrorists are categorized by the type of “disorder” they display. This is antithetical to the sociological approach, which explores the terrorist phenomenon through examining how groups are formed and considering the sociological catalysts that motivates a potential offender toward violent political activity. Clearly this approach is more valuable in the application of programs designed to discourage the sociological features that may result in political violence, and hence limit the formation of organized terrorist groups. Again, this approach works against the psychological perspective, which deals with the terrorist dilemma by trying to establish a model by which groups and individuals can be categorized, effectively dismissing the root causes of terrorist motivations outside of mental disorder.

The fields of history and economics also have much to contribute to the study of terrorism. However, their contributions would be much more valuable if their models

accounted for the new world environment in which modern terrorism operates. For example, as with any other phenomenon, history grants valuable insights on trends and background variables that contribute to certain acts and patterns of events. However, the historical perspective as applied to the study of terrorism does not take into account many of the variables that have given rise to the proliferation of terrorism in the later half of the twentieth century.

For example, among the most important features of our present society is the pervasive importance of the media, a “new” phenomenon in an historical context. This is one of the most valuable tools of the terrorist, since the present state of communication ensures an almost instantaneous dissemination of information, and “the existence of an international economy means that disruption in any one country will quickly be felt in others” (Dingley 1997:27). Both terrorism and the media flourished at approximately the same time in history. While this grants important insights into the study of both subjects, it also calls into question the value of historical data in the study of terrorism. Terrorist acts were simply designed differently, carried out differently, and motivated by different variables over various times in history.

There are also important considerations when reviewing the traits of terrorists relative to their sponsors at different times in history. These sponsorship distinctions can be found even between groups in the last decades of the 20th century, when the primary sponsors of terror transitioned from the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations to rogue Islamic states (Kushner 1998:86-86). It would be misleading to conduct a strict comparison of current terrorist acts and events that took place when the world situation and weapons capabilities were so much different. The study of terrorism in the context of

our global society has to be disaggregated from events of the past. They are simply not the same phenomena.

“Classifying” the Individual Terrorist: Psychological Perspective vs. Political Idealism

Understanding what motivates the individual terrorist is critical for formulating and employing an effective anti-terrorism program. The target population of this study, law enforcement leadership personnel, must know that they are dealing with rational criminal actors. To build an anti-terrorism program based on the faulty perception that potential terrorists in a given jurisdiction are mentally deficient is to dismiss a critical component in understanding the adversary. Acknowledging the rationality of terrorist actors is no small feat, since the concept does run contrary to much in the body of research.

The popular perception of the terrorist, which is unfortunately also the perception adopted by far too many citizens and policy makers, is that perpetrators of terrorist violence must suffer from some sort of mental or emotional disorder. In viewing the results of terrorist violence, the mass destruction and seemingly random deaths of innocent civilians, it is not hard to imagine how one could come to this conclusion. Yet in reality this perspective could not be further from the truth. Most terrorists are, in fact, distinguished by the fact that they display no overtly identifying psychological features; their only “abnormality” is that they participate in forms of violent activity. Yet it is foolish to assert that this one feature is tantamount to proof that acts of terrorism are the product of a deranged mind (Crenshaw 1992; Dingley 1997).

There are two predominant theories that explain the emergence of a terrorist. The most voluminous stance holds that terrorists are driven by mental disorder. This theory, called the mental disorder perspective or psychological perspective, is the theme of both the lion's share of academic research in the area and also of public opinion. However, this perspective has come under increased scrutiny as current events force academics and policy makers to break away from media portrayals and develop a more grounded understanding of the terrorist phenomenon.

This distinction is so important because it drives the responses to terrorism and influences the paradigm through which terrorism is studied, prevented, and investigated. Counter-measures, both to prevent an incident and to quickly respond to the aftermath of a successful incident, are organized within theoretical paradigms. The consequences of employing law enforcement programs and counter-measures against a group that is misidentified, i.e. as psychologically impaired as opposed to ideologically motivated or vice versa, could have disastrous consequences, since "each type plays a very different game" (Knutson 1980:199).

Psychological Perspective

The mental disorder perspective asserts that "political terrorists engage in gratuitous violence," and rules out socio-political causes in favor of psychological ones (Corrado 1982:295). This stance took a serious theoretical foothold with the publication of the Third Edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-III) in 1980. This manual was so important because it defined the concept

of mental disorder for the first time. There are four types of mental disorders listed in the DSM-III that are most frequently associated with terrorists: sociopathy or psychopathy, narcissism, Freudian “thanatos” (death wish), and organic or physiological disorders (Corrado 1982:295).

Sociopathy and psychopathy are used interchangeably, although sociopathy is the term employed by the DSM-III. Regardless of which term is used, this disorder is the one most often associated with terrorists. To illustrate its predictive validity Pearce (1977) cites evidence of “superego lacunae,” which consists of a “depressed” superego. This translates into a lack of consciousness for the terrorists. This disorder precludes the terrorist from appreciating the violence of his acts, thus allowing him to commit atrocities that would be unthinkable to “normal” people. This quality of the terrorist, Pearce asserts, is evidenced by the terrorist habit of claiming credit after an act is perpetrated, an obvious indication of the absence of remorse.

Pearce further maintains that the political terrorist is a “sociopath allied with an extreme cause” (Pearce 1977:174). However, as researchers both in and outside of the mental disorder perspective point out, this “alliance” with a cause is antithetical to the sociopathic personality. Membership in a terrorist organization, or allegiance to any “cause” for that matter, requires an idealistic motive of which the sociopath is simply not capable due to his diminished ego capacity. This character trait would preclude the actor’s being “reliably instrumental in attaining group goals” (Knutson 1980:198).

Cooper (1978) believed that membership in a terrorist organization is an ideal vehicle for the sociopath to act on his delusions. He saw political idealism as a

“camouflage” for the psychopathy, and maintained that for these individuals “terrorism provides a vehicle for impulses that would otherwise find another outlet” (Cooper 1978:254). But unlike Pearce, Cooper acknowledged the inconsistency between the sociopathic personality and the qualities necessary to be an active member in an ideological movement. Although he acknowledged this point, he did little to explain it, beyond submitting that individuals with this disorder make only mediocre terrorists.

The second mental disorder explanation of terrorism is narcissism. Facets of this disorder include “overidealization, preoccupation with omnipotent and unrealistic fantasies and the exhibitionist need for admiration” (Corrado 1982:298). Researchers using this perspective maintain that terrorists embrace violence and radicalism as a mode of self-dramatization, not as a means to gain practical results.

Critiques of the application of narcissism as an explanation for terrorism are grounded in cultural values. Western society is generally permissive, and it many ways emphasizes narcissistic values (Corrado 1982:299). In many forms it is in fact encouraged, as our society grants positive judgment to those with professional and personal accomplishment. The pervasiveness of narcissism in our society in many forms precludes its usefulness in explaining the terrorist phenomena.

However, in the area of developing anti-terrorism strategies and counter-measures, even negotiation strategies, understanding this psychological disorder can provide a solid conceptual foundation. Acknowledging the narcissistic qualities of a terrorist’s psyche would go far in affecting productive dialogue. Although entirely dismissing ideological motivation in favor of mental illness is a flawed position, any

angle that could be deployed as a tool by law enforcement to deal with terrorism generally should be considered.

The third disorder category is the “death wish,” an extension of Freud’s concept of “thanatos.” This concept has interesting implications in the study of terrorism, and may offer an explanation for suicidal operations. At its most basic level, this death instinct is a sub-conscious desire for the individual to return to a state devoid of impulse and awareness. It also raises a possible link to psychosis. To explain terrorist activities in the context of thanatos researchers cite terrorist activities like close-range assassination, in which the chance for escape is small and a rapid and violent end to the terrorist’s life is likely.

The death-wish disorder is a subject of great controversy among theorists. This is especially the case when academics assign the concept to perpetrators of hunger strikes. Counter-arguments to this position point to hunger strikes as cases of civil disobedience, not terrorism. Opponents also discount suicides that are consistent with the cultural norms of the perpetrators, such as Islamists who believe suicide in certain contexts guarantees entrance into paradise and Japanese political terrorists who are following the Bushido tradition that requires suicide as a response to certain situations (Corrado 1982:301).

Others point out the willingness to die as a feature of many inherently life-endangering occupations, such as the military, certain police duties, and even professional stuntmen. But in these cases the embracing of death is more a function of constantly confronting it, more than a desire to end one’s own life.

The fourth and final category of disorder, that of physiological impairment, holds very interesting concepts and, unlike the other categories, some empirical data. For example, McGuire (1977) reported findings of a study that examined 80 terrorists imprisoned in 11 countries. The study found that nearly 90% of these individuals had defective vestibular functions of the middle ear. It is hypothesized that this defect causes an inability to relate to others through conventional methods, and thus generates anti-social or sociopathic behavior to gain attention.

Unfortunately, as interesting as the psychological impairment theory seems, there has been little follow-up work conducted. McGuire's study was conducted in 1977, and there is little reference made to the theory later than the early 1980s.

In addition to the specific arguments against the individual disorders listed above, there are problems with the psychological perspective in general. The public at large, and far too many policy makers, view terrorism as indiscriminate violence perpetrated by personnel incapable of appreciating the consequences of their actions beyond self-gratification. This could not be further from the truth. The act of bombing, by far the most prolific of all events, is undertaken with painstaking planning to avoid detection and in some cases direct blame. Supporters of the psychological perspective often point to the practice of claiming responsibility as an illustration of certain mental disorders, but this practice is no longer the norm. In fact, many events generate claims for credit by organizations that had nothing to do with the act, while the true perpetrators escape unscathed until such time as they deem appropriate to send their political message.

Beyond the avoidance of direct blame, other trends point toward the calculating as opposed to psychotic qualities of terrorists. Again, when studying trends in bombing, it becomes apparent that the terrorists attempt to separate themselves from carnage. With the notable exception of Islamists, this separation is accomplished by carrying out attacks in areas of little traffic or by detonating devices during hours that are least likely to result in a large body count. This works strongly against the mental disorder perspective. Of course, this tactical practice is not always the case. The casual consumer of news would argue that terrorists target populated areas at peak hours to ensure the maximum number of casualties; but events like this are historically contrary to the norm.

Finally, proponents of the mental disorder perspective do not explain the many events that are perpetrated by “non-violent” terrorists. This term may seem to be an oxymoron, but many recorded events reflect a mere demonstration of what “could have” been done had the terrorist been prone to violence. A well-known example of this is the activities of the Fuerzas Armadas de la Liberacion Nacional (FALN) in the 1980s. Although the group did detonate several bombs in both Chicago and the Wall Street district of New York City, they were more prone to conduct non-violent operations. Once they established their expertise with explosives, the group seemed to disavow violent activity. Instead of repeated bombings, they began to plant devices that looked like bombs, in some cases even including materials that demonstrated their continued proficiency. But instead of detonating the devices, they called in bomb threats, used the media to claim responsibility, and allowed police to locate their inert “bombs” without taking lives or destroying property. This is clearly not the work of deranged or psychotic individuals, but rather of secure, calculating, and very capable minds.

Despite the many problems with and challenges to the mental disorder perspective, it must be submitted that terrorist groups do attract a high proportion of certain personality types. Namely, terrorism seems to attract “action oriented, aggressive and stimulus hungry people, particularly those with an ability to ‘split’ and ‘externalize’” (Dingley 1997:29). These individuals are prone to resolve individual problems with attacks on an “enemy,” whether real or perceived. Many studies reflect some interesting albeit inconclusive findings in support of this assertion. Among these data are a high incidence of childhood problems among West German terrorists, and a high proportion of Basque terrorists who were born to or grew up with a non-Basque parent (Dingley 1997:30). This evidence still does not support the theory of mental disorder, but it does suggest that some members of terrorist groups join the organization partly out of a need to “belong” due to some level of fragmented self-identity.

Political Idealism

An alternative to the psychological approach is based on the idea that “political violence is the result of reasoned, instrumental behavior” (Crenshaw 1992:7). It must be acknowledged that struggles for power may, and some would say are even likely to, result in violence. Terrorists are rarely motivated by personal gain, and also rarely exhibit psychological illness as the motivating factor for their actions (Dingley 1997:27).

The psychological distinction between terrorists and mainstream criminals does much to illustrate what should be considered the “normalcy” of terrorist psychological processes. In a study undertaken in Ireland, researchers found that 9% of non-political murderers had a family history of psychological disorder, while the same was true of only 2% of political murderers. More important to the argument at hand, they also found that 58% of non-political murderers could be identified as mentally ill, compared to only 8% of political murderers (Heskin 1980). The perception and classification of terrorists as mentally deficient has some obvious challenges.

The crux of the ideological perspective is the belief that individuals of normal psychological make-up can be driven to violence by a variety of factors. Participating in violence does not make one insane, or mentally or morally deficient. It may simply be that a rational human being can be driven to extreme forms of violence if given the right stimuli.

Also consider the demographics of the participants in political violence. They are usually drawn from all segments of society; a distribution that grows even more representative as the movement expands. The participants, even in early phases, are goal-directed and not pathological (Crenshaw 1992:8).

The propensity for certain segments of a population to participate in terrorist activity must be explored in more depth here. There is evidence that terrorists who operate under the flag of nationalism are people who “transfer their social and economic failure onto their current constitutional framework” (Dingley 1997:30). This failure can be defined in terms of career and social opportunity. The larger problem of which this situation is a small piece is borrowed from the field of history, and has been referred to as

“The Lower Middle Class as Historical Problem” and “The Problem of an Excess of Educated Men.” The problem stems from industrial society’s premium on education. The result is an over-educated population, which translates into underemployed or at worst unemployable people. The frustration of these individuals is obvious, and their propensity to try and change the political situation to their advantage is also logical. If one adds the variable of ethnic identity into the equation the desire to facilitate change is even stronger and potentially more dangerous.

A sub-sect of the political idealist typology is the rational-idealist perspective. The crux of this perspective is that terrorist events are the end result of situations in which the perpetrator is left little or no recourse outside of violence, acts which are essentially a reflection of “normal adjustments” (Corrado 1982:304). In these situations, which would include the cases of the Nicaraguan Sandinistas and Palestinian Liberation Organization, terrorism is an “understandable response to the desire for and frustration over attaining political ideals” (Ibid. p. 305).

Some theorists (Wilkinson 1979) attempt to explain the “creation” of terrorists through a kind of hybrid of the psychological perspective and rational idealism. They identify some terrorist organizations as genuinely idealistic, which have been led down the course of violence as a final recourse. Other groups, among them the Red Army Faction and Provisional Irish Republican Army, resemble “tiny gangs of bandits” and “weird cults of violence” more than political organizations.

Of course, the assumption that terrorists are motivated by rational ideals infers that they were exposed to situations that would generate such a passionate level of

idealism. Russell and Miller (1977) attempted to establish a profile of terrorists by studying eighteen groups from throughout the world. Among their conclusions was the finding that many of their subjects had backgrounds in the “medical, legal, and teaching professions” and were practicing in their respective fields before becoming active terrorists. It was only after being exposed to sub-cultures and environments that generated an extremist ideology that these individuals turned to violence.

To understand these catalysts, one need not look further than many features of today’s global society. It is difficult to not be stricken by the profound contrast between the third world and industrialized nations, the ongoing raping of the environment, and unchecked incidents of genocide. The theoretical position is that when these factors are combined with certain rhetoric, such as would be heard and seen as part of Marxist recruitment on a college campus or religious-political instruction in Islamic madrassas, it is not hard to understand how even an educated and productive individual can be drawn into violent political action. Mental disorder would not enter into the equation, nor should it, in the process of “making” a terrorist.

Financial Stimuli

In the fringe area between the psychological and rational-idealist perspectives exist those that participate in terrorism for the financial rewards involved. The most notorious of these terrorists is “Carlos the Jackal,” perhaps the most prolific terrorist of all time (Knutson 1980). Carlos may have spent the late stages of his career as a “rental-terrorist,” but his training was first-rate as a Marxist-terrorist in Moscow and the majority of his operational successes were as a violent leftist ideologue in Western Europe

(Kushner 1998:29-30). Many modern examples of this category of violence can be found in present day Latin America, where the failures of leftist terrorism led to the devolution of political terrorists to a kind of mercenary population. It is here that “narco-terrorism” has evolved into a lucrative industry.

While the phenomenon of narco-terrorism is too broad to be dealt with in depth here, a cursory explanation would be useful as an illustration of financial motivation. This relatively recent brand of terrorism evolved in the late 1980s and early 1990s when several events converged in Latin America. The strongest impetus was the capture of Abamail Guzman, the leader of Peru’s notorious terrorist group, the Sendero Luminoso (“Shining Path”), a Marxist revolutionary organization devoted to the overthrow of Peru’s pro-Western regime. After Guzman’s capture, which coincided with a severe crackdown by the Peruvian military and police forces, many Sendero members were either running for their lives or looking for work. They found both shelter and employment with the narcotics cartels of Columbia and Venezuela, and other smaller criminal organizations. Their missions have included assassination, kidnapping, and bombing as directed by their employers. Even though the bulk of their training and experience was grounded in political ideology, these “terrorists” have degenerated into criminals plying their trade for financial gain.

Is there a Profile?

As with all criminal types, law enforcement professionals could more effectively counter terrorism if they could employ a viable profile of the offenders. Unfortunately, due to the diverse identities, goals, and tactics of the groups operating in the world today, a universal profile has been elusive. The most worthwhile step in profile development would be the creation of a group typology with a profile for each group type. Unfortunately, as discussed in detail below, researchers are far from reaching consensus on a universal group typology. Until this issue is resolved, there are some areas of terrorism literature that provide a starting point.

Russel and Miller (1977) incorporated the features listed in the preceding sections with their own research and produced a classic profile of the terrorist. There have been more recent attempts at profile development, but Russel and Miller's is presented here as the standard. Among their profile features are the following:

- Average age of 22-25, with leaders from 40-50
- 80% male, with the majority of the 20% female members concentrated in support roles like intelligence gathering and courier work
- 80% single
- Familiarity with home ground. Thus terrorists come from both rural and urban areas
- 66% from middle or upper-middle class. Only the IRA were predominantly working or lower-middle class
- Majority were well educated. Level of education was highest in Latin America and lowest in Northern Ireland

- Most terrorists were recruited on university campuses. This was true with all but the IRA, Basque, and Palestinian organizations
- A political philosophy of anarchic, Marxist-Leninist, or nationalist*

(* This final profile feature of political philosophy has obviously changed with the times, though an argument could be made that the current rash of Islamists employs a hybrid of anarchic and nationalist philosophies.)

Most researchers have supported this profile, and some have added to it. A notable addition has been the finding that terrorists who are college graduates mostly represent the humanities and social sciences (Dingley 1997:31). The humanities background is particularly important in explaining membership in terrorist organizations. The course of study for these individuals is centered on culture and language, which is also the core of nationalist ideology. If this ideological background is combined with the strain of being “betrayed” by the societal system that both encourages education and denies adequate standards of employment, the potential for frustration and resorting to violence is not difficult to link.

This finding is consistent with the political idealist perspective outlined above, which discusses the frustration felt by members of an industrial society who are told to pursue education only to be under-employed and under-represented in politics. The combination of this frustration and the learned ability to articulate legitimacy for political action helps explain this population’s propensity for membership in terrorist groups.

Trends of Group Study

Researchers have struggled with identifying the unit of analysis in the study of terrorism. In our age of globalization it has become increasingly difficult to study terrorism and other forms of political violence in a strictly localized context. Events and organizations often become transnational without the intent or even the knowledge of the perpetrators. And, most alarmingly, sophisticated networks have emerged that allow groups with different goals but common enemies to share equipment, tactics, and training. These activities are very difficult for law enforcement agencies to detect and even harder to infiltrate. So the question remains- at *what level* is terrorism best studied? Clearly the argument of psychology versus idealism focuses on the individual terrorist actor, but terrorist *groups* should also be studied to help explain the phenomena.

Terrorism as an event and an academic field of specialty gained a strong international identity in the 1970s. En vogue events of the time included airline bombings and hijacking, and kidnapping of foreigners. This international scope was widened in the 1980s with the prominence of “state-sponsored” terrorism, usually defined as proxy or surrogate warfare” (Crenshaw 1992:4). Stated differently, sovereign nations began to provide training and funds to organizations with agendas that would work against the sponsoring state’s adversaries. It proved to be a powerful and cost effective tool of warfare.

Yet this international focus of the study of terrorism has resulted in many far-reaching problems. For one, the only data available for study are international incidents¹. This restriction on the data omits an endless amount of valuable information that could be gleaned if local and domestic data were included. For example, in the United States incidents of terrorism may not be counted or even defined as terrorist depending on which definition one uses. Militant environmental organizations and animal rights activists, both relatively new groups, are not counted as terrorists under the FBI's definition. Also not counted are anti-abortionists, who are responsible for a wide variety and number of what would be considered terrorist acts in an international context.

This trend is particularly striking considering the results of two empirical studies undertaken in the mid-1990s. The first was accomplished in 1993 by Joseph Carlson. He surveyed police chiefs in all 140 U.S. cities with populations above 100,000, requesting they choose from a list of ten potential terrorist groups and rank the four most likely to commit a terrorist act in the next 2 years. Eighty-six of the 140 chiefs responded. Anti-abortionists received 43 votes (50 percent of all responses), identifying them as the number one threat. The group with the second most votes as the greatest threat was White Supremacists. Middle East Groups and Black Militants were third and fourth, respectively. This means, according to this survey, that three of the top four organizations perceived by chiefs of police to present the greatest terrorist threat for "the next two years" were not international and not classified by the FBI as terrorist organizations. Only Middle East Groups satisfied the conspiratorial element required by the FBI (Carlson 1993:83).

¹ There are presently two main data files of terrorist incidents available to researchers: Edward Mickolus' incident based database and a chronology by The RAND Corporation. Both list only incidents of international terrorism.

RAND published similar findings two years later. Through a national survey and ten case studies completed over 24 months, they analyzed the main issues confronting state and local agencies in employing anti-terrorism measures. In addition to finding that a “sizable majority” of state and municipal agencies considered terrorism a major problem, a much wider definition of terrorism was used than employed by the FBI. Specifically, “states and municipalities are equally adamant in identifying right-wing (Neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, anti-federalist) and issue-specific (anti-abortion, animal rights, environmentalist) organizations as the most threatening actual and potential terrorist sources” (RAND 1995:41). Again, the vast majority of the groups seen as the most dangerous threats were not considered terrorist organizations under the FBI definition.

Typologies

A primary goal of the present study is to uncover what law enforcement professionals view as their local terrorist threat and what variables predict fear of certain groups. It is in this paradigm of practitioner perspectives and projections that a workable typology becomes critical. There are many existing typologies of terrorism, all built for specific research questions or agendas, just as the typology built for this study will be constructed to best address practitioner concerns.

The key concept behind a workable typology is the context in which it must be employed. For example, studies of terrorism aiming to explain cultural factors leading to

terrorist violence should develop or employ a typology along cultural-geographic lines. Depending on the specific research question, the typology may employ national boundaries, geographic features, or religious identity concentrations to distinguish among groups in a way that leads to reliable and valid research findings. Unfortunately, the macro-level views of such findings are worth little to the agencies that are responsible for the detection and defeat of terrorist groups operating within their jurisdictions. In this context, a typology must be developed that would be useful to the practitioner.

Considering the needs of law enforcement agencies, a workable typology must distinguish groups in a way that allows for specific deterrence and infiltration strategies. In other words, the typology must be based on group tactics. In this model, terrorist groups can be disaggregated into eight distinct categories; Left Wing, Right Wing, Islamists, Eco-terrorists, Anti-Abortionists, Ethnic Supremacist, Foreign Nationalists, and Amateur Terrorists.

The identification of anti-abortionists as a distinct group may seem too specific for a typology, but previous research (most notably Carlson 1993 and RAND 1995) has shown this group to be the most feared among all types by United States law enforcement agencies. This translates to the identification of anti-abortionists as the group most likely to perpetrate an act of terrorist violence in the United States. Of course, as events occur fear of other groups may change based on who perpetrates terrorist acts. For example, the 1996 McVeigh bombing in Oklahoma City may affect the ranking of Right Wing groups, just as the 9/11/2001 attacks may change the ranking of Islamists. Regardless, the previous ranking of Anti-Abortionists so consistently high demands their status as a unique category. Specific research hypotheses thoroughly tested these statements.

Early Typologies

The typology for the study was drawn from the seminal works in the literature that have been tested and debated, and in most cases improved. To understand how the proposed typology was determined, an overview of the most important contributions to typology development is provided below.

Dr. Frederick Hacker set forth one of the first typologies for use in classifying terrorists in 1976. His typology was based on two dimensions; selfish/unselfish and self-protective/non-protective. This model leads to three distinct categories of terrorist: the *crusader*, who is non-protective and unselfish; the *criminal*, who is self-protective and selfish; and the *crazy*, who is non-protective and selfish.

However, by constructing a simple 2x2 table of Hacker's dimensions, there is a clear need for a fourth category. When considering that, in all science, classification categories should be both exhaustive and mutually exclusive, this need for a fourth category looms even more important. To fill this need several academics have submitted a category that is self-protective and unselfish (Lazarsfield et al., Kissane 1989), called the *calculator*.

This *calculator* classification can take many forms. Kissane lists almost a dozen, among them government and private sector nationalists, revolutionaries, racists, anarchists, and arms dealers (Kissane 1989:40-41). Regardless of the many possible forms, the calculator is the catalyst of terrorist activity. Although Hacker did not specify this fourth category, he alluded to it on many occasions by submitting that the crusader is obedient to someone. The presence of a prototypical calculator would explain this obedience.

Hubbard (1978), a psychiatrist, also identified three distinct categories of terrorists. The first of his typology is the *soloist*. As the name suggests, these individuals act alone and are generally incapable of partaking in the group behavior required of terrorist organizations. Soloists are embarrassed by social and sexual inadequacies and fear that they will disappear from society as a result of their failures (Hubbard 1978:184). The second type, the *conspirator*, is exhibitionistic in the same ways as the soloist, but is more likely to be able to function in a group environment. His primary motivation for terrorist activity is his fear of an unresolved grief, such as from a lost loved one or even an ideal like ethnic nationalism. His actions as a terrorist serve as a means to force society to atone for his loss. Third is the *groupist*, who willingly surrenders his individual identity for the good of the group. He is committed to a lofty and long-term goal, such as nationhood, and will sacrifice endlessly to the attainment of this goal. This final category is the most likely to be involved with political terrorism.

Incident-Based Typologies

The eight groups listed in this study's typology are disaggregated based on their goals. This feature can be further explained as group tactics, since tactics allow groups to meet their goals. The identification of specific tactics comes from statements issued by the group and actual attempts at terrorist violence, but the most reliable way to disaggregate groups by goals and tactics is to use data from actual past events. It is in

this area that past work with incident-based typologies are most useful to the current study.

Terrorist incidents can be generally disaggregated into categories according to several variables. An example would be type of incident, i.e. bombing, assassination, hijacking, etc. Another incident typology would be the perpetrating group affiliation, for example Islamic fundamentalist, ethnic nationalist, Marxist, etc. Or, incidents can be categorized into motivation, which would include intimidation of a population or elicitation of violent response (if the terrorist was trying to goad their enemy into retaliation in order to gain sympathy for their cause).

The point to be taken is that incidents can be categorized in countless ways depending upon the research question at hand. This categorization varies widely across the literature, and is dependent upon the perspective used (i.e. historical, psychological, etc.) and the question addressed by the researcher. Some incident typologies are restricted and too narrow for use outside of the work they are designed to complement, while others are too general to be of much use to anyone. The one used below, which disaggregates incidents into either *fait accompli* or *negotiated* acts, is one such useful example. It may grant the most valuable insights for a wide variety of motivations for the general study of terrorism.

Fait accompli or negotiated

All terrorist incidents, regardless of motivation, can be placed in one of two categories. The first, the *fait accompli*, involves “hit-and-run” type incidents in which the chance for escape is good. The vast majority of terrorist activities fall into this category. The second category, that of an ongoing or negotiated act, is more rare and difficult to enact but often results in a much more significant outcome for the terrorist.

The time bound dimension of *fait accompli* incidents grants the terrorist numerous advantages. For one, the opportunity to escape is greatly enhanced. Among this category of incidents are bombings (with the obvious exclusion of suicide attacks). Present technology allows for the perpetrator to detonate a device either remotely, which has the additional advantage of ensuring the desired level of casualties, or via timer, which all but guarantees escape. Consider the ease of escape for terrorists placing a bomb on an aircraft. A device can be set to go off at certain altitudes or after a certain amount of time has passed. By the time the device explodes the actors can be as far away as they like, virtually ensuring their escape (at least until they are tied to the incident, although even then they may avoid punishment by hiding in nations, in the past generally Libya or Afghanistan, that will deny investigators access to suspected perpetrators).

An added feature of the *fait accompli* incident is a high level of operational control by the terrorist. If the situation changes in mid-mission, many of these incidents can be amended or aborted by the terrorist. Perhaps the greatest advantage, other than ease of escape, deals with claiming of responsibility. If the event must be aborted, or if the results cause more outcry and anger than sympathy for their cause, the terrorist may simply disavow any connection to the incident (Knutson 1980:200). The net result is

either achievement of the political goal set forth in the planning stage, or a denial of responsibility to preserve the political agenda of the group.

The second category of incident, that of a protracted, negotiated event, is far more risky for the terrorist. It is also a more attractive undertaking, as its relative value is so high. These acts, which include hostage situations and hijackings, all but guarantee massive publicity for the perpetrating group. And, unlike *fait accompli* incidents, this publicity is not fleeting. As an example consider the 1979 seizure of the American embassy in Iran. Until September 11th, 2001, this event was the defining moment of the friction between the West and the Middle East. It also set in motion the retooling of American forces to deal with the threat of terrorism.

Clearly, the risks associated with protracted events are far more severe than *fait accompli*. Yet this feature is integral to the importance of the protracted event. Terrorist attacks like bombings and other brief but violent events have unfortunately become entirely too common in the last four decades (Lacquer 1999). As such, they no longer garner the press and attention they once did. Protracted events all but guarantee massive press, political response, and public outcry or sentiment. Terrorists trying to gain credibility on the world stage can no longer rely on the traditional means of attack, however tactically effective they remain. To ensure attention groups almost have to take part in events that are unique enough to guarantee an impact with both the media and the target government or population.

While publicity is and will likely always be the major goal sought by terrorists, there are other goals that are more likely to be fulfilled by a protracted, negotiated event. One of these is political legitimacy. Many acts, including bombings, have become

common and vilified to the extent that the actors are seen as bloodthirsty and irrational among the audience they are trying to influence. It is also where the “criminal” label is hardest to shake. This criminal label is the most damaging assessment given to the terrorist. It removes the likelihood that the public will see the perpetrators of violence as politically valid, and the target of violence worthy of its fate.

The value of negotiated incidents is also illustrated by the reluctance of governments to negotiate with perpetrators of negotiated incidents. By simply entering into negotiations, the terrorist is “endowed with adversary status and with the mantle of political actor” (Knutson 1980:201). This in itself is a significant victory for the terrorist, and a loss of sorts for the target government or organization. Negotiation indicates recognition of the group and their cause, however downplayed this recognition may be. The protracted incident all but guarantees at least esoteric recognition, and most governments believe they are put in a no win situation once negotiation begins. If they refuse to negotiate they are seen as unwilling to preserve the lives of those held by terrorists and thus make themselves a valid target in the eyes of many outside the situation. However, if they negotiate, they legitimize the terrorist group working against them.

This said, it must be submitted that governments have begun to correctly realize that negotiating with terrorists should not be discounted in all circumstances. Too many governments in too many situations have allowed events to spin out of control as a result of their wholesale refusal to negotiate. The tradeoff is to grant a means to air grievances in exchange for psychological gain (Knutson 1980). By doing so the target government is simply acknowledging the political nature of the event. The government does in fact

allow the terrorist to assume certain legitimacy, but at the same time it gains a psychological edge with both the public and terrorist group. By avoiding or at least delaying a violent response governments can appear unworthy of their target status. It is when the response is excessively violent and tyrannical that governments truly grant the terrorist legitimacy, not simply through the tactic of negotiating.

In fact, it can be argued that negotiation with terrorists can be helpful to the cause of the government. Open communication may serve to keep the terrorist on a level of reality that may be lost if he or she is denied communication. Addressing demands and explaining the rationale behind why some are impossible to meet may keep terrorists in a logical framework instead of allowing them to exist in an unrealistic vacuum.

Additionally, the allowance of a modicum of legitimacy granted through negotiation may be effective in ensuring a peaceful outcome to a single terrorist event or sustained terror campaign. Even a small measure of publicity for the addressing of grievances may be enough to steer the perpetrating group into a peaceful outcome. By denying all means of legitimacy, however slight, a government may force events toward an outcome of defiant violence.

The potential effectiveness of this approach can be seen in a review of the Italian government's handling of their terrorism crisis in the 1980s. In response to the ineffectiveness of hard-line, zero-negotiation policies, the Italian government shifted to a *Reintegrative Punishment Strategy* (Das 1990). This relatively new approach to anti-terrorism policy incorporated reintegration of terrorists to mainstream society through negotiation, a long-regarded taboo of anti-terrorism policy. Leniency was granted in

exchange for the terrorist's denouncement of terrorism and their demonstrated willingness to re-enter society.

The new Italian policy, formed through years of legislation, resulted in the Reale Law, the Law Moro, and the Repentance Law of 1979 (Das 1990). The final element of the program was Law 34, written in February 1987. It applied to former terrorists who had "definitively abandoned the organisation, the terrorist or subversive movement to which they belonged and who in conjunction with this have also admitted to the activities which they partook; objectively and unequivocally engaged in behavior that is incompatible with the maintenance of the association; repudiated violence as a method of political struggle" (Evans 1989:343). The law led to the release of 269 terrorists by the end of May 1987. Through this policy, which was tantamount to a protracted negotiation, the Italian situation was brought under control.

Another strength of the development of negotiation as part of a national anti-terrorism strategy is that it addresses the terrorist view that a government's legal processes have no real value and are aimed solely at the pacification of dissenters. Many terrorists view this false empowerment, whether real or perceived, as justification for violence. The Italians' Reintegrative Punishment Strategy "recognized the importance of this break with society as an ideal motivation for terrorism" (Ginges 1997:178). The strain of perceived lack of ability to dissent is reduced by allowing the terrorist a legitimate avenue to air their specific grievance while allowing a route back into mainstream society.

Cyber-Terrorism

Returning to the concept of typology development based on incident, a new and evolving incident type is entering the literature as an expanding threat. Several incident types were listed in the typology section above, and like most past incident typologies in the literature, included mainstream events like bombings, assassinations, and hijackings. Absent from these typologies is the relatively modern act of “cyber-terrorism.” The newness of this tactic explains its absence from classic typologies, but there are several reasons it must be considered in contemporary studies.

Traditional debate over the use of computers and the internet as tools of crime has focused mainly on financial features. This is not unreasonable, considering the amounts of money at stake. One case fairly representative of the problem was perpetrated in 1994, when a Russian “cracker” accessed Citicorp Bank’s computers. He managed to transfer over \$40 million, and personally withdrew \$400,000 before he was apprehended. Clearly, the potential for financial chaos is real. But it is beyond the financial realm that the true, potentially terrorist threat of cyber-crime can be found.

For example, a single skilled “hacker” or “cracker” can wreak havoc on public transportation or other systems affecting the general population. One such event took place in March 1997, when a juvenile disabled Federal Aviation Administration towers first at the Worcester Airport and later the Rutland Airport, both in Massachusetts. He was subsequently forced to surrender his computer equipment and sentenced to 250 hours of community service (Department of Justice 1998:1). While this case was perpetrated by a juvenile for strictly recreational purposes, the potential for disaster is obvious when one considers what could have been done if the offender was a motivated terrorist

looking to inflict mass casualties on a target population. Aircraft could have been diverted into dangerous patterns, forced to land in unsafe locations or conditions, or simply misled into an activity that would ensure destruction.

Beyond these threats to financial and transportation control systems, the use of cyberspace as a weapon could have drastic effects on a population's information system. One such case occurred in December 1997 when hackers attacked the Yahoo.com web site and infected all computers accessing the site with a "logic bomb/worm" that was scheduled to "explode" on Christmas Day, effectively destroying "thousands of computer systems all over the world." The offenders offered to distribute the antidote to the virus upon release of a fellow hacker from prison (European Commission Legal Advisory Board b 1998:1). Fortunately, Yahoo programmers detected the infection early enough to employ immediate countermeasures, ensuring the integrity of their website and the systems of all who visited their search engine.

Keeping in mind that almost all facets of government and public service, from police and fire to water treatment to power management, are reliant on computers to function day-to-day, a system infection or shut-down would be catastrophic. Beyond the immediate threats to capabilities, the financial damages associated with these acts are potentially staggering. For example, in February 1998 a programmer for a company contracted to support NASA and the U.S. Navy detonated a computer "bomb" that deleted all of the company's software. He had been fired three weeks earlier. Damages to his "customers'" systems were expected to exceed \$10 million (European Commission Legal Advisory Board a 1998:1).

The evolution of the computer and the internet as means to conduct attacks can be viewed as inevitable, a logical next step in applying emerging technology to criminal enterprise. Some researchers have synopsized this phenomenon nicely with the idea that perpetrators simply aspire “to commit an old crime in a high tech way” (Goodman 1997:469). Regarding evolution, one needs only consider traditional crimes such as counterfeiting and embezzlement that have gone high-tech with new iterations like fraudulent use of ATM cards and theft of cellular phone billing codes (Carter 1995:23). With terrorism, the same conceptual evolution takes place. For example, why go through the painstaking and dangerous business of placing bombs on a dam when taking control of the dam’s computer system can result in catastrophic failure and destruction?

While the threats of these acts are unnerving, the general lack of preparedness to meet this area of the terrorist threat is a greater cause for concern. The current study will attempt to identify what factors will predict the fear of all types of attack, including cyber-terrorism, and also attempt to uncover how prepared law enforcement agencies are to meet all areas of the terrorist threat.

Those in the academic community who are taking an interest in terrorism may dismiss the cyber-terrorism threat altogether. It is fairly underrepresented in the existing literature, but this may be more due to its relatively recent emergence as a viable tactic. We as an academic community dismiss this tactic at our own peril, for there are many indications that cyber-terrorism will be much more prevalent in the future. There are in fact several unique but equally important features that point toward a further proliferation of cyber-terrorism in years to come. The concept of “Moore’s Law,” which tells us that computer processing power doubles every 18 months, makes this tactic’s potential power

almost boundless. Couple this emerging power with the dramatic price reduction of computer equipment available to the general public, and the potential for an exponential increase in the use of computers for all illegal purposes is apparent. And it must be remembered that this equipment has become both more available and more powerful with little to no regulation of its use.

Just how prevalent computers have become is a matter of little debate. In the United States alone, over 4.7 million personal computers were sold annually as long ago as 1988. This figure was up from 386,500 in 1980. Since the year 2000, personal computer ownership has risen to be estimated in the tens of millions in the United States alone. Consider these figures in the context of networking, as 60 percent of personal computers were networked as long as ten years ago (Noble 1993:7), and the threat of cyber-terrorism and in fact all computer crime becomes even more alarming.

The rate that the threat of computer crime has expanded is difficult to fathom. Thus far, surveys have been the popular method for analyzing trends. A 1987 study found that “of the 300 corporations and government agencies questioned, 72 (24 percent) claimed to have been the victim of a computer crime in the 12 months prior to the survey...combined estimated losses from these crimes ranged from \$145 million to \$730 million over the one year period” (Carter and Katz 1996:2). A study just nine years later found that over 98% of the respondent population had been victimized by computer crime, and 43.3% were victimized more than 25 times (Carter and Katz 1996:3). Whether due to increased prevalence, increased technological power, or a lack of counter-measures, the expansion of the skills and raw numbers of this small offender

population has been extraordinary. It would be dangerous to dismiss the likelihood that these offender skill sets will not migrate to the terrorist population.

As stated above, the economic impact of non-terrorist computer crime has been staggering. In the late 1990s the British Banking Association estimated global loss to computer fraud as \$8 billion annually (Carter and Katz 1996:8). A 1995 study by Ernst & Young found that at least twenty companies responding to a survey had lost over \$1 million each as a result of computer related theft. To underscore the importance of computer security in the context of the global financial system, it has been estimated that “a prolonged failure of the computer system of a major bank in California would affect the economy of the state within 3 days, the United States within a week and the world within 28 days” (Electronic Frontier 1998:1). It is important to remember that the offenders in these incidents were after financial gain. How bad would the damage be if the goal were the destruction of an information system or the collapse of a financial institution?

All of these figures involve hacking or cracking; both jargon for somehow accessing the code of a company’s computer program files for criminal reasons. They do not account for the threat of infection by computer viruses, an act that could cost a victim millions of dollars in lost data and productivity. And it is no longer necessary to “write” a virus to suit deviant needs, as there are plenty readily available. For example, a bulletin board service (BBS) in France has a collection of diverse viruses that can be accessed via the internet and downloaded by any user (Carter and Katz 1996:5). To infect a target computer, the virus can be introduced by floppy disk or, more easily and virtually untraceable, via the internet.

This discussion on the unique threat of cyber-terrorism is so important because it has emerged so quickly as a viable tactic. Unfortunately, the existing data shows that the practitioner community to be surveyed in this study does not have the expertise to deter, detect, or investigate these incidents. This is partially due to the many problems inherent to the policing of computer crimes. One of these issues is the absence of the highly technical training necessary to effectively locate and catch criminals using computers. Once a criminal is caught, there is also a need for highly specialized evidence gathering techniques. These highly specific crimes require specialized units to police computer crime activities, which of course requires funding that not all medium and small size departments enjoy. A potential remedy to this problem is the formation of regional task forces, but this has limitations as well. The world of high technology is one of rapid evolution and constant change. Assigning officers to computer crime or cyber-terrorism task forces on a “part time” basis, or as an additional duty, would be a feeble response.

While local, state, and regional agencies should not rely solely on the support of federal agencies, such organizations do exist. To deal with the emerging threat, the FBI has established the Computer Analysis and Response Team (CART). Located at FBI headquarters, CART “provides on-site field support to both Bureau field offices and local police departments” (Noblett 1993:9). As a result of the lack of faith in the law enforcement community to deter and detect computer crime, private organizations have also formed specialized computer crime units. An example is the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), which operates out of the Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute (CERT Coordination Center 1998:1). These and other government and private agencies aid in responses to computer crime, especially data recovery and

improvement of security measures. However, they do not offer the front line of defense that may be developed by a competent and concentrated evaluation of data.

Another challenging issue to police resource allocation is the relative public ambivalence toward computer crime generally. There is simply not a strong public clamoring for the control of computer related crime, and by extension cyber-terrorism. In areas where it is an issue, it is still far behind violent and more traditional property offenses in the public conscience. The relative disinterest results in lack of manpower, little support for requisite funding, and thus the absence of effective policy. Like all forms of computer crime, lack of support against cyber-terrorism is prevalent because people primarily want to be safe from bombings and physical violence. Unfortunately, it is probably safe to say that until a cyber-terrorist event occurs and results in mass destruction, this area will not be viewed with much criticality.

The most alarming trend in computer crime and the sub-sect of cyber terrorism is that the gap between offenders and police is widening. Without a doubt, "police have fallen behind in the computer age and must overcome a steep learning curve" (Carter and Katz 1996:1). This curve has grown so large that corporations do not bother reporting computer related crimes to police, with some estimates putting the reporting figure as low as 11% (Goodman 1997:488). As the knowledge gap has widened, the requirement for specialized data collection and analysis of computer crime has finally gotten some attention. Most important, "the need to predict the nature and direction of high-technology crime has been widely recognized" (Coutorie 1995:16). Coutorie goes on to conclude:

"...high technology crimes are going to be more sophisticated in the future, and law enforcement agencies appear to be ill-prepared to meet this challenge...if

nothing is done until it becomes politically important enough to target, law enforcement will be hopelessly behind the learning and technology curves to address the problem” (Coutorie 1995:27).

To forecast potential targets for cyber-terrorists, one should begin with the funds available in global banking. The richest target by far, which has just recently been exploited by criminal elements, is the world of wire transfer. Futurists agree that international wire transfer and its local versions will eventually lead to the demise of paper currency altogether. Indeed, presently “over \$2 trillion in international wire transfers happen every day” (Goodman 1997:472). An extrapolation of the wire transfer problem is on-line filing of income tax returns, a system that is growing in popularity every year and that has already been penetrated by computer criminals to the tune of \$1 million in a single incident in 1992 (Coutorie 1995:15). The availability of funds and desirability of targets makes this arena a likely target for cyber-terrorists, a targeting opportunity that will be addressed in the study’s survey instrument.

This brief background on event types and the typologies that can extend from them is important for several reasons. Most important to the current study, it helps explain the incidents in which the different groups are likely to participate. Each group type has goals, both stated and implied. These goals are achieved through action, whether the action results in a successful attack or only a viable attempt at violence. Researchers can use each action as an identifying characteristic of each group. How a group attains its goals is just as useful in developing a useful typology as identifying the specific group goals. To law enforcement personnel, it dictates resource allocation, target hardening designations, and emergency response plans.

The value of incident distinctions in typology development is well illustrated by comparing right wing and left wing groups. Generally, both groups are dissatisfied with the current government structure, and want to bring about change. So why not just use a typology category of “anti-government” and leave it at that level? The answer of course is that the two groups have and are willing to participate in very different tactics, in other words different incidents. Both right wing and left wing groups will attack symbols of government and members of the establishment. But the left wing group’s goal of fomenting popular uprising and generating sympathy for their cause means they cannot allow mass casualties among civilians. Right wing groups have no such restriction. Consider the “collateral damage” of the Oklahoma City bombing, which included children in a day care center. These losses are acceptable to right wing groups that believe they are fighting for their existence from an increasingly oppressive government that is close to enslaving their friends and families. Clearly, though both are anti-government, left wing and right wing groups must be disaggregated in a group typology based on their tactics and the incidents they are willing to perpetrate. Similar arguments can be made between all eight groups in the typology, but the message is clear- any typology usable by practitioners must take incidents, goals, and tactics into account if it is to be viable.

The Criminality of Terrorism

The majority of terrorism literature acknowledges the phenomenon as a form of political struggle, legitimate or otherwise. Experiences and personal agenda obviously influence whether terrorism is argued as legitimate violence. Supporters of the legitimacy position often resort to the cliché that “one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter.” However, ideology aside, this is not an accurate portrayal of the phenomena (Kushner 1998; Sloan 1993). Those who would argue for the legitimacy of terrorism by casting an umbrella of legitimacy over all violence with political features ignore the distinctions between different forms of political violence. Their position awards equal status to terrorists as compared to individuals engaged in legitimate acts of violence, namely guerilla fighters and conventional soldiers, with whom terrorists are sometimes erroneously grouped. The distinctions among types of political struggle are well established in international law, and there is no shortage of examples in history.

Identifying terrorism as a criminal act is not to dismiss all forms of violent political struggle. The designation of terrorism as criminal is an acknowledgement of the tactics involved in terrorism as opposed to similar forms of political violence, like guerilla warfare and even inter-state war. The same tactics that make terrorist violence unique from these legitimate forms of struggle, as will be listed and discussed below, also make it criminal. The logical continuation of the argument for the criminality of terrorism is the identification of civilian law enforcement as the entity that will ultimately be responsible for operations to deter and defeat the threat.

Finally, although acts of terrorism should be considered criminal events, there are features of the phenomena that must be identified as unique from more mainstream

crime. As with any comparison between criminal forms, there are unique qualities of terrorism that distinguish it from simple criminal violence. These distinctions, based generally on motivation and targeting, are discussed below.

Terrorism vs. Guerilla Warfare

Perhaps the greatest distraction in the interdisciplinary base of literature on terrorism is its confusion with guerilla warfare. There are distinct characteristics of both that are well established.

“Guerilla” means “little war,” and can trace its origins to Napoleonic times when Spanish civilians harassed and ultimately defeated the invading and occupying French forces (Lacquer 1999). These Spaniards were not the Spanish Army, though the professional military establishment surely had a role among the guerilla fighters. The bulk of the fighters were in fact previously untrained civilians that took up arms against an established military force.

Guerilla fighters are defined as a “numerically larger group of armed individuals, who operate as a military unit, attack enemy forces, and seize and hold territory...while also exercising some form of sovereignty or control over a defined geographical area and its population” (Martin 2003:31). This is very different from the goals and practices of terrorists, who through “illegal force, subnational actors, unconventional methods, and political motives, attacks...soft civilian or passive military targets” and whose acts are “aimed at purposefully affecting an audience” (Martin 2003:34). Also, terrorists, unlike

guerillas, do not attempt to hold territory. Chief among their goals is to show that they can strike with impunity, thus displaying that the government cannot protect its society (Mickolus 1983:223).

Of course, there are at times significant overlaps between terrorism and guerilla warfare. Successful terrorist groups can evolve into guerilla formations, and unsuccessful guerilla groups can devolve into terrorist groups to “continue the struggle.” Both forms of violence typically enjoy support from outside sources. This support can lead to the label of either terrorism or guerilla warfare as “war by proxy,” employed by a nation-state that cannot match the conventional military strength of an ideological or political adversary. Of the two, terrorism is the most extreme form of war by proxy, best distinguished as a form of violence employed by an adversary when they cannot keep pace with the other or defeat them openly, even through a guerilla campaign. Using terrorism to disrupt an enemy society is relatively cheap, and “permits the [supporting] government to deny involvement in their terrorist action” (Mickolus 1983:235). This is in stark contrast to guerilla war, support for which is much easier to identify, trace, and possibly retaliate against.

The distinctions between terrorism and guerilla warfare are further blurred by researchers who insert personal agendas into their work by attempting to decriminalize terrorism and legitimize it as a means to “overthrow oppression” or any other romanticized notion of revolution. Revolution and guerilla warfare are legitimate and recognized forms of struggle. Terrorism is an illegitimate and criminal act. The legal distinctions are clear and easily found within established international law. These legal standards are discussed below in the framework of international rules of conflict, after a

brief introduction to the role played by conventional inter-state warfare in the development of international norms of violent conflict.

Inter-state Warfare

In any conflict, the ultimate form of which is war, the concept of terror is integral. Understanding this, it can be postulated that the purpose of an army is to “terrify enemies into either not starting a war or giving in” (Dingley 1997:26). This is the crux of the deterrence concept, and it relies on the threat of violence.

Warfare between states is as old as human history. Unfortunately, the use of terrorism as we recognize it today has been an integral part of warfare since the beginning of time. In early and intermediate history, civilians were often targets of military campaigns. Cities were placed under siege for months and sometimes years, during which up to 80% of the inhabitants would perish. Those who survived the siege would either die during the opposition’s entry to the city, or if they were “lucky,” be enslaved by the invaders. Biological warfare was used whenever available in the form of disease, delivered by launching infected livestock or human corpses from catapults over the walls of the enemy and into their civilian population.

The atrocities associated with this brand of warfare led to agreements among nations that became the standards by which warfare would be conducted and judged. Some of these standards have endured and are recognized as basic customs of warfare, and others became recognized international law. It is among these laws and standards of

conduct that terrorism is distinctive from warfare, even guerilla warfare and revolution, and it is in this context that terrorism can never be recognized as a legitimate form of political violence and thus must be acknowledged as a criminal act.

Legal Distinctions of Political Violence

To say that terrorism is not “legal” is not the same thing as to deny the right of citizens to employ political violence, including revolution and guerilla war. These opportunities are recognized and protected under international law. Terrorism, clearly, is not. One issue of international norms in warfare is that minimal harm be caused to third parties, even while targeting symbols and forces of the state. The legitimacy of political violence is grounded in the right to revolution, and has a historical precedent in international law, as well as the legal traditions of the United States, Greece, Rome, France, Germany, and medieval Europe (Goertzel 1988).

While what has been defined earlier as terrorist violence is illegal as a form of warfare, the right to “legitimate” political violence is formally recognized. Thus, there is a legal basis for political and revolutionary violence (Combs 2000; Goertzel 1988; Hagan 1997). The line between these legitimate forms of struggle and terrorism are established, but the interests and faulty interpretations of affected states have clouded the distinctions. This was especially the case during the Cold War, when the United States and the Soviet Union supported dozens of groups that employed very questionable tactics (Kushner 1998:13-19). Many of the groups supported by either superpower could have been

considered terrorists, but semantic arguments over the purported goals of the groups, with a blind eye to the illegality of their actions, ensured no real action was ever taken to counter the tactics.

For further examples, one needs to look no further than the ineffectiveness of the United Nations in handling terrorism. World government bodies like the U.N. become ensnared when debating struggles for self-determination, which are permitted under the U.N. charter of 1945. Regimes that argue and debate in the interest of self-preservation unnecessarily cloud the issue. Yet a simple review of U.N.-ratified laws provides clarity. The condemnation of terrorism indicts only those who target innocents. It is not and should not be permitted to de-legitimize those who try to free themselves or rebel against a corrupt regime (Combs 2000:37).

There is an important concept introduced in the preceding paragraph, that of the deliberate targeting of civilians. It is this deliberate use of violence against non-combatants that is the primary feature that identifies an action as de-legitimate and criminal. When bystanders are killed during state-sponsored counter-terror operations, the world political body often entertains arguments made against the country that perpetrated the attack. These arguments are not usually valid, as they miss the primary feature of the concept of legitimacy- targeting. A suicide bomber who deliberately detonates his device outside a youth nightclub is deliberately targeting civilians. A violent action against a combatant or terrorist leader that results in harm to bystanders does not target civilians, even if harm is a result. This concept is established by international norms, notwithstanding the rhetoric of political leaders.

Included in these international norms and agreements are concepts that war allows violence, but incidents of torture and targeting of civilians is forbidden. As stated above, terrorist tactics operate in direct contradiction of these norms since civilians *are* the targets. Many terrorist groups plan their attacks to generate mass casualties for a desired effect. But revolutions and guerilla warfare can and do conduct their forms of political violence without resorting to terrorism.

The process of distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate violence would be incomplete if it did not address how different violent forms are viewed under law. Although local terrorist actors can and should be dealt with locally, the effects of terrorism are felt on a global level. It could thus be said that terrorism's battleground is international, and it logically follows that the scope of legality be in the international arena. It is under this scope that the legitimacy of political violence and de-legitimacy of terrorism can be found. The standard of international law could be employed even to domestic terrorist groups. Nations no longer operate in domestic vacuums. If international standards of conduct are violated, individual nations face censure or hostility from other members of the world body (see Saddam Hussein's suppression of his Kurdish and minority Shi'ite "terrorists" as an example of breaking universal standards). When reviewing the rhetoric of many domestic terrorist groups in the United States, many argue that a "state of war" exists and they are fighting against what they see as an illegitimate government (Freilich 2003). Thus, the best counter-measures are those that operate within international norms. Intelligent employment of accepted counter-

measures allows for the suppression of groups while removing or further reducing their legitimacy.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ratified by the U.N. in 1948, allowed that certain rights supercede government activity. There were three basic elements: the integrity of persons, basic human needs, and civil/political liberties. Section 3 also allowed for the rights of citizens to change their government (Hagan 1997:4-7). As later reinforcement, the 1968 Proclamation of Tehran identified Universal Declaration of Human Rights as “a statement of binding moral duties accepted by the world community” (Goertzel 1988). Under these umbrella agreements, and other ratified statements from international conferences, the international legality of political violence was established.

There were of course limits imposed on this violence, which is another area in which terrorism sets itself apart. For example, the “respect for human rights” section of the U.N. Declaration includes verbiage specifying freedom from political or other extra-judicial killing. While on one hand this concept can be cited as justification for legitimate political violence, it is also an indictment of favorite terrorist tactics, specifically assassination. Terrorists attempt to rationalize away these limitations by pointing out that the rules do not apply to wartime combat deaths, since they believe a state of war exists (otherwise why would they be fighting?). They fail to recognize that this exception was developed for a declared state of war between states, not declarations by small groups with grievances. Terrorist groups that attempt this argument may also use the defense that they do not have to adhere to the rules of law since they are not a state, or that they do not have to abide by international law since they can reject law

outright since it does not reflect their culture or values system. These claims are delegitimizing in themselves, and only serve to strengthen the label of criminality.

As previously stated, terrorist groups attempt to shelter themselves from international legal scrutiny by claiming they are engaged in war, and thus afforded relaxed scrutiny of laws against violent acts. They are trying to gain the status of guerilla movements or military formations engaged in violence in the form of revolution. This argument is also flawed and only reinforces the argument supporting terrorism as a criminal event. Here again, terrorism is distinguished from other forms of violence in its adherence to agreed upon laws of armed conflict, also agreed upon by world governments.

These laws of armed conflict were the result of the four Geneva Conventions, which established rules on waging war in humane a manner as possible. Among these rules are that irregular fighters are only legitimate and thus protected if they are part of the conventional military of a nation that had not surrendered. Otherwise, laws of war require that combatants wear uniforms, wear insignia, and carry arms openly (Goertzel 1988). Terrorists meet none of these criteria, key characteristic that distinguish them from legitimate soldiers engaged in legitimate acts of war.

Of course, an unfortunate feature of the modern world is that wartime and peacetime have become much harder to quantify. Wars are no longer declared, and are fought more by proxy than directly between nations (Laqueur 1999:243). Warfare has increased in cost as technology has become a central feature of the battlefield. This, combined with the lack of a military balance of power, has made war by proxy the preferred method of confronting an enemy. It is within this confusion and ambiguity

that terrorism thrives, a form of political violence related to guerilla warfare and revolution, but very distinct from these forms and illegal under all possible angles of international law, including laws of armed conflict.

The base of literature, international law, and the recognized rules and customs of armed conflict support the supposition that terrorism is a criminal act. While there are different kinds of terrorism, the targeting of non-combatants is the unifying feature that makes all perpetrators terrorists, and thus criminals. As criminal actors, the segment of government best equipped to meet this criminal threat is the civilian law enforcement community. The voice of these practitioners must be heard, a goal being met by the identification of police executives as the target population of this study's survey instrument.

Terrorism vs. "Ordinary" Crime

The previous pages make the argument that terrorism is a criminal event that operates outside the bounds of international laws and customs. The next step in this argument is to determine where terrorism stands in relation to more mainstream and traditional crimes. If the civilian law enforcement practitioners charged with fighting crime are to meet this threat, the unique facets of terrorism, as well as its similarities, must be uncovered.

In the debate over the criminality of terrorism, the argument could be made that it should thus be studied as “just another” criminal event. This paradigm is not necessarily flawed, as long as the unique features of terrorism are acknowledged. Studies of all specific crimes begin with clear definitions of the crime to be studied. With this standard in mind, terrorism must be disaggregated as an event unique from other, more traditional crimes that are handled by the subject population of this study.

The first distinction that must be drawn is the difference between terrorism and interpersonal and simple criminal violence. Stated succinctly, a criminal act “does not go beyond the act itself or the acquisition of money and other valuables,” while a terrorist act is “in pursuit of some long range *political* goal and is designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions on a particular target audience” (RAND 1995:3).

The difference, which should by now be recognized as a theme in this literature review, is based on the concept of motivation. Terrorists have a stated and demonstrated motivation that is tied to politics, religion, and/or ideology. Terrorist violence is also fairly well planned and deliberate. These features are far beyond unplanned or hastily planned criminal violence with goals that include financial gain or the immediate release of rage.

Terrorism is also distinctive from criminal acts because it deliberately targets innocent third parties (Combs 2000:9), whereas more mainstream criminality targets individuals or locations that are the source of funds or the ultimate target of violence itself. This interesting feature also makes terrorist groups harder to infiltrate and track, since, unlike criminals, they do not have an ongoing relationship with their victims as is the case with many common criminals. The police chiefs to be surveyed in this study

will be asked questions to see both whether they recognize this challenge and what bearing it has on their anti-terrorism strategies.

While there are clear distinctions between simple crime and terrorism, this does not argue against the fact terrorism is itself a criminal event. The concept of criminality is instrumental in terrorism, which should be considered as a type of political crime. A feature common to all political criminals, including terrorists, is that they attempt to decriminalize their acts based on higher moral authority, a rationalization of deviance that can also be seen among other violent criminals.

It is interesting to note that, as this study argues for the worth of civilian law enforcement to confront terrorism, the political criminal's favorite tactic is the denial of the legitimacy of laws (Hagan 1997:177). This refusal to abide by rules of law is present among both the international and domestic terrorist groups that will be used in the study's typology. For example, Islamist terrorists dismiss laws of conflict as Western concepts to which they do not subscribe (Laqueur 1999). Despite clearly different goals and tactics, this same position is taken by some domestic terrorists in the United States, who see laws as means of social control that will lead to their ultimate demise and enslavement.

While not an endorsement of the claims that the rules of law should not apply to those who participate in terrorist violence, it is true that terrorist violence operates conceptually beyond traditional criminality. For example, homicide for financial gain should not be viewed in the same context as politically motivated homicide. But the fact they are different does not remove the criminality of either act. Likewise, the act of labeling politically motivated violence as criminal does not remove its political features.

There are no mutually exclusive qualities between violence and political motivation. They can in fact exist as complementary features of a single event.

Most terrorists aspire to be legitimate perpetrators of violence. Indeed, the “holy grail” of the terrorist is to be considered a legitimate combatant (Lacquer 1999; Combs 1997; Ginges 1997). As discussed in great detail above, the legitimate combatant categories most often sought by terrorists are *guerilla fighter* and *soldier*, neither of which is an appropriate moniker. The position that terrorism does not extend past the realm of criminal violence into guerilla warfare or conventional warfare is also the position that states terrorism is a problem for law enforcement agencies, not military forces. Also, acknowledging terrorist actors as local criminals rather than national or international threats keeps the counter-measures where they belong- at the local level.

Media Effects

No study of terrorism is complete without considering the importance of the media. Indeed, all forms of media play critical roles in the perpetuation of terrorism, as could be said with most forms of violence. The emergence of the media’s importance is highlighted by the identification of media self-regulation as part of many combined response plans (Barkan and Snowden 2001:83; Rowe 1988:42). The relationship between the media and terrorism is a critical one that must be understood by the practitioners who are charged with detecting and influencing terrorist actions.

Media and globalization are two interrelated phenomena that have tremendous bearing on how terrorism is perpetrated. The present state of communication ensures an almost instantaneous dissemination of information, and “the existence of an international economy means that disruption in any one country will quickly be felt in others” (Dingley 1997:27). This grants international effects to even local terrorist events.

The importance of the media to terrorism cannot be overstated. It could be said without hyperbole that terrorism is reliant on the media. Generally, terrorism is aimed at the viewing public and not the victims. The media, for its part, can and does affect public opinion, especially in matters of politics and hence political crime. As a small but appropriate example of these concepts, during the 1980s Syrian troops killed 20,000 civilians in the town of Hama. Since it was underreported, there was no international outcry. During the same time, civilian deaths in Israeli-controlled refugee camps (exponentially fewer than the Syrian cases) were widely reported, and there was uproar (Hagan 1997:153-155). Hence, it could be stated that manipulation of the media is a two-way street. Among any political entity, from elected government to terrorist group, the one who understands and best controls the media will win the public relations war, and thus in many cases popular support.

Much of existing literature goes so far as to identify the relationship between terrorism and the media as “symbiotic.” While other forms of violence instill fear in potential victims, the scope and perceived randomness of terrorism causes it to instill more fear in a more wide-ranging population than any other type of violence. The value of the media does vary according to the associated political system. For example,

democratic nations are likely to over-report terrorist events due to their sensationalist nature.

Since democratic nations are presently the primary target of terrorism, terrorist groups have learned to master their media systems. Many terrorist groups have become public relations experts, even employing ad agencies to further their views (Barkan and Snowden 2001:83).

There is also a likely relationship between the possibility of terrorist violence and the presence of a free press. The case of the Soviet excursion into Afghanistan illustrates this nicely. The USSR was the only country occupying a Muslim country in 1980s, but potential terrorists knew that the lack of free press in the USSR made attacks practically worthless (Hagan 1997:153-155). Modern terrorism did not arrive on Russian soil until Chechens perpetrated several acts in the 1990s and early 2000s, only *after* a free press was functioning in the now non-communist state. Of course, there are other reasons democratic regimes are much better targets besides their free press, among them the fact they cannot respond and violate their own morals and values without being viewed as hypocritical, whereas totalitarian regimes can violently suppress political violence without generating shock from fellow governments and world bodies.

The importance for police practitioners to understand the value of the media in countering terrorism can also be explained in the context of severity. There is likely a correlation between lethality and media practice. One theory posits that the allocation of publicity from a sensationalism-seeking media depends on the action. As violence becomes commonplace, groups have to be more violent to gain attention (Mickolus 1983). This concept of increased lethality for coverage is especially true in democratic

societies that are likely to over-report terrorist events due to the sensationalist nature of their media. Speaking on the role of the media in the wave of kidnapping and executions in 1970s and 1980s Italy, Jamieson claims the media tended to “prefer the melodramatic to the analytical approach, emphasizing emotion, violence, and speculation rather than a balanced explanation of facts” (Jamieson 1988).

This focus on successful manipulation of the media may seem disconcerting to champions of unfettered access by the media to government agencies, including police departments. It should be noted that total or permanent controls are not the goals, but rather a focused control in regard to terrorism while the phenomena is at its present height. This concept of reduced or at least controlled media coverage is neither unreasonable nor unattainable. A viable model for this goal is the National News Council, which was established in the U.S. in 1973 as a body to address press performance and responsibility. Unfortunately, it was defunct by the late 1980s ostensibly due to funding problems (Rowe 1988:42). This or a similar organization should be considered in the future if this study shows that local media controls are not being successfully employed to combat terrorism.

The literature holds other findings and theories on the relationship between terrorism, violence, and the media. Foremost among these is the theory of a “Contagion Effect,” in which it is believed that the more terrorism is exposed, the more events will happen because people are emboldened. Some may even attempt to “copy-cat” successes. Another potential outcome is the awarding of folk-hero status to terrorists (Barkan and Snowden 2001:84). On an individual level, potential terrorists may become aroused by watching media accounts and experience a rush while observing violent

actions that address sympathetic grievances (Oots and Wiegele 1985). These concepts make measurement of police competency in media issues a paramount concern.

The preceding discussion on the relationship between the media and terrorism and associated problems for law enforcement is not an argument for censorship or other extreme measures. Care must be exercised, especially in the case of western democracies, that government does not exert “control” of the media. A prime example of how this can be problematic occurred in United Kingdom in 1985 under the leadership of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Her government put pressure on the BBC to not show a documentary on the Irish Republican Army, then very active in Northern Ireland. BBC’s Board of Governors relented, and then came under tremendous scrutiny for being government “stooges.” Thatcher’s government was also lambasted as practicing censorship (Rowe 1988:40). As exemplified in the model of the now-defunct “National News Council “ cited above, the goals should be to understand the effects on violence and media self-regulation, not outright censorship.

Chapter 3: Theory

Introduction

Considering that there is no universal definition of terrorism, just as there are no standard typologies, it should come as no surprise that there are no universal theories of terrorism. In fact, there are no specific “theories of terrorism” at all. Fortunately, now that the status of terrorism as a criminal event has been presented, the application of criminological theory to the study of terrorism can be explored.

Terrorism can be explained in the context of many classic theories of criminality, as well as several modern “approaches” to crime. This new batch of theories and approaches includes Opportunity Theories, which contain the primary concepts that helped develop this study’s hypotheses and guided the research project generally.

The current study is an exploration of practitioner perspectives, with the ultimate goal of identifying terrorist threats in the United States as they exist locally and assessing the predictors of fear of specific terrorist group types. These foci are the primary reasons opportunity theories were chosen to develop the study at hand. Far too many criminological theories attribute the causes of crime to factors that practitioners cannot control, like child-rearing and social factors (Felson and Clarke 1998:1). Characteristics of opportunity theories, especially the fact that they acknowledge crime prevention measures as applicable in the here and now, makes them ideal to study the diverse and currently pressing field of terrorist violence.


Opportunity theories can be disaggregated into three specific approaches to crime that “examine crime opportunities from a different direction and yet...arrive at the same

place” (Felson and Clarke 1998:4). By name, these approaches are Routine Activity, Crime Pattern Theory, and the Rational Choice Perspective. While all of these approaches could be applied with great benefit to a focused, empirical analysis of terrorism, the Routine Activity approach is best suited for the current study.

The Routine Activity Approach

In routine activity theory, Marcus Felson posited that crime requires the convergence in time and space of a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the absence of a capable guardian. These three features are presented conceptually in the following graphic:

Figure 1: *The Chemistry for Crime*



From: Felson, Marcus. 1998. *Crime and Everyday Life, Second Edition*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.

Generally, the graphic depicts the occurrence of crime (!) when a suitable target (1) and likely offender (3) converge in time and space when and where a capable guardian (2) is not present (Felson 1998). While the genesis of the routine activity approach dealt with predatory crime, researchers soon found that the approach could explain almost every type of criminal event. This is the reason the term “target” is used in lieu of “victim,” since an individual victim may not be present at the time property is stolen or damaged.

It is also important to note the characteristics of the capable guardian. The title does not imply a law enforcement officer or security guard. A family member, doorman, or other individual not involved in the commission of the offense in that space and time could be considered a guardian by simply being present (Felson and Clarke 1998:4).


Through only cursory analysis it becomes evident that each of the three elements of the routine activity approach- suitable target, capable guardian, and likely offender- are complemented by, if not evolutions of, specific criminological theories. The majority of these established theories, at least in a classic sense, focus on the *likely offender* element. After all, the identification of “why” someone participates in criminal activity is the holy grail of criminology. Yet the other two elements also owe acknowledgements to earlier theories. For example, theories on capable guardians can be found in the police science and management family. Just the term “capable guardian” conjures community policing concepts. Likewise, foundations for the *suitable target* element can be traced to theories and approaches like environmental criminology and situational crime prevention.

The “Crime Triangle” begets the “Chemistry for Terrorism”

It could be argued that the same crime model used in the routine activity approach is wholly applicable to the occurrence of terrorist events. The names of the elements need not be changed for the application to terrorism, though for clarity the terminology is adapted slightly for this discussion. While *suitable target* remains an appropriate moniker, capable guardian is changed to security force, and likely offender is changed to motivated terrorist. These very minor changes are conceptually consistent with the elements in Felson’s Crime Triangle, but add a level of specificity important to clarifying the uniqueness of terrorism when compared to more traditional criminal events.

Thus, the updated model is represented as follows:

Figure 2: *The Chemistry for Terrorism*



All three elements of this model- the suitable target, security force, and motivated terrorist- affect a terrorist event (!) much as the counterparts affect crime in the original routine activity model. An event takes place when a suitable target and motivated terrorist converge in space and time, when a security force is either not present or does not possess sufficient deterrent value to prevent the event.

The suitable target label is unchanged from the original model because it conveys the same concept- a person or object, be it a building, landmark, fuel facility, etc.- against which a violent or chaotic action is the primary goal of the offender. The significant expansion of this model's target concept from the original is the goal and potential result of the event. In the crime triangle, the target is generally one that will generate financial gain for the offender. While at times the target may be the recipient of gratuitous violence or damage that is the end result of the act (i.e. vandalism), this is not the norm. In the terrorism triangle, the opposite is true. Damage and destruction, including loss of life, is the goal in the vast majority of incidents.

The security force element is very similar to the capable guardian element in the parent model, with a few noteworthy differences. The greatest difference is that the concept of capability has considerably more value in the terrorism version. For example, the mere presence of an entity may be enough to discourage a traditional criminal event. But to discourage a terrorist event, the guardian must be capable enough to provide a deterrent value. Stated differently, mere presence is not enough. To better illustrate this argument, consider a motivated terrorist evaluating a site for attack. A small unarmed security guard force that is present to provide traditional roles (i.e. access control) will

have no deterrent value to the terrorist, though this same force would be sufficient to deter more mainstream criminal events like vandalism or petty theft.

For similar reasons, the motivated terrorist is somewhat “beyond” the likely offender. The crime triangle considers the presence of a perpetrator as a “given” (Felson 1998; Felson and Clarke 1998:4). The same is true with the terrorism model, but it must be acknowledged that the motivated terrorist is pursuing more elaborate goals. The criminal offender normally desires material gain, though in rare circumstances may be seeking to visit violence upon a victim or damage to an object. In contrast, the motivated terrorist seeks to inflict violence or damage to send a message to a wider audience. For this reason, the motivated terrorist will operate at a level of commitment and scope beyond that of the more “standard” criminal in the original model.

While the brief discussion above establishes a foundation for the application of the routine activity approach to crime as it applies to terrorism, the individual elements should be explained in more specific contexts. This will be accomplished by including backgrounds on each element as explained through some classic and established criminological theories.

Suitable Target

As recent world events have demonstrated, suitable targets for terrorism are plentiful. Size and even three-dimensional space do not save targets from their suitability to terrorists. On land, targets include mass gathering areas, buildings and symbolic

locations, mass transportation systems, and power generation infrastructure. In the air, passenger aircraft have earned the distinction of the most prevalent target of terrorist violence since the 1970s (Mickolous 1983). Finally, targets at sea include passenger liners, oil tankers, cargo ships, fishing boats, ferries, pleasure boats, and offshore oil platforms. No matter where a potential terrorists looks, targets are plentiful. Beyond venue-specific target lists, security forces have to deal with the added problem of multi-venue targets, which exist in all potential tactical settings. The main problem with securing multi-venue targets is that counter-terrorism policies must be developed for each venue, not simply for each target. Stated differently, what works in deploying a capable security force or environmental countermeasures for sea-based targets will often not work when the target shifts to the land.

An outstanding example of a multi-venue target, and prime target for terrorist violence, are Liquefied Natural Gas Containers (LNGCs). These vessels and corresponding storage facilities carry “natural gas chilled to -260°F and thus reduced to one six-hundredth its original volume” (Mueller 1985:166). If manipulated by terrorists, escaping gas from the containers could asphyxiate every living being for several square miles, and if ignited the resulting firestorm could wipe out an entire metropolitan area. Another example, which has unfortunately been victimized already, is transportation or shipping hubs, whether dedicated to air, sea, or land. These hubs include potential targets such as storage facilities, goods in transit, oil terminals, refineries, and petrochemical plants, and of course groups of people awaiting transportation. One needs only consider the uniqueness of airports when compared to seaports to understand potential difficulties in employing universal protective measures. They are simply too distinct to afford

sufficient deterrence if identical countermeasures are used without taking location into account.

When considering these and other suitable targets for terrorism it is important to consider the primary terrorist goal- *to influence a greater population*. With this in mind the argument could be made that almost any physical entity could be considered a viable target for terrorism, though clearly some are more valuable targets than others.

Dependant upon the goal- whether to affect an economic system, to cause environmental damage, or to embarrass a ruling government- the motivated terrorist can send a message by choosing among almost countless physical targets.

The above discussion on the importance of targets in understanding and even predicting terrorist violence may seem initially as a departure from the routine activity approach. In fact, the opposite is true, as the concepts provide the theoretical basis on which the suitable target point of the triangle is established. The “criminology of space,” as it has been called, contains concepts that establish the *suitability* of the suitable target. In these theories, geographic locations and the specific environmental features of each space or location are emphasized as valuable predictors of criminal events (Schmallegger 2002).

Among the theories in the “criminology of place” family is the concept of “defensible space,” defined as “a surrogate term for a range of mechanisms- real and symbolic barriers, strongly defined areas of influence, and improved opportunities for surveillance- that combine to bring an environment under the control of its residents” (Schmallegger 2002). For the application of the theory to terrorism, the concept of “control by residents” can be adapted to read “control by security forces,” since the threat

is one of violence and destruction instead of the traditional criminal threat imagined by the theory's originators. The distinction is necessary since terrorist targeting usually involves locations representative of a government or ideology, clearly targets not suitable for security provided by "residents."

Just as these theories believe that victimized places have characteristics that invite or at least allow criminal events, it could be argued that some locations contain characteristics that make them more attractive and more likely to be a target for terrorist violence. While the potential offender's motivation cannot be discounted and admittedly has much to do with target selection, site-specific variables are also critically important. For example, general site characteristics compared among available target categories can lead to a sound prediction of which is more likely to be targeted by a motivated terrorist. If the perpetrator was Islamist, a power plant would be a much more suitable target than an abortion clinic. Beyond simple target category, environmental characteristics of potential targets may also affect how a terrorist chooses among available targets. Considering a motivated anti-abortionist, he would have a choice to make from among target locations. A clinic with armed security guards and protected entrances hidden from public view would be a much less attractive target than a clinic that was unprotected and completely open to public access. These environmental characteristics as they relate to the chance for success would make the choice obvious.

The acknowledgement of the importance of physical characteristics, combined with concepts from opportunity-based theories, led to the relatively modern Situational Crime Prevention approach. This theory seeks to provide reduced opportunities for crime by integrating the concepts of defensible space into environmental design, thereby

altering a location's physical environment. Augmented by increasing the presence and even visibility of capable guardians and their tools, this approach has given way to the concept of "target hardening," the cornerstone of anti-terrorism strategies world-wide (Clarke 1992; Clarke and Felson 1993).

Clearly, the value of the "target" is well established in exiting theory, both as a stand-alone concept and as a critical point on the routine activity crime triangle. Target importance is further indicated by the emergence of agro-terrorism as a critical field of study, an area completely reliant on location and environmental challenges (Cameron and Pare 2001; Chalecki 2002). Studies developed to understand the characteristics of specific targets are becoming more common, and will likely increase in frequency and importance as the value of space and target environment are more widely recognized.

Capable Guardian/Security Force

The second element of routine activity theory, the absence of a capable guardian, has a somewhat more obscure theoretical background than the suitable target element. This is mostly due to the very general characteristics of the capable guardian in the overall theory. As mentioned above, the guardian need not be a law enforcement or security officer to be considered "capable." Anyone not involved with the commission of the offense, by virtue of their very presence, may be considered a capable guardian under routine activity theory. But the scope of this study makes the assumption that the

guardian in the terrorism model is more accurately identified as an entity with a deterrent value for a violent event as opposed to criminal act. This is an acknowledgement of the unique motivations of terrorists as compared to more mainstream criminals. The most basic unit of deterrence in this construct is the armed law enforcement patrolman, and the extended entity of the “security force” in the terrorism triangle is the law enforcement agency.

The concept of police as capable guardian is well addressed through police organizational studies and general management literature. This body of work may be better identified as approaches to police management, as they cover the evolution of the police management science over time. These works also discuss factors that affect police stress, which relates directly to police effectiveness. Theories on organizational change can also be applied to explain potential problems when new roles are added to existing police skill sets. Terrorism can be added to the list of causes for change, since before 9-11-01, police had little purpose, interest, or charter to participate in the very new concept of “homeland security.”

A brief review of classic police management theories indicates an evolution of principles but a fairly consistent organizational identity. Despite great strides in the modernization of leadership styles in policing, the institutional identity remains quasi-military. As explained very early on by Fuld (1909), this organizational theory originated in part to protect police organizations from partisan politics.

Management styles change over time, of course, and police agencies were not insulated from the emerging theories. As the field of behavioral science matured, behavioral police theories made their way into the practitioner community. These models

involved a more democratic model as opposed to the more authoritarian principles espoused by classic theories. A key piece of this movement was the application of discretion by line police officers, which is logical considering the increased trust afforded to lower-level officers under behaviorist theories.

These two extremes- the authoritarianism of the classic theories and increased democracy of behavioral theories- showed both promise and shortcomings. The concept of lone officer discretion and increased job satisfaction afforded to officers working under behavioral models were clear gains for the police community, but police effectiveness during crisis management and other tactical situations suffered somewhat under these new paradigms. Amidst the debate of which model was superior, Goldstein (1977) wrote of the value of a “middle-road” approach as the potential answer. Clearly, both models had a place in police organizational management. The trick was identifying and implementing the employable pieces of each theory into an integrated model.

As police leaders considered the value of each approach, and the hybrids that evolved from the debate, they refined their management approach. However, subordinate officers did not always view alleged changes the same way as their managers. In a 1985 study of police administrators in Illinois, Auten found that 66% of leaders considered themselves consultative, though only 45% of lower-ranking personnel agreed, which shows a disconnect between what police managers view as their matured leadership models and how policy changes are viewed from the bottom of an organization.

Attempts to develop an ideal management style will likely continue forever, as it is very unlikely that a universal approach will ever be found. There are simply too many diverse

missions in the police community and too many local agency variables to allow for the development of a management approach that works everywhere.

Integral in the discussion of police agency management theory is the concept of change. Each evolution of management theory obviously involved tremendous amounts of change for practitioners, who saw their roles and standards of behavior evolve dramatically. Since this section is being presented as a background for the capable guardian element, the effects of change on police agencies and personnel is an important piece of the discussion. In his book *Managing Transitions* (1991), William Bridges identifies the failure to identify and prepare for the daily and overall changes produced by new procedures as the largest problems that organizations in transition encounter. Bridges further identified management of the “neutral zone,” or the middle phase of the transition process, as the critical step in ensuring an agency will survive the change process and that changes will work.

Critical among the concepts of neutral zone management is the protection of agency personnel from too many changes occurring too quickly. Unfortunately, the process of shielding police personnel from changes associated with adding anti-terrorism and homeland security expertise to existing police skill sets was not possible due to the abrupt changes that needed to be made in response to the catastrophic events of 9-11. The fact this abruptness did not allow for skills to be developed gradually and perfected over time is critical, since the trial and error of new skills are inefficient at best, and potentially dangerous (Roberg and Kuykendall 1997).

Additional byproducts of sudden change include fatigue and demoralization of the personnel in an affected agency. These negative qualities simply add to the long list of

stressors on police. Since it is fairly well accepted that a person's (and entire agency's) health plays an integral role in behavior and productivity, the concept of stress and its effects on the capabilities of the capable guardians in routine activity theory must be explored.

Beyond the sudden change brought about by catastrophic events, there are many stressors that have been identified as present even when change does not threaten capabilities. Among the most prevalent are autonomy and feedback, structural characteristics, politics, and management practices (Laufersweiler-Dwyer and Dwyer 2000; Brooks and Piquero 1998; Storch and Panzarella 1996). Additional stress-inducing factors include age of the officer, gender and race, seniority, inadequate recognition of job performance, and inequitable opportunity systems (Toch 2002).

While the above lists provide insight into the many stressors that can adversely affect officer performance, research into the stress effects of violence is important to mention. After all, the crux of terrorist crime is violence, usually on a scale far beyond that which line police officers are used to or for which they are prepared. Prominent among research into violence as an important stressor is a 1983 survey of police in the United States showing that violence or threatened violence were rated as most stressful among of 144 life events related to the police profession (Swell 1983). Additional studies on police stressors show that facing possible physical injury or unpredictable situations are commonly reported sources of stress by police officers (Coman 1993; Violanti 1996). These are also prominent features of terrorist violence that cannot be discounted when considering the effects of guardian (police) capabilities when dealing with terrorism.

The above discussion is provided to show the foundations for the guardian/security force element of the crime/terrorism triangle. While the application of classic theories is not as direct as the case with the suitable target element, the narrowing of the capable guardian element to law enforcement personnel in the terrorism model affords a sound background discussion of police management theory, change processes, and stressors associated with gaining anti-terrorism skill sets. These parent theories, developed over time, are critical in understanding the dynamics of this portion of the routine activity theory as applied to this study. The police are the guardians to be measured, and understanding the theories outlining what affects their capabilities as agencies and individuals is critical.

Motivated Terrorist

The area of the motivated terrorist is the simplest to discuss in relation to criminological theories. This is the case because, however unfortunately, motivated offenders have always and will likely always exist. It is difficult to imagine a global society where the world's population is completely satisfied with its political situation. Discontent will always exist somewhere, and not everyone will be privileged enough to live in a society that permits legitimate and peaceful means to air and address grievances. Those who seek more radical means to address problems may turn to terrorism as a means of expression or to gain political relevance. It is also important to remember that any group with a political agenda may resort to terrorism.

There are many criminological theories, both classic and modern, that would do a more than adequate job in explaining to formation of a terrorist. Since the present discussion on the likely offender/motivated terrorist concept is being conducted to illustrate the value of parent theories in exploring elements of the routine activity approach, it is appropriate to cite classic theories in criminology. In this area, there are two very well known theories that provide explanations for the creation of almost all motivated terrorists- *anomie* and *strain*.

Consider the foundations of Emile Durkheim's classic theory. Durkheim called the uniformity found in a mechanical (modern) society the *collective conscience*. To the extent that a society is mechanical, it will pressure its members to conform with group norms and against diversity. The strongest form of this is criminal sanctions, weaker forms are social ostracism or the pronouncement of immorality. These are the very factors that drive the "fringe" elements of a society to terrorist activities. Their refusal to accept the norms of a ruling elite or societal majority leaves them to exist in the margins of society, and the ostracism and later criminal sanctions drive these groups to desperate measures.

Durkheim argued, "society cannot be formed without our being required to make perpetual and costly sacrifices." These sacrifices, embodied in the demands of the collective conscience, are the price of membership in society. Fulfilling the demands gives the individual members a sense of collective identity, which is an important source of social solidarity. But these demands are constructed so that a certain number of people will not be able to abide by them. This allows the large mass of people who do fulfill the demands of the collective conscience to feel morally superior. If certain groups never

accept the collective conscience, or if it becomes forced on them to supersede their own unique value systems, the alleged moral superiority of the ruling class leaves few legitimate alternatives for self-preservation. Radical means, including terrorist activities, are viable means of survival.

Durkheim also posited that a society without crime is impossible. The same could be argued about society's relationship with political instability and its most violent bedfellow, terrorism. Ruling powers by their nature will be militarily and technologically superior to weaker or less developed cultures and sub-cultures. The resulting dissatisfaction, frustration, and at times blind hatred toward those in power may force the subservient into action. In a just society this should lead to legitimate debate and reconciliation. Unfortunately this does not always occur and minority groups that need to assert their desire to be heard employ more radical and violent means.

Robert Agnew's general strain theory (GST) also does a good job explaining the formation of terrorist groups and the motivation of terrorists. Agnew conceptualized three kinds of strain:

The first type is the discrepancy between societal means and goals, which is the traditional view developed by Merton. A second source of strain is the loss of something positive in one's life, such as the breakup of a relationship with a boyfriend or girlfriend. The third kind of strain results from the presence of negative events, such as criminal victimization, or intimidation from parents or peers. (Shoemaker 1999: 96)

It is not difficult to see how all three of these situations may lead to the formation of both individual terrorists and terrorist organizations. The discrepancy between societal means and goals is probably the most important when exploring the terrorist phenomena. People need to be heard and have their specific problems addressed. If the ruling

government does not allow for grievances to be aired in legitimate forums, societal means are effectively denied to any number of groups. Groups may splinter, as in the case of the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland, and pursue their goals through violence.

The loss of something positive in one's life may explain terrorism on a more individual level. If forces representing a government, such as military or police, kill or injure members of a minority subculture surviving members may turn to violence as a response. Although it may also be seen as an act of self-preservation, losing people close to you often serves as the final catalyst towards violence.

Prolonged exposure to negative events can also drive an individual towards terrorist violence. If a ruling government is unable or unwilling to keep its population safe, a certain number of citizens concerned for their living conditions may take steps to force the government to address specific issues. In this situation even a crack down against the terrorists may be embraced as victory, since increased presence of government forces should theoretically reduce violence in areas of concentration.

These classic theories could be explored in more depth and expanded, but for the purposes of this background discussion the point is clear- the most basic theories of criminology can explain the concept of a likely offender/motivated terrorist. This third and final element of the routine activity approach to crime is in reality a concise identification of concepts taken from established criminological theories, just as similarly established theories explain the other elements. All have much to do with terrorism, which is appropriate since at its essence terrorism is simply an elaborate criminal event. Routine activity theory, with its three primary elements grounded in established, specific theories of criminology, is an ideal model for the study of terrorism.

Application of the Theory

Ideally, a fair test of theory will involve reliable data that will grant true insight into the efficacy of theoretical constructs. This is a serious challenge in the current study, since so little data exists on terrorist events. This is due to two major factors. First, as explained in detail in the pervious chapter, very little data exists, and where a database has been built, the incidents that are included invariably miss a vast amount of data due to the researchers' definition and research goals. Second, there have simply been too few terrorist events in modern history to evaluate the phenomena in any depth.

This latter problem is the most challenging. Better databases can be created, and existing ones can be expanded to include more events and greater detail. But the lack of raw data due to actual events is a problem not easily breached. This issue is especially awkward since the lack of terrorist incidents is a very good thing, and not something that should be hoped against. Still, the challenge of building data to test a theory remains, and the appropriate answer is elusive.

An acceptable though admittedly imperfect means of addressing this problem is to use a measure more abstract than actual events. If there is a "dark figure of crime," meaning an elusive figure that represents the true amount of crime in society, than there is a "black hole of terrorism." To grasp this statement, simply consider the amount of terrorist violence that is deterred at the last minute by circumstance, is not perpetrated because the actor had second thoughts at a critical moment, or is stopped at many points in time by law enforcement and security efforts that work even though the police have no way of knowing what was about to happen. The list of reasons a terrorist incident may

have been averted is almost endless. Again, this is very good news, because less violence is certainly a good thing. But what is lost is the true nature and scope of the threat of terrorism. Each incident that “almost happened” is very close to an actual occurrence, and may very well be attempted in the future when the deterrents change. These concepts make the “threat” a concept that could be considered a very strong indication of the potential for terrorist violence. In the absence of being able to test actual incidents, the concept of a threat could be considered the next best thing.

Of course, a critical element of this concept is that the threat would have to be viable. There are many potentially violent groups and organizations that issue threatening statements and meet to discuss their frustration with given situations. Very few of these groups, or even individuals within a group, could be considered at all capable of actually committing violence. This is especially true when applied to terrorism, which involves a level of planning and commitment much more involved than a simple act of criminal violence.

Thus, it becomes critical to obtain a fair measure of the viability of a threat. Professionals in charge of knowing the activities of criminal elements within an area are best situated to know what is viable. This population is best personified as local police, who through their interactions with the general public and local criminal population know more about their local area than the most astute agents of the state and federal governments. Phrased differently, the local police know whom to fear in their jurisdiction. Finding out “why” certain groups are feared is the challenge in framing a study to measure the theoretical constructs of the routine activity approach.

Once the concept of threat is accepted as a fair indication that a terrorist event is possible, data can be developed to test theory. For the present study, the critical effort will be to evaluate the “chemistry of crime” in regards to terrorist violence. Thus, each of the three elements should demonstrate significant worth in predicting practitioner fear of terrorism. Again, the measure of fear of a terrorist event by practitioners is being used as a reliable measure that a terrorist event has the potential of occurring. This should provide a much more complete evaluation of the routine activity approach than using actual incidents, because they are so (thankfully) rare.

In evaluating the routine activity triangle to be tested in a study of terrorism, several hypotheses become obvious. First is that each of the three points should be predictive of threat and group fear. For example, the presence of a “suitable target” should predict fear of a terrorist event. Likewise, the presence of motivated terrorists (shown through locally active groups) should be predictive. Both should show positive correlation with group fear.

The test of the capable guardian/competent security force will be somewhat more elaborate. In this study’s model for testing routine activity, local police were considered capable guardians, so in every case a guardian was present in some capacity. Since the argument was made above that mere presence is not enough, and that competency is the key to the deterrent value of the guardians in the terrorism version of the crime triangle, this measure was obviously be more subjective. Nonetheless, scientific measures can be developed to make this test of the routine activity theory as objective as possible. One way to achieve objectivity will be to measure competency by scoring concepts like agency training and equipment. Through testing the capable guardian/security force

element, a negative correlation should be shown in relation to fear of terrorist violence. In other words, high scores of competency should show low measures of fear, and vice versa.

Finally, it was very interesting in this endeavor to see which of the three elements was most predictive. For example, was the presence of a suitable target more predictive than the identification of a locally active group? Or were agency characteristics- the competency of the capable guardian- more valuable in predicting fear than the other two elements? These questions are answered definitively in the data analysis chapters.

Testing the value of the routine activity approach in measuring fear of terrorist violence is thus possible. Fear of violence from certain groups is not as ideal as actual incidents, but the exponential increase in measurable data points make these models an exciting opportunity to test a modern approach to crime.

Chapter 4: Methodology

Data Collection

No dataset currently exists that will allow analysis of the local terrorist threat in the United States. To build a suitable database, a survey was conducted of police executives in the 48 contiguous United States and the District of Columbia. The survey population included police chiefs, sheriffs, superintendents, and other executive positions in local police agencies, federal agents working in local field offices, and administrative agency heads of state counter-terrorism offices. The survey was internet-based, with automated coding of responses. There were no mailings, personal interviews, or manual data input.

The primary means of solicitation was through an online search of professional law enforcement organizations and agency websites. Although they were adamant about not being identified as an active partner in this study, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) included a link to the study on their website. The IACP also announced the study with summary information and website address in their May 2004 State Associations of Chiefs of Police newsletter. Since so many respondents were members of the IACP, a brief review of the organization is necessary.

The IACP is the oldest and largest nonprofit membership organization of police executives in the world, with over 19,000 members in over 89 different countries. The IACP's member base consists of the operating chief executives of international, federal, state and local agencies of all sizes. The distribution of survey respondents from the

IACP was representative of the proportion of small, medium, and large agencies, as they exist in the United States.

Besides the IACP, the National Sheriff's Association (NSA) was contacted and requested to assist in advertising the study. The NSA was very supportive in advertising the study, informing 100% of their membership via email and through an advertisement in the September issue of their monthly membership magazine.

Of course, IACP and NSA members do not represent all members of the target respondent population, and efforts were made to ensure non-IACP members also knew of the study. To accomplish this, individual state associations of chiefs of police were contacted via email and telephone, and in some cases were provided with flyers announcing the study. Some state associations distributed these flyers at annual meetings, while others either emailed the study announcement to all members or provided a link to the study on their state association homepage.

Finally, the distinctive populations of tribal police agencies and college and university police executives were specifically targeted. To accomplish as wide an announcement as possible, the IACP Tribal Police representative faxed a copy of the announcement flyer to members of its tribal police section. To inform the college and university police populations, the president of the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA) email-forwarded the study solicitation to his membership population.

The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) and Police Foundation were also contacted several times via phone and email. Neither organization responded to requests to support the study.

Internet Survey Overview

As mentioned previously, the data collection instrument for this study was a web-based survey. This is a relatively new collection method in social science. Researchers from across the spectrum of disciplines have for several years been exploring the applicability of this expeditious and generally automated research tool. The general conclusion is that internet-based surveys are the next step in the evolution of the survey instrument, a research method whose “time has come.” Still, its newness requires a background discussion, especially in regard to the instrument’s reliability and validity.

Internet-based surveys were developed and perfected by marketing professionals, who over the past decade have turned the research tool into a cornerstone of their industry. The use of surveys as a means of data collection for the service sector of our economy has become almost pervasive. Even casual users of the internet cannot move through the web without viewing opportunities (of varying obtrusiveness) to complete an online survey, more often than not with an accompanying enticement such as a sweepstakes entry or forms of discounts from internet-based vendors.

Clearly, these instruments and the methodologies that drive them do not meet the high standards of scientific research, especially not in a way that allows results to be applied to the general population. The most glaring problem with the marketing-focused web surveys is the self-selection bias integral to the standard advertisement/sweepstakes model, though this has been overcome as research models have evolved (NLETC 2002:5-6). Despite its initial shortcomings, the internet survey’s frequent application and wide use over many years has led to several stages of formalization and maturation. This

process has reached the point that the internet survey can be considered a valid and reliable instrument for sophisticated research across all academic disciplines.

As both internet-based technology and the general population's access to it expand, the promises of web-based surveys are just being realized. While the maturation process is still in progress, mail surveys and face-to-face interviews are still the standard, and will likely remain so for the short-term. This is due to the remaining challenges to the usefulness of internet survey instruments. Top among these remaining challenges is the concept of sampling, specifically the inability to generalize results since the survey instrument by its very nature only collects information from respondents actively using the internet (Croxall 2002; DSS 2000, Berson et al. 2002). Not surprisingly, research into the reliability of the internet survey instrument have shown web survey respondents to be "younger, more likely to be single, better educated, and less likely to come from an African American or Hispanic background..." than mail survey respondents (DSS 2000:5). Clearly this is a shortcoming with tremendous negative effects for research attempting to generalize conclusions, especially in a multi-cultural context.

Fortunately, this shortcoming does not damage the usefulness of the internet survey instrument generally, but is a threat to reliability and validity only for studies that need a sample representative of the general population. For targeted studies, the internet survey is in many ways more reliable and valid than other means of data collection. For example, Berson et al. (2002) conducted a study on risks of violence against teenaged girls associated with their internet use. Their data collection instrument was a web-based survey, a link for which was embedded on a popular online e-magazine geared toward

teenaged girls. Since their research question was specific for violence related to internet usage, the forum of an internet survey was ideal for the population being studied.

Even in studies meant to target more diverse populations than internet users, web-based surveys have been shown to be in many ways more reliable than mail surveys or face-to-face interviews. An oft-cited explanation for the higher accuracy of internet surveys as compared to these other tools is the higher level of perceived anonymity (Berson et al. 2002; Croxall and Thompson 2002; DSS 2000). Yet even in studies where anonymity would have less of a bearing on responses, internet surveys have been shown to be as statistically significant as mail responses. A somewhat surprising finding consistent across tests comparing the two survey instruments is that internet surveys have shown a greater level of predictive value than mail surveys.

Most recently, Croxall and Thompson (2002) conducted a national survey of Family and Consumer Science Professionals (n=235), using both mail surveys and an email solicitation to use a web-based survey. Comparison of the different respondent populations showed similar demographics for the two groups, and no statistical difference in the responses from each group. In short, the internet survey was just as reliable and as statistically valid as the mail survey.

Other research has directly applied as a research question the value of internet surveys as compared to mail surveys. The most comprehensive of these studies was conducted by Data System Services (DSS) in 2000. DSS is a professional research firm specializing in the healthcare industry. To test the statistical value of the internet survey versus mail survey methodology, they used an identical survey instrument in both forums. The instrument was the same survey used over 40,000 times previously (DSS

2000:2). The survey was presented via mail and on the internet with the same questions, with the same order and grouping, and with the same presentation format. The survey contained 76 questions and took on average 10 minutes to complete.

Data from the DSS survey was analyzed for content, consistency and reliability. Using Cronbach's Alpha to measure internal consistency, the results between the internet and mail survey methods were within .001. Guttman Split-Half statistics measuring correlation within groups of attributes yielded similar results, with .007 difference between mail and internet surveys. Finally, the strict-parallel test was conducted to test variance and means, resulting in Chi-square tests with significance at the 0.00005 level for both the mail and internet survey instruments.

While both mail and internet survey instruments were similar in the above statistical measurements, the internet survey proved to be more predictive in other tests. First, through running Pearson correlations to explain inter-relationships between variables, factor analysis in the internet survey explained 79.9% of the variation in the internet survey, and only 74.7% of the variation in the mail survey. The questions correlated with each factor were "nearly identical in both factor analysis solutions" (DSS 2000:9).

Analyses of variance (ANOVA) were also used to determine differences in distribution of internet and mail survey responses. In considering all 76 survey questions, the average difference between mail and internet surveys was 0.6%. This already small percentage was reduced to 0.2% when a random sample of 1,000 surveys was taken from each survey response population.

Finally, regression analyses and discriminate analyses were used to predict variables. As with other statistical tests, statistical modeling showed internet surveys to be “more consistent, reliable and predictable than mail survey responses” (DSS 2000:11).

Clearly, when sampling issues are correctly addressed, the internet survey has equal statistical value and superior predictive value as compared to mail surveys. Internet surveys show similar statistical strength when compared to face-to-face interviews (Berson et al. 2002:55). The internet survey instrument has been proven a viable, valid, reliable data collection instrument, and is ready for application by the social science community.

Sampling

As mentioned above in making the argument for an internet survey, the primary challenges to its validity and reliability in social science research is sampling. The current study used a 100% sample of all police executives (i.e. Police Chiefs, Sheriffs, Directors of Offices of Counter-Terrorism, etc.) in the Continental United States (CONUS) that could be reached via email.

Since the majority of respondents were members of the IACP or NSA, the process by which law enforcement leaders join these organizations highlights potential selection biases. First, for the IACP there are rank and position requirements. There is a long list of titles eligible for membership that can be summarized as all commissioners, superintendents, sheriffs, chiefs, and directors of national, state, provincial, county,

municipal, and university police departments, and officers who command a division, district, or bureau within these departments. Second, an active member in the IACP that works in the applicant's state, province, or country must then sponsor the prospective members. Finally, a \$100 membership fee is required annually. Due to this process, the IACP membership population is accurately identified as *self-selected*. Thus, the worth of this study will be much less if non-members' viewpoints and perceptions are not included.

The NSA and IACLEA organizations employ somewhat less stringent requirements for membership. Their membership is basically open to practitioners who are currently serving in positions falling under the umbrella of organizations identity- in these cases, sheriff's officers/deputies and college/university police administrators, respectively.

Agency size was measured to ensure a proportional respondent population. The variable of "agency size" was an important measurement in this study. Regional dynamics were also integral to the study's data analysis section, as were predictor variables based on the number of officers in a department. Thus, the aggregate response populations had to be representative of the proportion of agency sizes and regional representations as they exist in the real world. Also, for valid generalizations to be made about predictors of terrorist group fear as related to agency size, the proportion of each agency size used in data analysis must be large enough that valid statistical measures could be applied. To deal with this threat to validity, demographics were checked prior to data analysis to ensure agency sizes and regional representation were appropriately

represented. All tests of proportionality showed a representative sample, with almost equal representation across regions and in regard to agency size.

Survey Instrument Overview

As discussed, the survey for the study was web-based. There were no hard copies, mailings, or interviews. The target population was notified via the different methods of advertisement listed above, and directed to the survey's internet address. Once on the homepage, the initial survey screen provided a very brief introduction to the study, including a summary of information that was made available at the conclusion of the survey (generally a complete presentation of all responses up to that point so respondents could immediately compare their information with the rest of the population). A consent statement explaining that survey responses were anonymous followed the introduction screen. The actual survey portion consisted of 21 questions, disaggregated by three main subject areas- local agency, local actors, and local targets.

The local agency section gathered information on the respondent and his department or agency. This included agency type, area code of main headquarters, size of agency, respondent's position in the agency, training issues, past events in the jurisdiction, and equipment on hand or available. This section also asked respondents to rate the anti-terrorism capabilities of the police agency.

The local actor section asked respondents questions about terrorist groups present in the jurisdiction. A list of known groups was provided as survey options, complete with an option for the respondent to “write-in” a group type if specific local group names were not included in the list. Similar questions were asked on what groups and tactics were feared. This section also included questions on types of attacks perpetrated or expected, such as WMD employment, cyber-terrorism, or eco-terrorism.

Finally, the local target section asked the respondent to identify what potential targets were available in his/her jurisdiction. Available choices included clinics, laboratories, power plants, mass gathering areas, landmarks, and transportation and shipping hubs. There were 24 target categories in all.

Confidentiality

Telephone area codes were chosen as the primary respondent identifier because they are not specific. Zip codes were rejected because, through their specific nature, they could potentially identify a specific department and thus a respondent. Since there are likely to be several or even several dozen departments within a given area code, there is no specificity.

Identification by state was rejected because the dissertation’s central concept of locality would have been lost. Area codes are also valuable because they reflect regional dimensions of a state generally (for example the diverse regions of New Jersey are accurately reflected by the various area codes). Area codes also help disaggregate intra-

state regions by identifying urban areas from suburban and rural. Finally, through geographic mapping software applications cross-boundary diffusion effects can be shown.

Since area codes are non-specific, and in almost every case there were multiple responses from each area code, the privacy of respondents was protected. There was no threat to privacy or confidentiality.

Hypotheses Background Data

Many hypotheses include references to the location of a respondent's department or agency. These data are both general, through designating regions of the 48 contiguous United States, and specific, through the use of telephone area codes. The regions and states are listed as much by "identity" as they are geographically, though geographical boundaries are generally adhered to. The primary departure from geographical boundaries in favor of identity is the listing of Washington D.C. as in the Northeast while Maryland and Virginia are listed in the South. Arguments can be made for and against these designations, but it is the author's opinion that the US capital city has an identity much closer to that of New York City, Boston, and Philadelphia, than Atlanta, Charleston, and Richmond.

As listed in the survey, the regions and state affiliations were:

- Northeast (CT, DC, DE, MA, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT)
- South (AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, SC, TN, VA, WV)
- Midwest (IO, IL, IN, KS, MO, NE, OH)

- Central (MI, MN, ND, SD, WI)
- Southwest (AZ, NM, OK, TX)
- West (CA, CO, ID, MT, NV, OR, UT, WA, WY)

Beyond the regional designations in the survey, the respondent's agency primary telephone area code was collected. It was from this data that the vast majority of spatial analyses were performed. Area codes are obviously more specific than regional or state data, without being so specific that they could identify a single organization. An added benefit of spatial analyses through the use of area codes is that they capture features across borders, such as adjacent towns located on opposite sides of a state boundary. Thus, clustering effects of threat identification and other respondent categories can be well identified.

Research Questions

The current study attempted to illustrate several dimensions of the practitioner's view of the terrorist threat in the United States. The most simplistic goal was to identify the groups reported as locally present, with local being defined as in or within 30 miles of the respondent's jurisdiction. From this data, the identification of which groups were feared was also ascertained. Once group presence and group fear were established, the process of identifying predictors of fear of certain groups, and spatial features of group fear and terrorist group presence, were accomplished.

Research Question 1: Are there aggregate regional features of terrorist group presence?

The first goal was to identify what police chiefs viewed as local terrorist actors in their jurisdictions. Threat identification is the most important step in anti-terrorism strategy development, and is unfortunately sometimes overlooked. Most germane to the present study, it is in the area of local threat identification in which the views of local police are most valuable in forming a comprehensive picture of the threat; they are the experts, and they are most familiar with the criminal actors in a given area.

It is clear that the threat from Islamists is currently at the forefront of the national government psyche; thus, most of the resources, funds, and training from the federal government have focused on this group type (Gunaratna 2003; US Department of State 2003; US Department of State 2004). This paradigm has resulted in a lack of attention to local threats that do not jibe with the national picture. This likely serves to hurt the overall anti-terrorism posture of the country, since each terrorist group employs unique tactics and focuses on disparate targets. For example, departments in most non-urban areas are not likely to have a local Islamist threat. If they are trained and equipped to combat Islamists and their tactics, but their local actors are anti-abortionists, their anti-terrorism strategy will be fatally flawed. Police resources will be deployed at the wrong locations, the wrong facilities will be hardened, and the wrong local actors will be placed under surveillance. In short, the entire anti-terrorism strategy will be built to combat a non-threat. The identification of local threats as seen by local police chiefs will both advance the field conceptually and hopefully encourage an appropriate allocation of training and resources.

The first two hypotheses addressed the contention that the threat of Islamists was not consistent with the practitioner view, as follows¹:

- H1- The perceived national threat of Islamists will not be reflected in local or aggregate regional data.
- H2- Of the seven groups identified in the typology, Islamists will not be present among the top four in any region EXCEPT the northeast.

Next, the concept that there are regional concentrations of terrorist groups was tested, as follows:

- H3- There will be regional representation of specific terrorist groups. Specifically, regional group presence will be reported as follows:
 - The most prevalent group in the South region will be Anti-abortionists.
 - The most prevalent group in the Central region will be Right Wing.
 - The most prevalent group in the Northeast region will be Islamists.

¹ For easy reference, the typology developed earlier in this dissertation is listed here:

- Left Wing (Symbionese Liberation Army, Weathermen, anti-capitalists, etc.)
- Right Wing (Militia, Christian Identity, Freeman, etc.)
- Islamists (al-Qaeda, al-Islamia, etc.)
- Eco-terrorists (ALF, ELF, PETA, agro-terrorists, Sea Sheppard, etc.)
- Anti-Abortionists
- Ethnic Supremacist (Klan, Black Panthers, Skinheads, Aryan Nation, etc.)
- Foreign Nationalists (IRA, Puerto Rican Independence, Anti-Castro Cubans)

- The most prevalent group in the Southwest region will be Ethnic Supremacists.
- Left Wing groups will not be among the top 4 in any aggregate region.

Research Question 2: Which terrorist groups are most feared, and why?

Beyond the simple regional characterizations of the threat, the study attempted to identify what groups were most feared, operationalized as most likely to perpetrate a terrorist act in a given jurisdiction. This concept of *fear* was the central issue of this dissertation. While important to establish regional features of group presence, it was in many ways more important to find out *why* some groups were feared more than others. This key measurement, stated succinctly as “group fear,” was tested via responses to clear, specific questions on group presence and perceived likelihood that a group would act in a specific time frame.

To identify predictors of group fear, survey respondents were asked several lines of questions, focusing on one of three key areas. Guided by the elements of Routine Activity theory, these areas were local agency characteristics, local terrorist actors, and local targets. Analyses of the various data points provided insight regarding which of these elements best predicted fears of certain groups- either agency dynamics, identified terrorist group dynamics, or targets available in a given jurisdiction.

Thus, the next sets of hypotheses were drawn from the tests of predictors of group fear. The hypotheses, by sub-area, were:

Local agency:

H4. Agency size will be a significant predictor of group fear.

H5. Agency competency in anti-terrorism skill sets will predict group fear.

Local threat:

H6. The presence of a local group will be a significant predictor of fear of that group.

Local targets:

H7. The availability of suitable targets will predict fear of certain groups.

This general hypothesis will be tested by 7 sub-hypotheses, as follows:

H7a. An abortion clinic will be a significant predictor of anti-abortionist group fear.

H7b. A nuclear power plant will be a significant predictor of Islamists group fear.

H7c. An airport will be a significant predictor of Islamists group fear.

H7d. A federal government complex will be a significant predictor of Right Wing group fear.

H7e. A fuel storage facility will be a significant predictor of Islamists group fear.

H7f. A communication center will be a significant predictor of Islamists group fear.

H7g. A mass gathering area will be a significant predictor of Right Wing group fear.

Research Question 3: What are the spatial dimensions to group presence and group fears?

Finally, spatial characteristics were examined by linking national maps to telephone area codes that were gathered via the survey's demographics section. This was accomplished to provide visual representations of both terrorist group presence and fear that groups would act.

The first set of graphics was designed to give a spatial representation of *group presence*. This was accomplished through a series of national maps depicting the presence of each individual group, as reported by respondent area code. These maps basically illustrated the distribution of terrorist groups in the US at the time of the survey.

The other map series show where groups were expected to attempt attacks. As with the group presence maps, the group fear series shows each group as an individual graphic. The continuity between the two series allowed for an analysis of whether *group presence* and *group fear* were related, and if so to what extent.

The Dataset

The survey instrument was accessible on the study's internet homepage from 6 June 2004 through 22 November 2004. There were a total of 1,883 responses during this time frame. While some of these responses resulted from passive recruitment measures like website links and flyer distribution, the vast majority of responses were received immediately after mass emailings inviting law enforcement agency heads to participate.

From the period of 6 June 2004 through 28 August 2004, internet links on organizational homepages and flyers distributed to state associations resulted in approximately 180 survey responses. Though these passive measures worked, the response rate was not as high as hoped. Thus it was decided in late August to email state populations directly to increase awareness of the study.

The first of two rounds of mass emailings was accomplished between 29 August and 21 September 2004. Emails were sent daily to law enforcement leaders in states in each region until all forty-nine populations received the initial email invitation to participate (forty-eight states plus the District of Columbia). From 6-12 October 2004, the second and final email was sent to all forty-nine population groups, thanking participants for their time and reminding all others that the study would be closing soon. These two mass emailings resulted in the vast majority of survey responses.

Overall, from 6 June 2004 through 22 November 2004, the study's homepage was visited 3,782 times. There is no way to distinguish unique "hits" from repeat visitors. Of these 3,782 visits, 1,883 surveys were submitted, for a rate of 50%.

To ensure there were no attempts to deliberately sabotage the data, the internet protocol (IP) addresses of respondents were collected and checked for features that may have threatened the study's reliability. IP addresses indicate specifically where a computer physically accesses the internet. To protect the anonymity of respondents in this study, IP addresses were only checked to ensure the respondents were accessing the internet from a location in the continental United States.

Surprisingly, this was not always the case. The website for the study was viewed twenty times by people using foreign IP addresses. Among the countries represented in

the population of foreign visitors were India, China, Pakistan, Kuwait, and the Philippines, along with many European nations.

The IP address for each of these foreign visitors was checked against the response database to ensure none participated in the study. This search showed that of the twenty visits from foreign IPs, five individuals actually took the survey. These five cases were investigated further to determine whether to delete the entries from analysis. Of the five, only two were deleted, specifically because they were submitted by law enforcement officers in Puerto Rico and Guyana. Officers from U.S. police agencies who were overseas for unknown reasons completed the other three responses while in China, Italy, and Kuwait. The responses were retained because they all occurred within 48 hours after the respective agency received the email solicitation. Since the study was conducted over a more-than four-month period, it was unlikely that the respondents were anyone other than the executives targeted by the email solicitations. Beyond these cases, two others were deleted from respondents from outside the contiguous U.S.; one each from Hawaii and Alaska.

The variable representing the respondent's 3-digit area code was critical to the study since it served as the anchor for all spatial analysis. It was unfortunately also the variable that experienced several coding issues. For example, four respondents input their zip code instead of area code. Once the zip code was verified as from a targeted agency, the variable was manually recoded to reflect the actual 3-digit area code.

Another three respondents input zip codes of four digits. After some investigation it was discovered that a "0" was dropped from either side of the entry. Once the correct zip

code was cross-referenced with a respondent agency, the correct area code was manually input into the dataset.

Finally, problems that could not be remedied resulted in the deletion of cases. For example, 135 respondents terminated their participation early in the survey process, resulting in the exclusion of the majority of data that was useful for analysis. All 135 of these cases were deleted.

Thus, of the original 1,883 responses, 1,744 were retained for analysis. These 1,744 cases served as the population that was analyzed and is discussed in the next three chapters.

Chapter 5: Group Presence

Overview

To develop the overall picture of terrorist group presence, simple frequency distributions were run on the entire national sample of respondents. The data was then disaggregated regionally, allowing for the creation of regional-level basic frequency reports and a statistical process called crosstabulation, or “crosstabs” for short.

Generally, crosstabs are excellent representations of relationships between two or more categorical variables, and in this chapter were applied to discover relationships between regions and group presence.

Along with crosstabulation procedures, chi-square tests of independence were conducted. These tests were important to the models because they helped determine whether observed frequencies of reported terrorist group presence differed significantly from expected frequencies. These tests also indicated the strength of relationships, with large chi-squares indicating a strong differences between observed and expected values and smaller values indicating weaker relationships.

In some models, chi-square measurements involved more sophisticated statistical tests. First, Pearson’s *phi* statistic was used to display a standardized measure of association between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating complete independence between variables and 1 indicating strong association. Though there are many ways to measure strengths of association, the phi statistic is the accepted measure of a 2 x 2 table, which is the primary model dimension used in this section. When deciphering the phi statistic, the following range was applied to the level of association:

Determinate; > 0.7 very strong; $0.5 - 0.7$ strong; $0.3 - 0.5$ medium;
 $0.2 - 0.3$ weak; $0.1 - 0.2$ very weak; < 0.1 extremely weak.

When applying this scale, however, it must be noted that in social science even a weak association may be statistically valid and important for consideration. It is widely assumed that higher levels of association, such as .7 or larger, are impossible to achieve in all but the natural sciences.

Frequencies

National

To obtain a snapshot of terrorist group presence at the national level, meaning an aggregate picture of group presence from all respondents, simple frequency tests were run for each group. 1,732 respondents (99.3% of the 1,744 total) answered the survey questions on local terrorist group presence. All data included in Table X.X, and in the discussion that follows, was gleaned from survey questions that asked respondents to list which terrorist groups were present in their local areas. Respondents were able to choose as many responses as were appropriate; thus, the list of percentages will not equal 100%, since respondents were able to report multiple groups as present.

Table 5.1 National Reporting of Group Presence

| | # of total respondents | % of total study pop |
|---------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| Ethnic supremacist | 1,028 | 59.4% |
| Anti-abortionists | 1,004 | 58% |
| Right Wing | 839 | 48.4% |
| Eco-terrorists | 675 | 39% |
| Islamists | 486 | 28.1% |
| Left Wing | 288 | 16.6% |
| Foreign groups | 199 | 11.5% |

n= 1,732

As shown in Table X.X, the national results of terrorist group presence ranked from most frequently reported to least were (n= 1,732): Ethnic supremacist, 1,028 (or 59.4% of all respondents); Anti-abortionists, 1,004 (58%); Right Wing, 839 (48.4%); Eco-terrorists, 675 (39%); Islamists, 486 (28.1%); Left Wing, 288 (16.6%); and Foreign groups, 199 (11.5%). Other potential responses included a miscellaneous group presence, meaning the agency wanted to report a group presence but the group type was not listed as a choice in the survey. Eighty-eight respondents, or 5.1%, said this was the case. An additional 57, or 3.3%, said that a group was present but they were not sure what type.

Note that the presence of two groups- Ethnic Supremacists and Anti-abortionists- were reported by a fairly sizable *majority* of respondents (59.3% and 57.9%, respectively). The other five groups were not reported by a majority of respondents. Another interesting overview data point is that a large majority, 1,444 (84.4% of the 1,732 that answered these questions) reported the presence of a terrorist group, regardless of type.

Regional Breakdown

Many of the hypotheses for this project have to do with regional features of terrorist group presence. Frequencies for each of the six regions are presented individually below for easy comparison to national data and other regions. The results of the crosstabulations, which were run to test for significant relationships between group types and regions, will be presented after the discussion of frequency reports.

As with the national data, it is important to note that the percentages reflecting group presence represent the number of respondents who reported a group type as present in their local area. Respondents were not restricted as to how many groups they could report. For this reason, the region totals will not equal 100%, since the percentages simply relate what proportion of the regional population reported the presence of a specific terrorist group type, regardless of which other groups they reported as present.

As listed in the survey, the regions and state affiliations are:

- Northeast (CT, DC, DE, MA, MD, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT)
- South (AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, VA, WV)
- Midwest (IL, IN, IO, KS, MO, NE, OH)
- Central (MI, MN, ND, SD, WI)
- Southwest (AZ, NM, OK, TX)
- West (CA, CO, ID, MT, NV, OR, UT, WA, WY)

Northeast

Terrorist group presence in the northeast region was characterized by the prevalence of anti-abortionists and ethnic supremacists. As reflected in Table X.X, these were the only two groups reported as present by a majority of respondents. Northeast regional data showed a very close similarity with national aggregate data; not surprising considering the northeast was the largest respondent population. The most surprising feature of northeast regional data was the low level of overall presence reporting as compared to the other five regions.

Table 5.2 Northeast Region Group Presence

| | # of regional respondents | % of total regional pop |
|---------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Anti-abortionists | 245 | 57.5% |
| Ethnic supremacist | 237 | 55.6% |
| Right Wing | 158 | 37.1% |
| Eco-terrorists | 137 | 32.2% |
| Islamists | 117 | 27.5% |
| Left Wing | 74 | 17.4% |
| Foreign groups | 63 | 14.8% |

n= 426

Of the 1,744 total respondents nationally, 428 (24.6% of all respondents) were from agencies located in the northeast, making this population the largest regional group. From this total population of 428 eligible respondents, 426 (99.5%) answered the survey questions on local terrorist group presence.

As with the national-level data, simple frequency tests were run for each terrorist group type. Ranked from most frequently reported to least, the results were (n=426):

Anti-abortionists, 245 (or 57.5% of all respondents); Ethnic supremacist, 237 (55.6%); Right Wing, 158 (37.1%); Eco-terrorists, 137 (32.2%); Islamists, 117 (27.5%); Left Wing, 74 (17.4%); and Foreign groups, 63 (14.8%).

For the potential answer of a miscellaneous group presence, meaning a group was present but not listed as a survey option, 27 respondents, or 6.3%, said this was the case. An additional 13, or 3.1%, said that a group was present but they were not sure what type.

An interesting finding in this area was that the seven terrorist group types were ranked in almost identical order as the national data. The only discrepancy was that the groups ranked one and two for presence were reversed in the northeast compared to national data; ethnic supremacists were first nationally and anti-abortionists second, conversely in the northeast region. It was also interesting to note that the percentile rankings were very similar in the northeast region as compared to aggregate national data. For these reasons it is not surprising, but nonetheless important, to see that both anti-abortionists and ethnic supremacists were reported as present by a sizable *majority* of northeast respondents.

The number of northeast respondents who reported any group presence was surprisingly low. The northeast's 336 (78.5%) of 426 potential respondents reporting any presence was the lowest of any region. The other five regions ranged from 82% to 86.7% in reporting some terrorist group presence. Although the northeast's 78.5% was relatively low, it obviously still represented a considerable majority of respondents.

South

As summarized in Table X.X, the south region was nearly identical to national-level reporting rates, the only exception being their placement of left wing groups as the least often reported (foreign groups were least often reported in national data and in all other regions). The other notable feature of the south was the very high rate that ethnic supremacist groups were reported as present.

Table 5.3 South Region Group Presence

| | # of regional respondents | % of total regional pop |
|---------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Ethnic supremacist | 215 | 63.2% |
| Anti-abortionists | 196 | 57.6% |
| Right Wing | 153 | 45% |
| Eco-terrorists | 105 | 30.9% |
| Islamists | 94 | 27.6% |
| Foreign groups | 50 | 14.7% |
| Left Wing | 43 | 12.6% |

n=340

Of the 1,744 total respondents nationally, 340 (19.5% of all respondents) were from agencies located in the south. All 340 (100%) eligible from the south answered the survey questions on local terrorist group presence.

The rank-ordered list, again gleaned from simple frequency tests and ranked from most frequently reported to least, was (n=340): Ethnic supremacist, 215 (or 63.2% of all respondents); Anti-abortionists, 196 (57.6%); Right Wing, 153 (45%); Eco-terrorists, 105 (30.9%); Islamists, 94 (27.6%); Foreign groups, 50 (14.7%); and Left Wing, 43 (12.6%).

For the miscellaneous group response, meaning a group was present but not listed as an option, 10 respondents, or 2.9%, said this was the case. An additional 10, or 2.9%, said that a group was present but they were not sure what type.

The rank-ordered list closely resembled the national-level data, with the exception being the lowest end of the rank-order. In the south, respondents reported a higher foreign group presence than left wing group presence, the only region to do so. Beyond this difference, the seven terrorist group types were ranked in similar order and with similar percentile ranks as the national data. A striking finding here was the very large number of agencies reporting an ethnic supremacist presence (63.2% of all respondents). At 57.6%, anti-abortionists were the only other group type reported by a majority of respondents from the south region.

In regards to overall reporting, 280 (82.4%) of respondents from the south region reported some group presence. This is a clear majority, and is consistent with the national data and most other regions.

Midwest

Analysis of terrorist group presence in the midwest revealed several unique characteristics. First, as shown in table X.X, anti-abortionists usurped ethnic supremacists as the group type most often reported as present. Additionally, right wing groups were reported as present by a majority of midwest respondents, one of only three

regions to do so. Finally, eco-terrorist groups were severely under-represented in the midwest as compared to national data and other regions.

Table 5.4 Midwest Region Group Presence

| | # of regional respondents | % of total regional pop |
|---------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Anti-abortionists | 171 | 60.6% |
| Ethnic supremacist | 166 | 58.9% |
| Right Wing | 143 | 50.7% |
| Islamists | 75 | 26.6% |
| Eco-terrorists | 70 | 24.8% |
| Left Wing | 37 | 13.1% |
| Foreign groups | 29 | 10.3% |

n=282

The midwest region accounted for 284, or 16.3%, of the 1,744 total national respondents. Of the 284 respondents from the midwest region, 282 (99.3%) answered the local terrorist group presence survey questions.

The simple frequency tests run for each terrorist group type resulted in rankings as follows, from most frequently reported to least (n=282): Anti-abortionists, 171 (60.6%); Ethnic supremacist, 166 (58.9%); Right Wing, 143 (50.7%); Islamists, 75 (26.6%); Eco-terrorists, 70 (24.8%); Left Wing, 37 (13.1%); and Foreign groups, 29 (10.3%).

For the miscellaneous group response, 9 respondents, or 3.2%, said a group is present but not listed as an option. An additional 8 respondents, or 2.8%, said that a group was present but they were not sure what type.

The rank-ordered list for the midwest contained several departures from the national picture. First, anti-abortionists replaced ethnic supremacists as the most frequently reported group, though the majority of respondents reported both groups as being present. A second unique feature was that a third group, right wing, was also reported as present by a majority of respondents (though just barely, at 50.7%).

The significant drop in eco-terrorist group presence reported by midwest respondents was also striking. Eco-terrorist groups were reported at a rate of 39% of respondents on the national level and by a similar percentage by other regions, while just 24% of respondents in the midwest reported them as present. This drop in reporting also served to move Islamists past eco-terrorists in the rank-ordered list from 5th to 4th in the midwest.

The overall terrorist group presence was consistent with the national picture and other regions, with 233 respondents (82%) reporting that a terrorist group was present. Though on the lower end of the six regions, this represented a solid majority of respondents.

Central

The central region, smallest of all regions in the study population, ranked second in terms of percentage reporting any terrorist group presence. The critical findings in the region were the relatively low rates of ethnic supremacist presence, especially when

contrasted with the very high rates of reported right wing presence. Rates of reported presence of these two groups were the most extreme of all regions.

Table X.X Central Region Group Presence

| | # of regional respondents | % of total regional pop |
|---------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Anti-abortionists | 101 | 64.7% |
| Right Wing | 87 | 55.8% |
| Ethnic supremacist | 78 | 50% |
| Eco-terrorists | 57 | 36.5% |
| Islamists | 38 | 24.4% |
| Left Wing | 16 | 10.3% |
| Foreign groups | 4 | 2.6% |

n=156

Of the 1,744 respondents nationally, 158 (9.1%) were from agencies located in the central region, making them the smallest regional population. Of these 158 eligible respondents, 156 (98.7%) answered the terrorist group local presence survey questions.

As shown in Table X.X above, simple frequency tests were run for reported presence of each terrorist group type and were ranked as follows, from most frequently reported to least (n=156): Anti-abortionists, 101 (64.7%); Right Wing, 87 (55.8%); Ethnic supremacist, 78 (50%); Eco-terrorists, 57 (36.5%); Islamists, 38 (24.4%); Left Wing, 16 (10.3%); and Foreign groups, 4 (2.6%).

Of all respondents from the central region, 8 respondents, or 5.1%, chose the miscellaneous group response, meaning a group was present but not listed as an option. An additional 3, or 1.3%, said that a group was present but they were not sure what type.

The most interesting finding in the central region was the drop of ethnic supremacists to the third most frequently reported group. This is the only region in which ethnic supremacists were not in the top two, and also the only region in which they were not reported as present by a majority of respondents (only 50% of respondents from the central region reported them as present). The central was also one of only three regions in which a majority of respondents identified right wing groups as present, in contrast to the national picture.

Overall in the central region, 135 (85.4%) respondents reported a terrorist group presence in their local area. This percentile ranks second among all regions, with only the west region having a higher overall group presence, at 86.7%.

Southwest

The southwest region was characterized by uniquely high rates of right wing and Islamist group presence. As presented in Table X.X, the reporting of these two groups' presence created a rank-ordered list that contrasted sharply with all other regions and overall national data.

Table X.X Southwest Region Group Presence

| | # of regional respondents | % of total regional pop |
|---------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Ethnic supremacist | 115 | 66.1% |
| Right Wing | 108 | 62.1% |
| Anti-abortionists | 101 | 58% |
| Islamists | 66 | 37.9% |
| Eco-terrorists | 58 | 33.3% |
| Left Wing | 32 | 18.4% |
| Foreign groups | 14 | 8% |

n=174

Respondents from agencies located in the southwest represented 10.3% (179 of 1,744) of the total respondents nationally. Of these 179 eligible respondents from the southwest, 174 (97.2%) answered the local terrorist group presence survey questions.

The simple frequency tests run for each terrorist group type were ranked as follows, from most frequently reported to least (n=174): Ethnic supremacist, 115 (66.1%); Right Wing, 108 (62.1%); Anti-abortionists, 101 (58%); Islamists, 66 (37.9%); Eco-terrorists, 58 (33.3%); Left Wing, 32 (18.4%); and Foreign groups, 14 (8%).

For the miscellaneous group response, meaning a group was present but not listed as an option, 15 respondents, or 8.6%, said this was the case. An additional 12, or 6.9%, said that a group was present but they were not sure what type.

There were several important distinctions of the data from southwest respondents. The first was the very high rank ordered position and reported percentile (62%) of right wing group presence, placing them second behind only ethnic supremacists. The very high percentile was very unique to this dataset, and suggested that the southwest was unique in regards to right wing group presence. It was also interesting to note that

respondents from the southwest reported Islamist group presence at a rate almost 10% higher than the national aggregation (37.9% versus 28.1%), moving this group past eco-terrorists as the fourth most reported group present in the region.

The overall number of individuals reporting an overall group presence was 152, or 84.9% of regional respondents. This is the third-highest percentage among the six regions, and less than 1% lower than the second highest ranked group (the central region at 85.4%).

West

It was immediately clear that terrorist group presence in the west region was distinctive from all other regions and the national sample. This statement is based primarily on the extraordinarily high rates of reporting for eco-terrorist group presence. These high rates of reporting, as reflected in Table X.X, resulted in the west's striking uniqueness in regards to terrorist group presence compared to the national data and all other regions.

Table X.X West Region Group Presence

| | # of regional respondents | % of total regional pop |
|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| Eco-terrorists | 246 | 69.9% |
| Ethnic supremacist | 217 | 61.6% |
| Right Wing | 190 | 54% |
| Anti-abortionists | 188 | 53.4% |
| Islamists | 94 | 26.7% |
| Left Wing | 86 | 24.4% |
| Foreign groups | 37 | 10.5% |

n=352

The west region contained 353 of the 1,744 total respondents nationally (20.3%), placing it second only to the northeast in percentage of the national sample in this study. Of the 353 respondents representing the west region, 352, or 99.7%, answered the survey questions on group presence.

As with all other models, simple frequency tests were run for each terrorist group reported as present by a respondent. The responses for the west region were ranked as follows, from most frequently reported to least (n=352): Eco-terrorists, 246 (69.9%); Ethnic supremacist, 217 (61.6%); Right Wing, 190 (54%); Anti-abortionists, 188 (53.4%); Islamists, 94 (26.7%); Left Wing, 86 (24.4%); and Foreign groups, 37 (10.5%).

Seventeen respondents, or 4.8% of the total, said a group was present but not listed as an option by name. Eleven others, or 3.1%, said that a group was present but they were not sure what type.

The critically important data point in the west region was the position of eco-terrorist group presence as the group most often reported as present. This was distinctive for two reasons. First, eco-terrorists finished no higher than 4th of 7 in rank order of presence in any other region. Next, the very high rate of reporting, a remarkable 69.9%, was also extraordinary. The only group and region pairing that reported a percentile that came even close to this number was ethnic supremacists in the southwest, at 66.1%.

There were other features of the west region that made it unique in regards to terrorist group presence. Consider for example that the only portion of the rank order consistent with the national sample was the bottom three groups, in other words the three least reported (Islamists, Left Wing, and Foreign groups). The lack of consistency with

national and other region data is especially interesting considering the west region encompassed over 20% of the total national sample, second only to the northeast's 24.6%. This data indicated that there were features of the west region that made it unique when considering terrorist group presence.

A final point illustrating the uniqueness of the west in regards to group presence is the fact it has the highest percentage of affirmative reporting, with 306 respondents (86.7%) indicating that a terrorist group is locally present. This is well above all other regions, and markedly above the northeast's 78.5% reporting group presence. The fact there was such a disparity between the northeast and west regions, the two most populous in the study, is noteworthy.

Frequency Summary

Table X.X provides an overview of regional statistics on terrorist group presence, including rank ordering and percentage of respondents reporting presence per region. There are several points of summary data that are worthy of discussion.

First, with one exception, ethnic supremacists were consistently reported as present either first or second most often in each region. The exception to this statement was the central region, which reported them as present third most often behind anti-abortionists and right wing groups. Despite this relatively low ranking in the central region, ethnic supremacists were ranked first as the group most frequently reported as present in the national aggregate dataset.

Table X.X Group Presence by Region; Rank and *Percentage Reporting*

| | Northeast | South | Midwest | Central | Southwest | West |
|---------------------------|-----------|-------|---------|---------|-----------|-------|
| Ethnic supremacist | 2 56% | 1 63% | 2 59% | 3 50% | 1 66% | 2 62% |
| Anti-abortionists | 1 58% | 2 58% | 1 61% | 1 65% | 3 58% | 4 53% |
| Right Wing | 3 37% | 3 45% | 3 51% | 2 56% | 2 62% | 3 54% |
| Eco-terrorists | 4 32% | 4 31% | 5 25% | 4 37% | 5 33% | 1 70% |
| Islamists | 5 28% | 5 28% | 4 27% | 5 24% | 4 38% | 5 27% |
| Left Wing | 6 17% | 7 13% | 6 13% | 6 10% | 6 18% | 6 24% |
| Foreign groups | 7 15% | 6 15% | 7 10% | 7 3% | 7 8% | 7 11% |

Anti-abortionists were the second most often reported in regards to national presence. Though reported as locally present nearly as often as ethnic supremacists (only 1.4% less often nationally), the rate at which anti-abortionists were reported as present was consistent across regions. Even in the west, where they were ranked 4th of 7, anti-abortionists were reported as present by 53% of respondents. From these numbers it could be said that anti-abortionists were the most consistently reported group, as they did not experience the same fluctuation between regions as other groups.

Islamists experienced similarly consistent ranking across regions. Ranked as either 4th or 5th most present in every region, the percentage of respondents reporting an Islamist presence was between 24% and 28%, with a notable spike of 38% in the southwest region. Even with this spike, Islamist still placed only 4th of 7 in the southwest.

Finally, the consistency of the two groups least frequently reported was notable. Left wing and foreign groups were reported as present substantially less often than all other groups with such consistency that they were always ranked as the last two groups. The south region was the only population to deviate from the consistent ranking of left wing sixth and foreign groups seventh, instead reversing the two lowest places.

The frequency reports suggested that there was not a consistent, national picture of terrorist group presence, but rather there were regional characteristics of the data. To discover relationships between regions and groups, crosstabulations and chi-squared analyses were conducted. The results of these analyses are presented in the following section.

Crosstabulations

The frequency results presented above were useful in developing simple snapshots of the presence of terrorist groups at overall national and regional levels. While an important step, this analysis did little to explain the relationship between group presence and region. To address this research interest, crosstabulations were conducted to test for significant relationships between variables.

In each crosstab, a single group's presence served as the dependent variable. Each group presence variable was dichotomous; meaning the answer to the question of

group presence was either yes or no. Region variables were then recoded to build a new variable that allowed for the construction of a simple 2x2 table.

This recoding was accomplished to isolate single regions against all others. For example, for models crosstabulating group presence and the northeast region, the independent variable was a dichotomous measure of being in the northeast or not. Thus, there were six crosstabulations for each of the seven terrorist groups, one for each terrorist group to serve as the dependent variable against each of the regions.

Significance tests were set at a minimum value of $p < .05$. This meant that statistical tests were conducted to ensure results were not due to chance or random factors. In this case, using .05 as the threshold, all data considered statistically significant were considered 5% likely to be the result of chance, and thus 95% likely to have been a valid statistical finding. There were some cases where the significance threshold was returned at $p < .01$, meaning there was a 99% probability that the findings were statistically valid and not due to chance. Other models returned significance levels of $p < .001$, meaning there was less than a 1 in 1,000 chance that the results were due to chance. The significance level is always included in the discussion of the specific models and noted on all tables. If any of the crosstabulations returned significance scores above $p < .05$, they were considered statistically invalid and thus not analyzed further.

The total number of cases involved in each crosstabulation model was 1,730, representing 99.2% of the 1,744 total number of cases. The remaining 14 cases were rejected for missing data or other limiting information. For consistency with the previous section, the results of the crosstabulation models are presented and discussed by region in the same order as the frequency reports. Overall national data were not subjected to

crosstabulation since it represented the entire sample, and thus could not be used to test for association with specific terrorist group presence.

A table is presented for each crosstabulation model for clarity and quick reference. In each table, the *fe* column represents the number of respondents that were *expected* to report the presence of the terrorist group being questioned. The *fo* column relates the *observed* number of respondents who actually reported that group's presence. The raw numbers used to gain the frequency percentages are included in the table, but for ease of reading only percentages are used in the narrative text. To ensure clarity, the first model, which tested the relationship between the northeast region and right wing groups, uses additional figures to exhaustively illustrate how the models were deciphered. Further region-group crosstab discussions present raw numbers in the tables and percentages in the text for ease of understanding.

Frequencies that were statistically significant are bolded in the tables, with significance level noted by an asterisk (*). All significant relationships are explained in detail. The third column in the tables, *% of national total*, denotes what percentage of the national total of group presence was attributed to the region in the model. The fourth and final column presents the Pearson's *phi* statistic. The *phi* score, thoroughly explained in the chapter introduction, indicates the strength of the relationship between the two variables. *Phi* statistics are included only for significant variables.

Northeast

Setting the significance threshold at $p < .05$, 4 of the 7 terrorist group types did not have a statistically significant relationship with the northeast region. The groups with insignificant relationships were ethnic supremacist, anti-abortionists, Islamists, and left wing groups. The remaining three- right wing, eco-terrorists, and foreign groups- were significant and will be discussed individually. The summary of these crosstabulations is presented in Table X.X.

Table X.X Crosstabulation Summary- Northeast Region and Group Presence

| | <i>fe</i> | <i>fo</i> | % of national total | <i>phi</i> |
|-----------------------|--------------|---------------|---------------------|---------------|
| Anti-abortionists | 246.7 | 245 | 14.2% | - |
| Ethnic supremacist | 253.1 | 237 | 13.7% | - |
| Right Wing | 206.6 | 158*** | 18.8% | - .130 |
| Eco-terrorists | 165.7 | 137*** | 20.4% | - .079 |
| Islamists | 119.2 | 117 | 6.8% | - |
| Left Wing | 70.9 | 74 | 4.3% | - |
| Foreign groups | 48.5 | 63* | 32% | .061 |

*** $p < .001$

* $p < .05$

The crosstab analysis of right wing groups and the northeast region returned a negative association and a significance level of $p < .001$. Specifically, there were 48.6 fewer respondents in the northeast than expected who reported the presence of a right wing group [$fe(206.6) - fo(158) = 48.6$]. This raw number represented 37.1% of the within-region analysis. From this information it can be said that an association existed between right wing groups and the northeast region, in that agencies reporting from the northeast reported *no* right wing terrorist group presence at a rate of 62.9%. Since the

crosstabs table was a 2x2 construct, it is possible to compare the northeast to the other five regions in their reporting of right wing terrorist group presence. This exercise showed that respondents in the northeast accounted for only 18.8% of the national total of right wing group presence; a small percentile considering the northeast was the largest respondent population of the six regions. Finally, the *phi* statistic generated the level of association between the northeast region and right wing group presence. At - .130, the relationship was negative; in other words the two variables were negatively associated with each other. Next, the *phi* statistic's absolute value of .130 is considered very weak by conventional standards, since it operates on a scale of 0 to 1. However, as stated earlier, it is important to note even small measures of the *phi* statistic in social science research because the statistic is always useful if the relationship is significant. For example, in this case, the seemingly low level of .130 actually represents one of only four *phi* statistics over .1 in all forty-two crosstabulation models. Clearly the relative strength of association is worth noting, regardless of its smallness in a conventional sense.

The association between eco-terrorists and the northeast region was similarly significant and also showed a negative trend. First, respondents from the northeast region reported an eco-terrorist group presence only 32.2% of the time ($p < .001$). In regards to the national sample, respondents from the northeast reported only 20.4% of the total national eco-terrorist group presence, again a low number considering regional response proportions. The *phi* statistic of - .079 also illustrated the negative relationship and a relatively strong association between the two variables.

The final significant group presence category, foreign groups, was the only group in the northeast that showed a positive trend. At $p < .05$ ($p = .011$), respondents in the

northeast reported the presence of a foreign terrorist organization 14.8% of the time. Though this percentage was small, it is interesting to note that 32% of the national reporting of foreign group presence was accounted for by respondents from the northeast. This comparative percentage was very high, as it represented a proportion far above what would be expected by the respondent population distribution. The *phi* of .061 is roughly the average of the forty-two crosstab models.

South

Mirroring the northeast, crosstabs in the south region produced significant relationships with 3 of 7 groups. The four groups that did not show a significant relationship with the south region were ethnic supremacist, anti-abortionist, right wing, and Islamists. As reflected in Table X.X, only eco-terrorist, left wing, and foreign groups showed significant relationships.

Table X.X Crosstabulation Summary- South Region and Group Presence

| | <i>fe</i> | <i>fo</i> | % of national total | <i>phi</i> |
|-----------------------|--------------|---------------|---------------------|---------------|
| Ethnic supremacist | 202.0 | 215 | 20.9% | - |
| Anti-abortionists | 196.9 | 196 | 19.6% | - |
| Right Wing | 164.9 | 153 | 18.2% | - |
| Eco-terrorists | 132.3 | 105*** | 15.6% | - .081 |
| Islamists | 95.1 | 94 | 19.4% | - |
| Foreign groups | 38.7 | 50* | 25.4% | .052 |
| Left Wing | 56.6 | 43* | 14.9% | - .053 |

*** $p < .001$

* $p < .05$

Crosstabulation and associated tests indicated a relationship between the south region and eco-terrorist group presence ($p < .001$). As in the frequency reports, the crosstabs showed that 30.9% of respondents from the south reported the presence of eco-terrorist groups in their local area. It is important to note this strong relationship, though the crosstabulation indicated that eco-terrorist group presence reporting from the south region accounted for only 15.6% of the national total. From our frequency analysis we know that the majority of eco-terrorist presence was reported in the west, so the fairly small percentile of 15.6% may be more noteworthy than warranted by mere cursory examination. The *phi* statistic also indicates a stronger relationship than expected. At $-.081$, the strength of association is in the top third of all models.

Left wing group presence was also found to enjoy a statistically valid relationship with the south region ($p < .05$). Though significant, the percentage of left wing group presence in the south was low. Just 12.6% of respondents from the south indicated left wing presence, and these respondents account for just 14.9% of the national sample that reported left wing groups present in their local areas. Although worth noting, the *phi* statistic of $.053$ was among the lowest in any model.

Finally, foreign groups and the south region were found to share a relationship ($p < .05$). In this case the national proportion percentiles were considerably higher than the other significant group variables. While just 14.7% of all respondents from the south region reported foreign terrorist group presence, respondents from the region accounted for 25.4% of all respondents who identified a local presence of foreign terrorist groups. Recalling that the northeast region accounted for 32% of the national reporting of foreign

group presence, the total of the two regions was an astounding 57% of the nationally reported foreign group presence. This over-representation was extraordinary.

Midwest

As shown in Table X.X, only the variable representing eco-terrorist group presence was found to be significant with the midwest region, and the relationship was negative. Ethnic supremacist, anti-abortionists, right wing, Islamists, left wing, and foreign groups all returned insignificant results during cross-tabulation.

Table X.X Crosstabulation Summary- Midwest Region and Group Presence

| | <i>fe</i> | <i>fo</i> | % of national total | <i>phi</i> |
|-----------------------|--------------|--------------|---------------------|---------------|
| Anti-abortionists | 163.3 | 171 | 17.1% | - |
| Ethnic supremacist | 167.6 | 166 | 16.1% | - |
| Right Wing | 136.8 | 143 | 17.0% | - |
| Islamists | 78.9 | 75 | 15.5% | - |
| Eco-terrorists | 109.7 | 70*** | 10.4% | - .127 |
| Left Wing | 46.9 | 37 | 12.8% | - |
| Foreign groups | 32.1 | 29 | 14.7% | - |

*** $p < .001$

Analysis of the frequency reports showed a sizable drop in reporting of eco-terrorist group presence as compared to the national rate and other regions. It may seem surprising then that the only significant relationship for the midwest variable was with eco-terrorist group presence ($p < .001$), though the data point makes sense after

recognizing that the relationship was negative. While 24.8% of midwest respondents reported the presence of a local eco-terrorist group, this number accounted for just 10.4% of the national presence of eco-terrorist groups. The strength of relationship between the midwest and eco-terrorist group presence, though negative, was among the strongest of any crosstabulation model run for any variable. Supporting this statement, the *phi* statistic (-.127) of this relationship was the third highest of all forty-two crosstabulations.

Central

The central region exhibited significant relationships with three group presence variables, all three being negative. Presented in Table X.X, the three significant group presence variables were for ethnic supremacists, left wing, and foreign groups. The other four groups- anti-abortionists, right wing, eco-terrorists, and Islamists- all returned insignificant models.

Table X.X Crosstabulation Summary- Central Region and Group Presence

| | <i>fe</i> | <i>fo</i> | % of national total | <i>phi</i> |
|---------------------------|-------------|-------------|---------------------|---------------|
| Anti-abortionists | 90.4 | 101 | 10.1% | - |
| Right Wing | 75.7 | 87 | 10.4% | - |
| Ethnic supremacist | 92.7 | 78* | 7.6% | - .060 |
| Eco-terrorists | 60.7 | 57 | 8.5% | - |
| Islamists | 43.6 | 38 | 7.9% | - |
| Left Wing | 26.0 | 16* | 5.6% | - .054 |
| Foreign groups | 17.8 | 4*** | 2.0% | - .087 |

*** p < .001

* p < .05

The ethnic supremacist-central region crosstab model was significant at the $p < .05$ level ($p = .012$). The return of a significant relationship was interesting after noting that exactly half of all central region respondents reported an ethnic supremacist group presence. However, it must be remembered that ethnic supremacists were the most reported group nationally, at 59.3%. It is also important to recall that the central region is the smallest in terms of number of respondents. Thus, their high rate of 50% reporting a local presence of ethnic supremacists accounts for only 7.6% of the national picture. The *phi* statistic of $-.060$ also indicates this negative association, though it was among the weakest of all models.

The association between the central region and left wing groups was significant ($p < .05$), with a noticeably strong negative relationship. Only 10.3% of central region respondents reported a left wing group presence, which accounted for just 5.6% of the national total. While these numbers were significant, it is important to also note the *phi* statistic of $.054$, among the lowest of all models.

The third and final significant model involving the reported presence of foreign terrorist groups generated an even more striking negative relationship ($p < .001$). First, only 2.6% of central region respondents reported a foreign terrorist group presence, proportionally far less than the model's expected frequency rate. The negative association between foreign group presence and the central region is made even more apparent through a comparison of regional rates to aggregate national data; the central region accounted for just 2% of the national presence of foreign terrorist groups. This

strong relationship is also reflected in the *phi* statistic, which at -.087 is among the highest of all models.

Southwest

As presented in Table X.X, only two of the seven terrorist group presence variables were significantly related with the southwest region, namely right wing groups and Islamists. The presence of each group generated a positive relationship to the region. Ethnic supremacists, anti-abortionists, eco-terrorists, left wing, and foreign groups did not satisfy the statistical significance requirements of the models.

Table X.X Crosstabulation Summary- Southwest Region and Group Presence

| | <i>fe</i> | <i>fo</i> | % of national total | <i>phi</i> |
|--------------------|-------------|---------------|---------------------|-------------|
| Ethnic supremacist | 103.4 | 115 | 11.2% | - |
| Right Wing | 84.4 | 108*** | 12.9% | .091 |
| Anti-abortionists | 100.8 | 101 | 10.1% | - |
| Islamists | 48.7 | 66** | 13.6% | .074 |
| Eco-terrorists | 67.7 | 58 | 8.6% | - |
| Left Wing | 29.0 | 32 | 11.1% | - |
| Foreign groups | 19.8 | 14 | 7.1% | - |

*** p < .001

** p < .01

The relationship indicated through the crosstabulations of right wing groups and the southwest region was statistically significant (p < .001). First, 62.1% of respondents

in the southwest identified right wing groups as present, a number well above the expected frequency of positive responses. Rated against the other five regions, respondents from the southwest who identified right wing group presence accounted for 12.9% of the national total. Recalling that the southwest represented just 10.3% of the entire national sample, this number is noteworthy, as is the relatively high *phi* statistic of .091. This number, though small by conventional standards, represents a very high level of association relative to the other crosstabulation models in this section.

Islamic group presence was also significant at the $p < .01$ level ($p = .002$). The percentage of agencies reporting Islamist group presence was 37.9%, well above the expected percentage of positive reporting. The statistic of percentage of the national total of Islamist presence in the southwest, at 13.6%, was also well above the expected frequency, though the *phi* statistic of .074 was average for this set of models.

West

Left wing, right wing, and eco-terrorists all showed significant relationships in crosstabulation models with the west region. As should be expected from the frequency reports, the relationship between the west region and eco-terrorist presence was extraordinary. Ethnic supremacist, anti-abortionists, Islamists, and foreign groups did not have significant effects with the west region and are thus not discussed individually. These data are all displayed in Table X.X.

Table X.X Crosstabulation Summary- West Region and Group Presence

| | <i>fe</i> | <i>fo</i> | % of national total | <i>phi</i> |
|-----------------------|--------------|---------------|---------------------|-------------|
| Eco-terrorists | 136.9 | 246*** | 36.6% | .321 |
| Ethnic supremacist | 209.2 | 217 | 21.1% | - |
| Right Wing | 170.7 | 190* | 22.6% | .055 |
| Anti-abortionists | 203.9 | 188 | 18.8% | - |
| Islamists | 98.5 | 94 | 19.4% | - |
| Left Wing | 58.6 | 86*** | 29.9% | .106 |
| Foreign groups | 40.1 | 37 | 18.8% | - |

*** $p < .001$

* $p < .05$

Left wing presence was associated with the west region ($p < .001$) and indicated a strong contribution to the national total. Within the west region, 24.4% of respondents indicated the presence of a left wing terrorist group in their local area. This was well above the expected frequency. At 29.9% of the national total for left wing presence, but just 20.3% of the national sample population, the west region was clearly over represented in the area of left wing presence. The strength of this relationship can also be found in the *phi* statistic, which at .106 was the fourth highest of all forty-two models.

The national effect was markedly less for right wing group presence, though a significant relationship ($p < .05$) was found. Observed frequencies were higher than expected for right wing presence within the west region, at 54%. Though also higher than expected for percentage of the national total, at 22.6% the percentage of reported right wing presence in the west region was in line with its proportion of the national sample. The average nature of this relationship was also reflected in the *phi* statistic of .055, among the lowest of all models in this section.

The results of the crosstabulation model measuring the relationship between the west region and eco-terrorist group presence were extraordinary. As shown in Table X.X, the raw-number residual of the cells in the model, meaning the difference between expected and observed counts, was 109.1. This was exponentially larger than all other significant models in every region. There is obviously statistical significance to support the presence of a relationship between eco-terrorist group presence and the west region ($p < .001$), and the evaluation of response distributions showed this very strong positive association. A remarkable 69.9% of respondents from the west region reported eco-terrorist group presence, which accounted for 36.6% of the national total. Also remarkable was the *phi* statistic of .321, by far the highest of any model in this section. This number was nearly triple the next highest *phi* of .130. The relationship between these two strongly related variables will be explored further in subsequent chapters employing more sophisticated statistical techniques.

Crosstabulation Summary

Crosstabulations and chi-square analyses illustrated significant relationships between terrorist group presence and regions. These associations were suggested by simple frequency reports, though the extent to which there were relationships and the relationships' statistical significance were not clear until crosstabulations were conducted. From these findings it can be said that there are regional dynamics to terrorist

group presence. These group-region relationships are summarized below in Table X.X by displaying the *phi* statistic for each significant region-group association.

Table X.X Regional Crosstabulation Summary- Significant Group Presence Associations by *phi*

| | Eco-terrorists | Islamists | Anti-abortion | Ethnic-suprem | Right Wing | Left Wing | Foreign groups |
|-----------|----------------|-----------|---------------|---------------|------------|-----------|----------------|
| Northeast | - .079 | - | - | - | - .130 | - | .061 |
| South | - .081 | - | - | - | - | - .053 | .052 |
| Midwest | - .127 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Central | - | - | - | - .060 | - | - .054 | - .087 |
| Southwest | - | .074 | - | - | .091 | - | - |
| West | .321 | - | - | - | .055 | .106 | - |

Since it provides a quick visual reference for how terrorist groups are over- or under-represented in certain regions, Table X.X is also useful in providing an overview of how reported group presence was distributed across the respondent population. For example, it is easy to see that the negative associations between eco-terrorist group presence and the northeast, south, and midwest regions were more than offset by the tremendous over-representation of eco-terrorist group presence in the west region. It is possible from Table X.X to appreciate where groups were concentrated and where they were sparse, though the table is obviously somewhat lacking in ease of interpretation. Fortunately, through crime mapping software a more easily viewed spatial presentation of group presence can be created.

Spatial Analysis

Through the application of ArcGIS 9 computer mapping software, spatial representations of the reported presence of the seven terrorist group types were generated. This was accomplished by linking area codes from survey cases to maps of the U.S. The resulting graphics provided an excellent visual representation of what was presented earlier in this chapter; that there were strong relationships between regions and terrorist group types. The mapping process also indicated that there were strong intra-region characteristics of group presence. In other words, the mapping process complemented traditional data analysis by showing the presence of terrorist groups at much higher levels of detail.

Before presenting the maps, limitations of the study data must be restated as they relate to spatial representations. Primarily, it is important to remember that area codes in South Dakota, the upper peninsula and extreme northeast corner of Michigan, the Gainesville Florida area, and the extreme northwest corner of Texas were not represented in the study. Consequently, the corresponding areas of these states on the maps do not indicate any group presence. Beyond the issue of missing data, the spatial features of telephone area codes must also be considered. For example, the visual representation of positive reporting in the relatively large area codes of the central and west regions make it tempting to assume a larger relative terrorist group presence. This temptation must be tempered through recognition that sheer geographic size of an area code should not be mistaken for higher rates of reporting.

To alleviate this temptation, and for increased clarity, each map was drawn with a graduated scale of color with darker colors representing higher rates of reporting. The color of an area is thus much more important than its size, a critical point when comparing larger area code zones to the smaller zones in the more heavily populated northeast and south. Hence, the maps in this section must be viewed as only illustrations of rates of reported terrorist group presence per telephone area code. These words of caution are simply a reminder that the maps should not be viewed as the comprehensive presence of terrorist groups in the U.S., just as other statistical tests should not be viewed as an aggregation of data from every local law enforcement executive in the country. The spatial data are representations of the sample of local law enforcement professionals who participated in the study. As a reminder of the contextual characteristics of the maps, legends are provided that indicate the raw numbers of respondents reporting.

Maps of each of the seven groups are presented in Figure 1, ordered from the national ranking of most reported group to least. Analyses of these seven maps suggest that there are local concentrations of terrorist groups. Clearly, the maps complement earlier analyses that found associations between terrorist group presence and regions. The maps also convey how localized reporting affected the strength of association between regions and groups by illustrating the distribution of intra-region responses.

A surprising consistency of the maps was the concentration of all seven group types in certain respondent areas, specifically southeastern Pennsylvania; Salt Lake City, Utah; Fresno, California; and Portland, Oregon. Not surprisingly, these areas were well represented in the study population, though this does not diminish the fact that respondents in these areas consistently reported the presence of each terrorist group type.


The maps depicting ethnic supremacists, anti-abortionists, and right wing group presence showed very liberal response distributions. Since these groups were the three most-reported nationally, this was not surprising. It was however noteworthy that almost every region contained local concentrations of all three groups.


Maps showing the presence of much less-frequently reported groups were more illustrative. For example, strong concentrations of eco-terrorists in Oregon, Idaho, Montana, and the Sacramento metropolitan area in California further explained the west region's unique relationship with this group's presence. Likewise, the extreme over-representation of foreign groups in the northeast and south were mostly attributed to high rates of reporting in Washington, D.C. and the southeast region of Florida, contrasted by a surprisingly high concentration in the San Francisco Bay area of California.

Finally, the map depicting the presence of Islamist groups contained very interesting respondent concentrations. Besides the expected high-rates of Islamist presence in the Washington D.C and New York City area, there were extraordinarily high rates of Islamist presence throughout Arizona and in the Houston-Corpus Christi Texas corridor.

These unexpected concentrations and other data points mentioned above were not captured via traditional statistical measures. While valuable for providing easily comprehended visual counterparts to statistical results, the application of spatial analysis software also provided much greater detail of responses distributions within regions. This granted the ability to understand the data in much finer detail.

Figure 1. Reported Presence of Terrorist Groups





Chapter Summary

There were clear regional distinctions of reported group presence. Although these distinctions must be acknowledged, there were patterns that suggested proportional consistency across the national sample. For example, group types reported in the top three of every region except the west were fairly consistent; ethnic supremacist, anti-abortionists, and right wing groups were reported in similar proportions though with varying percentages across regional samples.

The exception to this trend of a consistent “top 3” was the west region, which reported eco-terrorist groups as present more often than any other group, at an extraordinarily high rate (69.9%). Although first in the west region’s rank ordering, eco-terrorist presence placed fourth among the seven group types in terms of local presence in the northeast, south, midwest, and central regions, and fifth in the southwest. Discounting the surge of eco-terrorist group presence in the west, however, the region did enjoy a consistency with the other regions, placing the “traditional” top 3 into the second through fourth rank-order spots.

On the other end of the rank-order spectrum, left wing and foreign groups were always the bottom two, with foreign groups being the lowest ranked group in terms of presence in every region except the south. Similarly, Islamist groups were the third least frequently reported in terms of presence in every region except the midwest, where Islamists moved past eco-terrorists into the fourth slot in rank order. Through evaluating the data, however, this jump in rank order seems to have been caused more by the

considerable drop in reporting of eco-terrorist presence than a surge in reported Islamist group presence in the midwest.

The application of computer mapping software developed a more exhaustive picture of the presence of terrorist groups nationally and regionally. The resulting spatial analyses complemented findings from the earlier statistical tests with the additional benefit of showing intra-region concentrations of reported group presence. The mapping process also showed, for the first time, pockets of terrorist group presence in area codes that were too small to affect regional statistics, but nonetheless illustrated important data points.

The successful evaluation of data on group presence allows for evaluation of the critical question to be addressed in the following chapter: beyond mere presence, who do respondents fear will act- and why?

Chapter 6: Who are we afraid of...and why?

Overview

The preceding chapter established the reported presence of terrorist groups nationally and regionally. Though group presence was important to identify, it is arguably more critical to forecast which groups are likely to attempt terrorist violence. To gain this forecasting data, frequency reports and crosstabulation procedures were applied to the dataset to see which groups were believed likely to act, which for the remainder of this study will be referred to as “group fear.” First, simple frequency reports generated overview information of group fear and allowed for simple comparisons with group presence data. The familiar crosstabulation procedure then created models that highlighted differences in group forecasting both regionally and nationally.

Once the demography of group fear was established, tests for predictive variables were conducted. For this study the identification of predictive factors was accomplished through logistic regression. Group fear was the dependent variables for the regression equations, meaning the models measured whether a group was feared to act or not. Since this measure was dichotomous, meaning the response had only two categories (in this case “yes” or “no”), the dependent variables were considered binary. Logistic regression is the correct procedure to analyze predictive relationships between variables when these characteristics are present.

Data for the regression models was tested against group fear according to the categories derived from the Routine Activity (RA) theory of crime. The RA theory and its application to this study were thoroughly explained in chapter 3. Briefly stated here, in applying RA to a study of terrorism there are three element that must be considered- the presence of local terrorist actors, the presence of local targets, and the absence (or weak deterrent effect) of a capable guardian. These considerations guided the disaggregation of variables to test for predictions of group fear. Variables were assigned either as identified terrorist group presence (local actor element), targets available in a given jurisdiction (local target element), or agency dynamics (capable guardian element).

Crosstabulations

As with group presence in the previous chapter, crosstabulations illustrated the presence of group fear in specific regions and compared single regions against the others and the aggregate national sample. A departure from the preceding chapter is that much less time was spent examining the overall intra-region reporting of respondents, and more on inter-region comparative data. These measurements provided adequate information to illustrate the distribution of group fear. It also allowed a neat transition to the regression models that follow.

Each crosstabulation model specified group fear as the dependent variable. These variables were dichotomous- the answer to the question of forecasting group activity is either yes or no. Independent variables were formulated to isolate one region against the

other five for comparative reporting. These region variables were also dichotomous, since responses indicated being in a given region or not. Since both the dependent and independent variables were dichotomous, the resulting crosstabulation models took the form of 2x2 tables.

Chi-square analyses were also conducted for each model to measure relationships between variables. This was accomplished by comparing actual responses to expected frequencies and percentages. Significance tests for the chi-square analyses were again set at a minimum value of $p < .05$. As should be expected, some models returned higher chi-square values than others, with correspondingly stronger levels of significance. All statistically significant measurements are again included in the discussion sections of each model. Of course, some crosstabulations returned significance scores above $p < .05$. These results are not included for discussion of relationships between variables; however, data in crosstabulations with insignificant chi-square findings are presented to illustrate reported frequencies.

Before reviewing the frequency report results, the measurements should be clearly understood. The percentages and raw numbers of group fear represent the entire sample population. For the national section, the total number of cases was 1,732. All percentages in the national data section are based on this number. Likewise, each region's frequency data is based on the entire region's population.

It must also be noted that the survey instrument did not restrict respondents on how many groups they could report as feared to act. Thus, the list of percentages will not equal 100%, since respondents could choose to report fear of as many groups as they wanted. The percentage of respondents that reported fear of a specific group simply

represents how many of the total sample feared that a particular group would act, regardless of their fear of other groups.

Each regional crosstabulation model reflects 1,730 cases, or 99.2% of the 1,744 total number of cases. The 14 cases not used for analysis were rejected for missing data. Results of the crosstabulation models are presented and discussed first at the national level, then by each region individually.

National

To obtain the aggregate national picture of which groups are feared to act, simple frequencies were run. Crosstabs were not used since national data is an aggregate view, and thus not suitable for comparison against other similar groups or a larger sample. Chi-square tests were also not conducted since crosstabs were not run; the fact the national sample is the aggregation of all respondents makes it inappropriate to measure as a variable with a relationship to group fear. Regional relationships to national aggregate responses are discussed in the individual region sections to follow.

Table X.X Fear a Terrorist Group Will Act- National Data

| | # of total respondents | % of total study pop |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Eco-terrorists | 758 | 43.8% |
| Islamists | 700 | 40.4% |
| Anti-abortionists | 629 | 36.3% |
| Ethnic supremacist | 591 | 34.1% |
| Right Wing | 487 | 28.1% |
| Left Wing | 207 | 12% |
| Foreign groups | 112 | 6.5% |

n= 1,732

The frequency reports uncovered two unexpected findings. First, as reflected in Table X.X, no group was predicted to act by a majority of respondents, the highest percentage being eco-terrorists at 43.8%. Second, and most surprisingly, was that the rank order list of groups feared to act was entirely inconsistent with group presence reported in the previous chapter. Eco-terrorists (43.8% of the total study sample) and Islamists (40.4%) were the top two most feared groups, and the only two to have been reported by over 40% of respondents as likely to perpetrate an act of terrorist violence in the future. This was a very intriguing data point, especially when considering that these groups were ranked fourth and fifth out of seven in reported group presence. Clearly this is an important development, and further analysis will be applied via regression models later in this chapter.

The lower percentages of respondents reporting group fear as compared to group presence was also true of overall group fear. Recall that 84.4% of all respondents

reported a terrorist group presence of any type. It was noteworthy then to see that only 78% of all respondents feared a terrorist attack, regardless of which group was feared.

Overall, the national distribution of group fear is best reported in rank order from most frequently reported to least. This list was reported as follows (n=1,732): Eco-terrorists, 758 (or 43.8% of all respondents); Islamists, 700 (40.4%); Anti-abortionists, 629 (36.3%); Ethnic supremacist, 591 (34.1%); Right Wing, 487 (28.1%); Left Wing, 207 (12%); and Foreign groups, 112 (6.5%). An surprisingly high 228, or 13.2%, said that a group would attempt an attack in the future, but the respondent was not sure what type. Finally, there was also an option on the survey to forecast an attack by a group type that was not listed as a choice in the survey. This miscellaneous category was chosen by 29 respondents, or 1.7% of the total response population.

Regional Breakdown

Though the national picture of group fear was important to develop, a greater understanding of group fear can be reached if responses are disaggregated by region. This allows for tests of relationships between fear of certain groups and specific respondent populations.

A total of nine models were run in each region's crosstabulations, one with each of the seven terrorist group types as the dependent variable and two final models with "miscellaneous group" or "any group" as dependent variables. A regional variable that isolated the region against all others served as the independent variable in each model.

Group variables that were found to have a significant relationship with the region have an asterisk (*) applied and are bolded. Any significant relationships are explained in detail, while insignificant relationships are not discussed beyond the simple percentage of positive responses.

As a reminder and for quick reference, the regions were broken down as follows:

- Northeast (CT, DC, DE, MA, MD, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT)
- South (AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, VA, WV)
- Midwest (IL, IN, IO, KS, MO, NE, OH)
- Central (MI, MN, ND, SD, WI)
- Southwest (AZ, NM, OK, TX)
- West (CA, CO, ID, MT, NV, OR, UT, WA, WY)

Northeast

Crosstabulation models of the northeast region returned some surprising data points. First, Islamists and ethnic supremacists were reported at rates completely at odds with the rates they were reported as locally present. Additionally, chi-square analyses of the crosstabulations found that Islamists, eco-terrorists, and right wing groups all held a statistically significant relationship with the northeast region. All of these findings are explored in depth.

As presented in Table X.X, the rank order list of groups feared to act by respondents from the northeast, was (n=426): **Islamists, 190 (or 44.6% of all respondents)***; Anti-abortionists, 163 (38.3%); **Eco-terrorists, 162 (38%)***; Ethnic supremacist, 134 (31.5%); **Right Wing, 82 (19.2%)***; Left Wing, 45 (10.6%); and Foreign groups, 32 (7.5%). Miscellaneous groups, meaning the respondent knew the

identity of a group but the group name was not listed as a survey option, were reported by 11 (2.6%) respondents. Finally, of all respondents in the northeast region, 65 (15.3%) believed a terrorist event will occur but were not sure what type of group would make the attempt.

Table X.X Northeast Region: Fear a Terrorist Group Will Act and Chi-Square Significance (n=426)

| | # of total respondents | % of total regional pop |
|-----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| Islamists | 190 | 44.6%* |
| Anti-abortionists | 163 | 38.3% |
| Eco-terrorists | 162 | 38%* |
| Ethnic supremacist | 134 | 31.5% |
| Right Wing | 82 | 19.2%*** |
| Left Wing | 45 | 10.6% |
| Foreign groups | 32 | 7.5% |

*** p < .001

* p < .05

There are elements in these data worth additional scrutiny. First is the prominence of Islamists as the most feared group, reported by 44.6% of respondents as likely to act in their local area. This is particularly intriguing since only 27.5% of northeast respondents reported Islamists as present in their local area. Conversely, ethnic supremacists were not feared to act nearly as much (at 31.5%) as they were reported present (55.6%). These two examples suggest that a group's mere presence has little to do with fearing that group will act. This relationship will be examined in much further detail in the regression section later in this chapter.

In the chi-squared analyses of the crosstabulation models, Islamists, eco-terrorists, and right wing groups were all found to have a statistically significant relationship with the northeast region. While this is not the same as suggesting causality, it does indicate that the group variables and the northeast region are associated in some way. These groups have “*” symbols included in Table X.X and are bolded.

In the model that includes Islamists, 44.6% of all respondents in the northeast believed an Islamist group will attempt a terrorist act in their local area. This frequency is higher than expected, and indicates an association between the northeast region and fear of Islamist groups ($p < .05$). Of all regions that reported fear of Islamist groups, the northeast accounted for 27.2% of the national total.

The relationship with eco-terrorist group fear was also significant ($p < .05$), but indicated a negative effect. The 38% of northeast respondents that reported fear of eco-terrorist groups was actually well below the expected frequency in the model, though they did account for 21.4% of the national total that feared an attack by eco-terrorists.

Lastly, the relationship shared by right wing groups and the northeast region was statistically the strongest of the three ($p < .001$), though also negative. The 19.2% of respondents that feared right wing groups were a much smaller percentage than expected by the model. Additionally, the northeast region was responsible for only 16.8% of the total reported fear of a right wing attack. This number is particularly low considering the northeast was the largest respondent population.

In terms of overall group fear, 76.3% of respondents in the northeast reported that they feared a terrorist attack, regardless of group type. This is fairly close to the percentage of respondents who reported the presence of a local group (78.5%). When

viewing this relationship, it is important to remember that the northeast had the lowest percentage of reported group presence. This low frequency of reported presence likely accounts for the close relationship between group presence and group fear in the northeast. The 2.2% residual between group presence and group fear in the northeast is by far the smallest compared to any other region and the national total.

South

Unanticipated findings in the south region included the significant jump in the fear of Islamist groups as compared to group presence, and a corresponding drop in the fear that ethnic supremacists would act. Only eco-terrorists were found to have a significant relationship with the region in crosstabulation chi-square analysis.

Table X.X South Region: Fear a Terrorist Group Will Act and Chi-Square Significance (n=340)

| | # of total respondents | % of total regional pop |
|-----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| Islamists | 139 | 40.9% |
| Anti-abortionists | 118 | 34.7% |
| Ethnic supremacist | 107 | 31.5% |
| Eco-terrorists | 104 | 30.6%*** |
| Right Wing | 83 | 24.4% |
| Left Wing | 36 | 10.6% |
| Foreign groups | 29 | 8.5% |

*** p < .001

Table X.X shows the rank order list of fear of terrorist groups in the south region, presented here from most often reported to least (n=340): Islamists, 139 (or 40.9% of all

respondents); Anti-abortionists, 118 (34.7%); Ethnic supremacist, 107 (31.5%); **Eco-terrorists, 104 (30.6%)***; Right Wing, 83 (24.4%); Left Wing, 36 (10.6%); and Foreign groups, 29 (8.5%).

Additional survey options were a miscellaneous category, meaning a known group was predicted to act but the name was not listed, and an “any” category, meaning a group would attack but its identity was unknown by the respondent. Of these potential responses, 6 (1.8%) chose the miscellaneous response and 40 (11.8%) reported that “any” group would attack in the future.

The south’s rank ordered list of group fear varied widely from its reported group presence. The most notable jump in rank from the group presence list was Islamist groups, which were reported as present by only 27.6% of respondents (fifth place) in the south region but were ranked as most likely to attack by 40.9% of the same population. The group with the biggest drop in presence versus fear was ethnic supremacists, who were most often reported present (63.2% of respondents) but considered likely to attack by only 31.5% of respondents, leaving them ranked third of the seven groups.

The south region experienced an over 5% drop in overall group fear as compared to overall group presence. While the 77.3% who reported fear of a terrorist event regardless of group forecast is a considerable total, it is considerably less than the 82.4% of agencies that reported a group presence.

Only the eco-terrorist group / south region crosstabulation model was found to show a significant relationship ($p < .001$). The 30.6% of respondents who reported fear of eco-terrorist groups seems sizable, but represents a much lower frequency than expected. This lower than expected frequency of reporting also explained why

respondents from the south account for only 13.7% of all respondents' fear of eco-terrorist groups.

Midwest

Crosstabulation chi-square analyses in the midwest region showed significant relationships with three terrorist group types: eco-terrorists, left wing, and foreign groups. As in other regions, Islamists were feared much more often than they were reported present, but not enough in the midwest to overtake anti-abortionists as the most feared group to act, as displayed in Table X.X.

Table X.X Midwest Region: Fear a Terrorist Group Will Act and Chi-Square Significance (n=282)

| | # of total respondents | % of total regional pop |
|-----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| Anti-abortionists | 103 | 36.5% |
| Islamists | 100 | 35.5% |
| Ethnic supremacist | 95 | 33.7% |
| Eco-terrorists | 90 | 31.9%*** |
| Right Wing | 81 | 28.7% |
| Left Wing | 22 | 7.8%* |
| Foreign groups | 10 | 3.5% * |

*** p < .001

* p < .05

The midwest region was anomalous in this dataset in that the group most often reported as present was also most reported as feared to act. In this case, anti-abortionists lend a rare consistency, though the percentage of respondents reporting fear was much

lower than presence, from 60.6% for presence to just 36.5% for group fear. At 36.5%, the midwest reporting of anti-abortionists as most feared to act was the lowest for any first place group in any region. It should thus be no surprise to see that only 75.5% of respondents from the midwest reported group fear overall, compared to 82% of respondents who reported a group presence in their local area.

The rank ordered list of group fear for the midwest region, listed from most frequently reported to least, was (n=282): Anti-abortionists, 103 (36.5%); Islamists, 100 (35.5%); Ethnic supremacist, 95 (33.7%); **Eco-terrorists, 90 (31.9%)***; Right Wing, 81 (28.7%); **Left Wing, 22 (7.8%)***; and **Foreign groups, 10 (3.5%)***. For the miscellaneous group response, 3 respondents, or 1.1%, said they believed a group would act but group identify was not listed as an option. An additional 45 respondents, or 16%, said an attack would come but they could not identify which group would perpetrate the act.

As with many other regions, Islamists were reported as feared to act by respondents more often than they were reported as locally present, at a rate of 35.5% feared to 26.6% present. Another surprising feature of data from the midwest was the lack of fear associated with ethnic supremacists. Though they were reported as locally present by 58.9% of all midwest respondents, ethnic groups were only reported as likely to act by 33.7% of the same population.

Chi-squared analysis discovered a relationship between three groups and the midwest region. The first group, Left Wing, was found to have a negative relationship ($p < .05$). The observed frequency of 10.6% was lower than expected, and accounted for just 7.8% of all respondents nationally reporting fear that left wing groups would act.

The second group, eco-terrorists, was also found to be negatively associated with the midwest region, though the relationship in this case was much stronger ($p < .001$). The 31.9% of respondents who reported fear of eco-terrorist groups was much less than expected, and accounted for just 11.9% of all respondents nationally who reported fear of this group.

Finally, foreign groups were found to have a relationship to the midwest region, also negative but not as strong a relationship as the others ($p < .05$). The 3.5% of midwest respondents who reported fear that a foreign group would act is lower than expected, and represents only 8.9% of the national total who fear foreign groups.

Central

The central region, smallest of the six regions, exhibited the familiar trend of large increases in fear of eco-terrorists and Islamist groups compared to these groups' reported presence. A main difference in the region as compared to the others was that these increases were not enough to push both groups into the top-3 most feared. As reflected in Table X.X, chi-square analyses on the crosstabulations showed that right wing groups, Islamists, and foreign groups all shared a significant relationship with the central region.

Table X.X Central Region: Fear a Terrorist Group Will Act and Chi-Square Significance (n=156)

| | # of total respondents | % of total regional pop |
|-----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| Eco-terrorists | 69 | 44.2% |
| Anti-abortionists | 65 | 41.7% |
| Right Wing | 61 | 39.1%*** |
| Ethnic supremacist | 50 | 32.1% |
| Islamists | 46 | 29.5%** |
| Left Wing | 13 | 8.3% |
| Foreign groups | 3 | 1.9%* |

*** p < .001

** p < .01

* p < .05

Overall, the central region's rank-ordered list from most often reported to least was (n=156): Eco-terrorists, 69 (44.2%); Anti-abortionists, 65 (41.7%); **Right Wing, 61 (39.1%)***; Ethnic supremacist, 50 (32.1%); **Islamists, 46 (29.5%)***; Left Wing, 13 (8.3%); and **Foreign groups, 3 (1.9%)***. Of all respondents from the central region, 4 respondents, or 2.6%, chose the miscellaneous group response, meaning a group is predicted to act but not listed as an option. An additional 22, or 14.1%, believed that a group will attempt a terrorist act but could not identify which group.

The central region showed an unanticipated regional feature, in that two terrorist group types increased their reporting of group fear as compared to group presence, while the other five groups all decreased in reported group fear. The first of these two groups, eco-terrorists, increased from 36.5% reporting their presence to 44.2% reporting belief they will act, causing them to move from the fourth most reported present group to first and most likely to act. As reflected in every other region and the aggregate national data, Islamists also saw an increase, from 24.4% reporting their presence in the central region to 29.5% of the same population believing they will attempt a terrorist act.

Overall, 78.8% of central region respondents reported that they fear a terrorist attack generally, regardless of which group will perpetrate the act. This percentage is down from 85.4% of respondents who reported a terrorist group presence.

Chi-squared analysis of the crosstabulations resulted in three groups showing a statistically significant relationship with the central region- right wing, Islamists, and foreign groups.

First, right wing groups showed a strong positive relationship with the central region ($p < .001$). The reported frequency of 39.1% of central region respondents who reported fear that right wing groups would act was much higher than expected. These respondents accounted for 12.5% of all respondents nationally who fear right wing groups will attempt an act in their local areas, a notable percentage considering the central respondent population is smallest of all six regions.

Next, Islamists and the central region showed a significant negative relationship ($p < .01$). The 29.5% of central region respondents who reported fear of Islamists were actually less than expected in the model, and accounted for 6.6% of all respondents who reported fear of Islamist groups.

Finally, the model that tested for a relationship between foreign groups and the central region was found to be statistically significant ($p < .05$). The 1.9% of central region respondents reporting fear of foreign groups, just 2.7% of respondents fearing foreign groups nationally, was less than expected by the model.

Southwest

The southwest's most intriguing dynamic was the overrepresentation of fear of ethnic supremacists and right wing groups. A very large number of respondents from the region feared these groups, resulting in a disproportionate contribution to national totals. Not surprisingly, these two groups evidenced significant relationships with the southwest region in chi-square analysis.

As presented in Table X.X, the rank-ordered list of groups feared to locally act by respondents from the southwest region was (n=174): Islamists, 78 (44.8%); **Ethnic supremacist, 73 (42%)***; Eco-terrorists, 70 (40.2%); **Right Wing, 65 (37.4%)***; Anti-abortionists, 57 (32.8%); Left Wing, 24 (13.8%); and Foreign groups, 15 (8.6%). An additional 19, or 10.9%, reported that an attack would occur but were not sure which group would attempt the act. For the miscellaneous group response, meaning a group was present but not listed as an option, 2 respondents, or 1.1%, reported this as the case.

Table X.X Southwest Region: Fear a Terrorist Group Will Act and Chi-Square Significance (n=174)

| | # of total respondents | % of total regional pop |
|---------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| Islamists | 78 | 44.8% |
| Ethnic supremacist | 73 | 42%** |
| Eco-terrorists | 70 | 40.2% |
| Right Wing | 65 | 37.4%* |
| Anti-abortionists | 57 | 32.8% |
| Left Wing | 24 | 13.8% |
| Foreign groups | 15 | 8.6% |

** p < .01

* p < .05

In regards to the overall fear, 73% of respondents reported that an attack would occur regardless of which group type would make the attempt. This is markedly less than the 84.9% of southwest respondents who reported the local presence of a terrorist group. This 10.1% drop for group fear as compared to group presence represents by far the largest difference in any region, and contrasts sharply with the 6.4% drop nationally.

As was the case with most regions, Islamists and eco-terrorist groups jumped from the middle of the pack of reported group presence to being ranked in the top three most feared groups in the southwest region. As the group most feared to act in the southwest, Islamists were feared by 44.8% of respondents, while just 37.9% of the same population reported them present. Eco-terrorists were feared to act by 40.2% of respondents and reported as present by just 33.3% of the same individuals.

Ethnic supremacists and right wing groups were the only groups to show a significant relationship with the southwest region in chi-square analysis, with both indicating a positive association. The 42% of respondents who reported fear of an ethnic supremacist attack was more than the model predicted ($p < .05$). This higher than expected reporting is likely the cause of the southwest's high proportion (12.4%) of the national sample reporting fear of ethnic supremacists. This percentage is particularly unexpected given the southwest's status as second only to the central region as smallest respondent population.

The relationship between right wing group fear and the southwest region showed stronger significance ($p < .01$), and a correspondingly higher proportion of the national total. The 37.4% of respondents reporting fear of right wing groups was much higher than the percentage expected by the model, and accounted for 13.3% of the total number

of respondents reporting fear of right wing groups nationally. Again, considering the relatively small size of the southwest region's respondent population, this percentage is very high.

West

As should be expected from the group presence data, issues associated with eco-terrorist groups dominated analysis of group fear in the west region. In fact, the number of respondents that reported fear that this group would act dwarfed even the disproportionate numbers associated with the group's regional presence. Not to be lost in this one group's domination on regional data is the fact that the west region's overall level of group fear is identical to their group presence, the only region to have numbers that are even remotely close. Finally, as reflected in Table X.X, right wing and left wing groups were significantly related to the west region through chi-square analysis of the crosstabulation models. These relationships are discussed in depth below.

Table X.X West Region: Fear a Terrorist Group Will Act and Chi-Square Significance (n=352)

| | # of total respondents | % of total regional pop |
|-----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| Eco-terrorists | 263 | 74.7%*** |
| Islamists | 145 | 41.2% |
| Ethnic supremacist | 132 | 37.5% |
| Anti-abortionists | 123 | 34.9% |
| Right Wing | 115 | 32.7%* |
| Left Wing | 67 | 19%*** |
| Foreign groups | 23 | 6.5% |

*** p < .001

* p < .05

Respondents from the west region reported group fear as follows, listed from most frequently reported to least (n=352): **Eco-terrorists, 263 (74.7%)***; Islamists, 145 (41.2%); Ethnic supremacist, 132 (37.5%); Anti-abortionists, 123 (34.9%); **Right Wing, 115 (32.7%)***; **Left Wing, 67 (19%)***; and Foreign groups, 23 (6.5%). Thirty-seven respondents, or 10.5%, said that a group would attempt a terrorist act but they were not sure what type. Only 3, or .9% of the total, said a group is present but not listed as an option.

A noteworthy consistency in the west region was the overall level of group fear as compared to group presence. The 86.6% who reported fear of any group is almost identical to the 86.7% who reported overall group presence. As stated above, similarity between these two measurements is very unique in the dataset.

As evidenced by Table X.X above, the reported fear of eco-terrorists in the west region was extraordinary. The west region's 69.9% reporting rate of eco-terrorist group presence was by far the highest percentage of any group in any region, but was still considerably smaller than the 74.7% of respondents who feared eco-terrorist groups in the same region. Conversely, ethnic supremacists showed a significant decline from reported presence to reported fear. With 61.6% of respondents reporting ethnic supremacist presence, the group was ranked second only to eco-terrorists for presence in the west region. Thus, the relatively low rate of 37.5% of respondents who fear ethnic supremacist groups is surprisingly low.

As with all other regions, Islamists ranked considerably higher on the group fear list as compared to group presence. While just 26.7% of west region respondents

reported Islamists as present, 41.2% of the same population reported fear that an Islamist group will act in their local area. If not for the noted relationship between eco-terrorist groups and the west region, Islamists would likely have been reported as most feared of all seven group types.

Not surprisingly, eco-terrorist groups were found to be associated with the west region through chi-square analysis. Since the relationship is so extraordinary, this relationship will be discussed last. Clearly, eco-terrorist group dominance in the west was the most dominant issue, but should not completely overshadow the significant relationships between the west region and both right wing and left wing terrorist groups.

First, left wing groups were found to have a strong positive relationship with the west region ($p < .001$). The 19% of respondents reporting fear is higher than the predicted crosstabulation percentage. This may not seem to be noteworthy, but is revealed as an important relationship when viewed in the context of left wing groups' very low frequencies of both presence and fear. In fact, the west region accounted for 32.4% of all respondents nationally who reported fear of left wing groups.

Likewise, right wing groups showed a positive relationship with the west region, though the model was not as strong statistically ($p < .05$). The 32.7% of respondents who reported fear of right wing groups was higher than expected, but represented only 23.6% of the national total. This number is fairly low considering the large proportional size of the west's respondent population.

Finally, and as expected, the model testing for a relationship between the west region and eco-terrorist groups yielded a very high significance score ($p < .001$). Comparison with the chi-square values of other significant models illustrates the

extraordinary strength of this relationship. In even the most significant models comparing other regions and group fear, the Pearson chi-square values were roughly 20. The west-region-eco-terrorist model yielded a Pearson chi-square value of 174.411, considered very strong.

The high Pearson coefficient is a result of the observed reporting frequencies as compared to expected frequencies. In the case of the west region and eco-terrorist group fear model, the 74.7% of respondents who reported fear that an eco-terrorist group will attempt an act of terrorist violence represented 108.8 more respondents than expected. This large residual is by far the largest of any model associated with any region or group. Surprisingly, these unexpectedly high numbers account for only 34.7% of the total number of respondents reporting fear of eco-terrorist groups nationally.

Crosstabulations Summary

Summarized in Table X.X, analysis of group fear data yielded clear regional characteristics. Some aggregate national consistencies were suggested, but none without regional exceptions discussed below.

Table X.X Most Feared Group by Region; Rank and Percentage Reporting

| | Northeast | South | Midwest | Central | South-west | West |
|---------------------------|-----------|-------|---------|---------|------------|-------|
| Eco-terrorist | 3 38% | 4 31% | 4 32% | 1 44% | 3 40% | 1 75% |
| Islamist | 1 45% | 1 41% | 2 36% | 5 30% | 1 45% | 2 41% |
| Anti-abortionist | 2 38% | 2 35% | 1 37% | 2 42% | 5 33% | 4 35% |
| Ethnic supremacist | 4 32% | 3 32% | 3 34% | 4 32% | 2 42% | 3 38% |
| Right Wing | 5 19% | 5 24% | 5 29% | 3 40% | 4 37% | 5 33% |
| Left Wing | 6 11% | 6 11% | 6 8% | 6 8% | 6 14% | 6 19% |
| Foreign Group | 7 8% | 7 9% | 7 4% | 7 2% | 7 9% | 7 7% |

In regard to overview data, the apparent lack of consistency between overall rates of group presence and overall group fear was notable. For example, national data showed a fairly wide gap of 6.4% (with 78% reporting group fear and 84.4% reporting group presence). Across regions, the difference between the two measurements varied widely, from almost no difference (.1% in the west) to a wide gap (10.9% in the southwest).

The most compelling result of group fear analysis was the surge of Islamist groups in regional and national reporting. Islamists were ranked as the first or second most-feared group in every region except the central, which had them ranked very low in the fifth of seven rank order positions. Even in spite of the very low reporting in the central region, Islamist groups were ranked as the second most-feared group nationally. The only group ranked ahead of Islamists nationally was eco-terrorists, which is in the top two in only two regions, central and west. If not for the west region's extraordinary reporting of fear of eco-terrorist groups, Islamists would be by far the most feared group

nationally. There is clearly something about Islamist groups that causes respondents of this study to fear they will act, regardless of whether they actually exist in the respondent's local area.

As mentioned previously, eco-terrorists were considered most likely to act by two regions, the central and west, and second most likely by respondents from the southwest (behind Islamists). This finding was particularly surprising when considering the apparent lack of similarity between the central and west regions. This regional contrast further illustrates the need to discover what factors predicts fear of certain groups. The statistical method most appropriate to discover predictive variables, regression, will be applied in the following section.

Regression Models

As discussed in the chapter introduction, regression models were designed to identify what influenced whether a respondent fears a certain group will act. In line with the theoretical framework of this study, the models were disaggregated into the three elements that make up the “chemistry” of whether a crime will occur under Routine Activity (RA) theory. These three elements are presence of local actors, availability of local targets, and the absence (or weak deterrent effect) of a capable guardian.

The dependent variable in each regression model was group fear. Logistic regression was appropriate because the group fear variables are binary, meaning they are coded 0/1 and indicate whether or not a condition is present. Since the scores for group fear are 0 (no fear) and 1 (fear), the categories are also mutually exclusive, in that

respondents cannot be in both categories at the same time. These features of the data make logistic regression analysis statistically ideal.

Logistic regression statistical methods create likelihoods that an event will occur based on a set of conditions. The measurement of likelihood is presented through coefficients generated by the regression models. These coefficients, also called log-odds and presented in the “B” column of the regression tables, indicate the direction and strength of the relationship between variables. Again, in the models used for this study, the event being predicted is whether a group is feared to act.

Although regression coefficients are convenient for quickly identifying whether a relationship is positive or negative, it is often difficult to deduce the strength of the relationship from the log-odds alone. The odds ratio, in the Exp(B) column in the tables, is a much simpler measure of strength. Odds ratios indicate how much the odds of being in a population (the binary dependent variable) increase for each level of increase in the independent variable. Thus, in this study, the odds ratios show how much more likely a respondent is to fear a certain group based on the independent variables. The Exp(B) statistic is explained in detail for all significant relationships.

The discussion of each model and corresponding tables include the model chi-square and R-square statistic. Model chi-square tests whether the model is statistically useful, and whether it predicts the relationship between variables better than chance. All chi-square statistics are presented along with the significance value. The R-square statistic indicates the percentage of the variance in the dependent variable accounted for by the model. There are several measures of R-square in logistic regression, but only the

Nagelkerke R-square is a standardized measure that varies from 0 to 1. For this reason the Nagelkerke R-square was chosen as the R-square statistic for all regression models.

All of the models below are saturated, meaning all like-variables were included as independent variables. For example, when testing the strength of local targets in predicting fear of certain groups, all target types were included in the model. Likewise, when testing for the value of group presence in predicting an attack by a specific group, all groups were included in each model. The inclusion of like-variables controlled for association between independent variables (target types, group types, etc.) and resulted in more accurate and more statistically stringent regression models.

1. Local Actors

The first of the three routine activity elements is the presence of a motivated offender; in this case, a terrorist group. To test this element of RA theory, regression models were developed to discover whether the presence of terrorist groups affected whether a group was feared to act. All seven group types, plus the “miscellaneous group” and “any group” responses, were included as independent variables. Since all nine possible group presence variables were included in the model, the potential interaction between independent variables was controlled for and each model represented a more stringent construct.

There are seven regression models below, one with each of the seven group types as the dependent variable. This was necessary since the dichotomous response of group fear was given per specific group; i.e. a yes or no response to the question, “will a left wing group act in your local area?” General statistics and significant relationships are discussed for each individual model.

Left Wing

The regression model for fear of left wing groups and group presence, presented in Table X.X, yielded a strong statistical model with significant predictive relationships. Not surprisingly, the presence of left wing groups is a strong predictor of left wing group fear ($p < .001$). The presence of eco-terrorists and miscellaneous groups were also significant predictors of left wing group fear, though with substantially smaller odds ratios.

Table X.X: Logistic Regression of Fear of Left Wing Groups on Group Presence

| <i>Independent Variable (group presence)</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>s.e. of B</i> | <i>Exp(B)</i> |
|--|-----------------|------------------|---------------|
| Left Wing | 2.837*** | .220 | 17.067 |
| Right Wing | .051 | .214 | 1.052 |
| Islamist | -.162 | .218 | .850 |
| Eco-terrorist | .778*** | .208 | 2.177 |
| Anti-Abortionist | .130 | .235 | 1.139 |
| Ethnic Supremacist | -.179 | .225 | .836 |
| Foreign Groups | -.006 | .236 | .994 |
| Miscellaneous Group | .896** | .325 | 2.451 |
| Any Group | .204 | .557 | 1.227 |
| (constant) | -3.427 | | |

N = 1,732

Chi-Square = 379.831

*** p < .001

**p < .01

The very high chi-square of 379.831 ($p < .001$) indicated that the model is correctly specified and is statistically useful. The Nagelkerke R-square, which indicated the percentage of the dependent variable's variance accounted for by the predictor variables, is .379. From this statistic we can state that group presence variables account for 38% of the variation in fear of left wing groups. This 38% is considered a high number in social science research, and is the second highest R-square among the seven models.

As mentioned above, the presence of three specific groups were predictive of fear of left wing groups. The first, left wing presence, was intuitive and very strong. The regression coefficient in the B column indicates a positive relationship, meaning that affirmative reporting of left wing presence increased the likelihood of fearing left wing

groups. The odds ratio of 17.067 in the Exp(B) column means that respondents who reported left wing group presence were 17.1 times more likely to fear that group will act. This odds ratio is the second-highest odds ratio among all seven models, behind only eco-terrorists' 19.2.

Besides left wing groups, the presence of both eco-terrorist groups and miscellaneous groups were significant predictors of left wing group fear. Eco-terrorists ($p < .001$) showed a positive regression coefficient of .778 and an odds ratio of 2.177, meaning respondents who reported an eco-terrorist presence are 2.2 times more likely to fear left wing groups. The final significant group presence variable was the miscellaneous category ($p < .01$), where a respondent could name a group that wasn't listed as an option. There were 86 total responses in the miscellaneous category. Most of these 86 respondents wrote-in a motorcycle or street gang by name, or provided the name of an animal rights group. Miscellaneous group presence provided a positive coefficient and odds ratio of 2.451, meaning respondents were 2.5 times more likely to fear left wing groups if they reported a miscellaneous group presence.

Right Wing

The regression model that tested for predictors of right wing group fear against group presence (Table X.X) was statistically significant and well specified, and identified only right wing presence as a predictor variable. The model's statistical usefulness was indicated through the very high chi-square score of 431.672 ($p < .001$). The Nagelkerke

R-square was .317; meaning 32% of the variance of fear of right wing groups is explained by group presence. This percentage is very high.

As should be expected, the presence of right wing groups predicted fear of that group. The coefficient of 2.490 indicated a positive relationship while the very high odds ratio of 12.066 showed a strong predictive value, in that respondents who reported a right wing presence were more than 12 times as likely to report fear of right wing groups than those who did not report the group's presence.

Table X.X: Logistic Regression of Fear of Right Wing Groups on Group Presence

| <i>Independent Variable (group presence)</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>s.e. of B</i> | <i>Exp(B)</i> |
|--|-----------------|------------------|---------------|
| Left Wing | -.116 | .175 | .891 |
| Right Wing | 2.490*** | .158 | 12.066 |
| Islamist | -.170 | .152 | .843 |
| Eco-terrorist | .179 | .136 | 1.196 |
| Anti-Abortionist | .210 | .145 | 1.234 |
| Ethnic Supremacist | .067 | .150 | 1.070 |
| Foreign Groups | -.201 | .198 | .818 |
| Miscellaneous Group | .137 | .276 | 1.147 |
| Any Group | .259 | .374 | 1.296 |
| (constant) | -2.669 | | |

N = 1,732

Chi-Square = 431.672

*** p < .001

Islamists

The regression model predicting fear of Islamist groups is presented in Table X.X. The model was significant, and showed significant predictive values in four of the nine group presence variables. Overall, the model generated a chi-square value of 388.907 ($p < .001$), indicating statistical usefulness. The Nagelkerke R-square was .272, meaning 27% of the variation in fear of Islamist groups was explained by group presence. Though this number is high for social science, it was considerably lower than most of the other models.

Table X.X: Logistic Regression of Fear of Islamist Groups on Group Presence

| <i>Independent Variable (group presence)</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>s.e. of B</i> | <i>Exp(B)</i> |
|--|-----------------|------------------|---------------|
| Left Wing | .483** | .173 | 1.622 |
| Right Wing | -.234 | .126 | .791 |
| Islamist | 1.776*** | .137 | 5.907 |
| Eco-terrorist | .347** | .126 | 1.415 |
| Anti-Abortionist | .354** | .127 | 1.425 |
| Ethnic Supremacist | -.035 | .130 | .965 |
| Foreign Groups | .350 | .193 | 1.419 |
| Miscellaneous Group | .147 | .253 | 1.158 |
| Any Group | .332 | .306 | 1.393 |
| (constant) | -1.255 | | |

N = 1,732

Chi-Square = 388.907

*** $p < .001$

** $p < .01$

All four significant group presence variables showed a positive relationship, meaning the presence of these groups meant a greater likelihood that Islamists would be feared. Logically, the highest odds ratio was for Islamist group presence. The odds ratio

of 5.907 associated with Islamist presence is high, showing that respondents reporting Islamist group presence are 5.9 times as likely to fear Islamists. Though this number is high for a logistic regression equation, it is second lowest among the seven models.

Besides Islamist group presence, reported presence of left wing groups, eco-terrorists, and anti-abortionists were significant predictors of Islamist group fear. Though significant, the associated odds ratios were relatively small: left wing group presence produced an odds ratio of just 1.6, while eco-terrorist and anti-abortionist group presence generated odds ratios of just 1.4.

Eco-terrorists

The model developed to see which groups' presence predicted fear of eco-terrorists was statistically significant, and identified predictive independent variables. A surprising feature of this regression model was a negative relationship, specifically that respondents who reported the presence of ethnic supremacists were less likely to fear eco-terrorists. The regression table is presented as Table X.X.

Table X.X: Logistic Regression of Fear of Eco-terrorist Groups on Group Presence

| <i>Independent Variable (group presence)</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>s.e. of B</i> | <i>Exp(B)</i> |
|--|-----------------|------------------|---------------|
| Left Wing | .294 | .199 | 1.342 |
| Right Wing | .315* | .138 | 1.370 |
| Islamist | -.247 | .164 | .781 |
| Eco-terrorist | 2.955*** | .147 | 19.203 |
| Anti-Abortionist | .279 | .143 | 1.322 |
| Ethnic Supremacist | -.479** | .149 | .620 |
| Foreign Groups | -.379 | .216 | .685 |
| Miscellaneous Group | .324 | .287 | 1.383 |
| Any Group | -.074 | .351 | .929 |
| (constant) | -1.415 | | |

N = 1,732

Chi-Square = 713.892

*** p < .001

** p < .01

* p < .05

Overall, the model showed a chi-square of 713.892, very high and significant at $p < .001$. The Nagelkerke R-square was also very high at .453, meaning group presence accounted for over 45% of the variation in fear of eco-terrorists. This number is extraordinarily high, and is by far the highest R-square of the seven models.

Three group presence variables were significant predictors of fear of eco-terrorists. Right wing and eco-terrorist presence predicted increased fear that an eco-terrorist group would act, while an ethnic supremacist presence showed a negative relationship. The strongest predictive variable, as expected, was eco-terrorist group presence. The odds ratio of 19.203 is the highest of all seven regression models ($p < .001$), and indicated that respondents who reported eco-terrorist group presence were 19.2

times more likely to fear them. The presence of right wing groups showed a similar relationship, though with an odds ratio of just 1.37 ($p < .05$) it is much less valuable as a predictor variable.

The negative relationship between ethnic supremacist group presence and fear of eco-terrorists is particularly noteworthy. As reflected in Table X.X, respondents who reported an ethnic supremacist presence are .62 times *less* likely to report fear of eco-terrorists.

Anti-abortionists

The regression model that tested which groups' presence predicted fear of anti-abortionists generated an unexpected finding, in that the presence of eco-terrorists was significant. As with all other models, the presence of the group listed as the dependent variable was the most predictive.

Overall model statistics showed a high chi-square of 399.803, $p < .001$. The Nagelkerke R-square is .282, meaning 28.2% of the variation in fear of anti-abortionists is explained by group presence. This is high for social science, and consistent with the other fear-presence models.

Table X.X: Logistic Regression of Fear of Anti-abortionist Groups on Group Presence

| <i>Independent Variable (group presence)</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>s.e. of B</i> | <i>Exp(B)</i> |
|--|-----------------|------------------|---------------|
| Left Wing | .195 | .164 | 1.215 |
| Right Wing | -.071 | .126 | .932 |
| Islamist | .099 | .138 | 1.105 |
| Eco-terrorist | .380** | .126 | 1.462 |
| Anti-Abortionist | 2.172*** | .148 | 8.776 |
| Ethnic Supremacist | -.075 | .135 | .928 |
| Foreign Groups | -.006 | .178 | .994 |
| Miscellaneous Group | -.102 | .259 | .903 |
| Any Group | .272 | .328 | 1.312 |
| (constant) | -2.166 | | |

N = 1,732

Chi-Square = 399.803

*** p < .001

** p < .01

The presence of both eco-terrorists and anti-abortionists predicted fear of anti-abortionists. Eco-terrorist presence showed a positive coefficient, and an odds ratio of 1.462, meaning respondents with an eco-terrorist presence are 1.5 times more likely to fear anti-abortionists. Of course, this odds ratio is considerably less than the 8.776 associated with anti-abortionists presence. Though this number indicates that respondents with an anti-abortionist presence are 8.8 times more likely to fear them, the odds ration is notably smaller than the fear/presence pairings in other models.

Ethnic Supremacists

The regression model using fear of ethnic supremacist groups as the dependent variable was very unique. While the model specifics were identical to those used to test fear of other group types, the presence of six different groups proved to be significant predictors of fear that ethnic supremacists would act in a respondent's local area. Considering that there are a total of only nine groups in the model, this number is extraordinary.

Table X.X: Logistic Regression of Fear of Ethnic Supremacist Groups on Group Presence

| <i>Independent Variable (group presence)</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>s.e. of B</i> | <i>Exp(B)</i> |
|--|-----------------|------------------|---------------|
| Left Wing | .053 | .166 | 1.055 |
| Right Wing | .325** | .123 | 1.383 |
| Islamist | -.307* | .140 | .736 |
| Eco-terrorist | .430*** | .125 | 1.537 |
| Anti-Abortionist | .288* | .130 | 1.334 |
| Ethnic Supremacist | 1.749*** | .145 | 5.749 |
| Foreign Groups | -.097 | .178 | .907 |
| Miscellaneous Group | -.097 | .259 | .907 |
| Any Group | .658* | .315 | 1.931 |
| (constant) | -2.307 | | |

N = 1,732

Chi-Square = 324.469

*** p < .001

** p < .01

* p < .05

The model chi-square is 324.469 ($p < .001$), indicating a statistically useful model. The Nagelkerke R-square of .236 indicates that 23.6% of the variation in fear of ethnic supremacists is explained by terrorist group presence. This R-square measure is the smallest of all seven fear-presence regression models.

Of the six significant group presence variables, only Islamic group presence exhibited a negative relationship ($p < .05$). The odds ratio of .736 associated with Islamist group presence means that respondents who reported an Islamic group presence are .736 times *less* likely to fear ethnic supremacist groups. The strongest predictor of fear of ethnic supremacists is ethnic supremacist group presence, with an odds ratio of 5.749. Though obviously a strong relationship, this odds ratio is the smallest among all seven models.

The other four groups with significant coefficients were right wing, eco-terrorists, anti-abortionists, and the “any group” option. Respondents chose “any group” when they thought a group would act but were not sure which type. These four variables produced odds ratios between 1.38 and 1.93.

Foreign groups

Explained in Table X.X, the model designed to predict fear of foreign groups was statistically significant and produced two significant independent variables. As should be expected, foreign group presence was the most predictive, while the miscellaneous group presence variable was also a significant predictor of fear of foreign terrorist groups.

Table X.X: Logistic Regression of Fear of Foreign Groups on Group Presence

| <i>Independent Variable (group presence)</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>s.e. of B</i> | <i>Exp(B)</i> |
|--|-----------------|------------------|---------------|
| Left Wing | .350 | .281 | 1.419 |
| Right Wing | .248 | .267 | 1.281 |
| Islamist | .100 | .275 | 1.105 |
| Eco-terrorist | .489 | .264 | 1.631 |
| Anti-Abortionist | .041 | .301 | 1.042 |
| Ethnic Supremacist | .063 | .287 | 1.065 |
| Foreign Groups | 2.667*** | .254 | 14.398 |
| Miscellaneous Group | .823* | .417 | 2.278 |
| Any Group | .140 | .692 | 1.151 |
| (constant) | -4.151 | | |

N = 1,732

Chi-Square = 212.990

*** p < .001

* p < .05

Overall, the model generated a chi-square statistic of 212.990, $p < .001$. The Nagelkerke R-square shows us that 30% of the variation in fear of foreign groups is accounted for by group presence, a large percentage.

The coefficients for both significant predictive variables were positive, meaning the presence of these groups increased likelihood that respondent feared that a foreign group would act. The variable with the greatest predictive value was the presence of foreign groups, with a very high odds ratio of 14.398, meaning that respondents with a foreign group presence are 14.4 times more likely to fear foreign groups ($p < .001$).

Respondents who reported a miscellaneous group presence, which meant they chose to

write-in a group name that was not listed as an option, were 2.3 times more likely to fear attacks by foreign groups ($p < .05$).

Summary of Fear-Presence Regression

The seven regression models explained above used fear that a certain group would act as the dependent variable. Local presence of terrorist groups was used as the independent, or predictor, variables. In each regression model the independent variables were comprised of seven named terrorist groups and two general representations of group presence- the “miscellaneous” and “any group” categories. Since each model included all nine types of group presence as predictor variables, interaction among the variables was controlled for and resulted in statistically stringent models.

Each model was considered significant, and returned high Nagelkerke R-square statistics. In each model, these R-square statistics provided the percentage of the variance in the group fear dependent variable explained by the group presence predictor variables. While all R-square statistics could be considered high, they varied according to which group served as the dependent variable. All R-square statistics are summarized in Table X.X.

Table X.X: Summary Statistics for Fear / Presence Regression Models- R^2 and Odds Ratios

| Group Type | Nagelkerke R^2 | Odds Ratio |
|--------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------|
| Left Wing | .38 | 17 |
| Right Wing | .32 | 12 |
| Islamist | .27 | 6 |
| Eco-terrorist | .45 | 19 |
| Anti-Abortionist | .28 | 9 |
| Ethnic Supremacist | .24 | 6 |
| Foreign Groups | .30 | 14 |

*** All models were significant at $p < .001$

The value of group presence in predicting fear of that group was clear in each model, though the odds ratios varied widely depending on the group listed as the dependent variable. The summary of all odds ratios is included in Table X.X. From this data it is apparent that though fear of a group is predicted by the group's presence, the strength of the prediction depends on which group is being discussed. Stated differently, how much relationship there is between group presence and group fear depends on the group type. Despite the distinctions among group types, however, the models presented above show a clear and universally strong relationship between local actor presence and fear that a group will attempt a terrorist attack.

2. Local Targets

The second of the three Routine Activity elements is target availability. To test this element, logistic regression models were designed to discover if the availability of certain types of targets predicted fear that a terrorist group would attempt an attack.

As with group presence, the dependent variable in the target availability models was fear of a specific terrorist group. There were seven models, one for each of the terrorist group types to serve as the dependent variable.

Due to the complexity of the dataset's section on target availability, the independent variables must be explained in detail. There were twenty-four categories of targets, listed in Table X.X. Survey respondents were asked to identify which targets were present in four zones relative to their jurisdictions; in their jurisdiction, in an adjacent jurisdiction, within 30 miles of their jurisdiction, and 30 or more miles from their jurisdiction only if the target has an effect on local agency operations.

Table X.X Target Categories Included in Regression Models*

| | | | |
|--------------------------------------|--|---|--|
| abortion clinic | international airport | regional airport | communication center |
| fuel storage facility | shopping mall | seaport (cargo) | seaport (passenger) |
| military installation | hospital | animal laboratory | water reservoir |
| rail system infrastructure | power plant (non-nuclear) | nuclear power plant | sports and entertainment complex |
| chemical/petrochemical plant | federal government complex | nuclear weapons or storage facility | commercial landmark (skyscraper, etc.) |
| farmstead (livestock, storage, etc.) | major financial or insurance institution | cultural landmark (Statue of Liberty, etc.) | transportation infrastructure (bridge, tunnel, etc.) |

* For a more complete explanation of each target variable, please see page XX of the survey instrument in Appendix XX

To add strength to the logistic regression procedure, a scale variable was developed for each target category. This scale variable was a proximity score for each target category, with the following values assigned: 4 points for in-jurisdiction, 3 points for adjacent, 2 for within 30 miles, and 1 for outside 30 miles with a local effect. Responses reflecting a target as not available or outside 30 miles and no local effect were scored zero. Thus, the scale score per target availability ranges from 0 (no availability) to 10 (available in every zone).

The twenty-four target variable scale scores were used as the independent variables in each logistic regression model. Since the inclusion of all twenty-four target variables resulted in regression models that were very large, only significant target variables are included in individual tables and discussion. Table X.X can be consulted to see which target variables were not significant predictors of group fear.

After each model is explained, summary results will be shown that present total number of predictors per group, R-square statistics, the strongest predictive target type per model, and the corresponding odds ratios.

Left Wing

As shown in table X.X, cultural landmarks and animal testing laboratories were the only two target categories that predicted fear that a left wing group would act. Both targets generated positive coefficients, meaning that the higher the target location score, the more likely left wing groups were to be feared. The fact that only two target

categories were predictive of left wing group fear is noteworthy, as only ethnic supremacists had so few predictor variables.

Table X.X: Logistic Regression of Fear of Left Wing Groups on Target Availability

| <i>Independent Variable (target)</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>s.e. of B</i> | <i>Exp(B)</i> |
|--|---------------|------------------|---------------|
| Cultural Landmark | .117* | .048 | 1.125 |
| Animal Testing Laboratory | .140** | .045 | 1.150 |
| (constant) | -2.767 | | |

N = 1,709

Chi-Square = 124.438

** p < .01

* p < .05

The chi-square statistic of 124.438 ($p < .001$) indicated that the model was statistically useful. The Nagelkerke R-square was fairly low, at .135, meaning that just 13.5% of the variation in group fear was explained by target availability.

The odds ratio for cultural landmarks was 1.125 ($p < .05$), meaning for every one-unit change in the proximity of cultural landmarks, a respondent was 1.1 times more likely to fear an attack by a left wing group. Considering that the proximity scale is 0-10, this number is fairly large.

The proximity of animal testing laboratories exhibited stronger significance ($p < .01$) and a larger odds ratio of 1.2. Thus, as the proximity of an animal testing laboratory was closer, the respondent was 1.2 times more likely to fear left wing groups.

Right Wing

There were several surprising characteristics of the regression model predicting right wing group fear from target categories. Displayed in Table X.X, there are five predictive variables, second most among the seven models. There is also a negative relationship with cargo seaports that was unexpected and worth noting.

Table X.X: Logistic Regression of Fear of Right Wing Groups on Target Availability

| <i>Independent Variable (target)</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>s.e. of B</i> | <i>Exp(B)</i> |
|--|----------------|------------------|---------------|
| Farmstead | .108*** | .030 | 1.113 |
| Cultural Landmark | .079* | .036 | 1.083 |
| Seaport (cargo) | -.125* | .055 | .882 |
| Sports/entertainment Complex | .087* | .037 | 1.091 |
| Water Reservoir | .070* | .034 | 1.072 |
| (constant) | -1.523 | | |

N = 1,709
 Chi-Square = 89.985
 *** p < .001
 * p < .05

The overall models produced a chi-square value of 89.985 (p < .001), showing that the model was statistically sound. The Nagelkerke R-square was very low, at just .074, meaning just 7.4% of the variance in right wing group fear was explained by target availability. This number is considered very low in social science research and is the second lowest of all seven models.

The single most predictive target category was farmstead, which was comprised of agriculture infrastructure, farm distribution, and similar sub-industries. The coefficient of .108 ($p < .001$) and odds ratio of 1.113 were very strong. This odds ratio indicates that for every one-unit increase in farmstead target proximity, the respondent was 1.1 times more likely to fear an attack by a right wing group.

The other three target types that predicted increased fear of right wing groups were cultural landmarks, sport and entertainment complexes, and water reservoirs. All three variables were significant at the $p < .05$ level and produced odds ratios of 1.1. Finally, cargo seaports had a negative effect on predicting fear of right wing groups, in that the closer they were to a respondent the less likely they were to fear right wing groups. This is of course likely due to geography, since the regions reporting fear of right wing groups were not in coastal areas.

Islamists

The regression model with Islamist group fear as the dependent variable was the most intriguing of the seven due to three compelling findings. First, seven target categories were found to be significant predictor variables of Islamist group fear, the most of any model. Second, three of these target variables had a negative predictive effect, the only model to show more than one negative association. Finally, the relationship between Islamist group fear and nuclear power plants was among the

strongest parings in any model. Significant data from this model is presented in Table X.X.

Table X.X: Logistic Regression of Fear of Islamist Groups on Target Availability

| <i>Independent Variable (target)</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>s.e. of B</i> | <i>Exp(B)</i> |
|--|-----------------|------------------|---------------|
| Abortion Clinic | .077* | .038 | 1.080 |
| International Airport | .109* | .045 | 1.115 |
| Farmstead | -.104*** | .031 | .902 |
| Cultural Landmark | .141*** | .036 | 1.151 |
| Hospital | -.107* | .046 | .898 |
| Power Plant (non-nuclear) | -.079* | .036 | .924 |
| Nuclear Power Plant | .187*** | .047 | 1.205 |
| (constant) | -1.403 | | |

N = 1,709

Chi-Square = 275.247

*** p < .001

* p < .05

Overall, the model returned a chi-square of 275.247 ($p < .001$) and a Nagelkerke R-square of .201, both the highest of all seven models. The R-square score meant that over 20% of the variance in Islamist group fear was accounted for by target availability. In fact, the next highest R-square was for the foreign group model, at just .159. Target proximity seems to play an important role in predicting fear that an Islamist group will attempt terrorist violence.

As presented in Table X.X, the target categories that predicted an increase in Islamist group fear were abortion clinics, international airports, cultural landmarks, and

nuclear power plants. Among these four target groups nuclear power plants produced the largest odd ratio, at 1.205. This large number was the second highest overall for all seven regression models, second only to the relationship between eco-terrorists and animal laboratories. The other three target groups produced odds ratios of about 1.1, still a very large effect on group fear considering the ten-point target proximity scale.

Target categories with a significant negative effect on predicting Islamist group fear were farmstead, hospitals, and non-nuclear power plants. Among these variables the most intriguing was non-nuclear power plants. With a negative coefficient and an odds ratio of .924, respondents with higher scores of non-nuclear power plant proximity were .92 times *less* likely to fear Islamists. Considering the strong predictive value of nuclear power plants, the negative relationship with non-nuclear plants is striking. The other two target groups with negative associations, farmstead and hospitals, returned odds ratios of .90.

Eco-terrorists

Fear of attack by eco-terrorists was predicted by five target variables. The predictive relationship of animal testing laboratories was intuitive; however, the statistical significance of targets like regional airports was somewhat surprising. The most unexpected finding in this regression model is the strength of passenger seaports in predicting fear of eco-terrorist attack. With an odds ratio of 1.146 ($p < .05$), this target

variable generated much more predictive value than expected. All significant findings are presented in Table X.X.

Table X.X: Logistic Regression of Fear of Eco-terrorist Groups on Target Availability

| <i>Independent Variable (target)</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>s.e. of B</i> | <i>Exp(B)</i> |
|--|----------|------------------|---------------|
| Regional Airport | .085* | .042 | 1.089 |
| Commercial Landmark | .079* | .039 | 1.082 |
| Animal Testing Lab | .232*** | .033 | 1.261 |
| Major Financial/Insurance | -.083** | .031 | .920 |
| Seaport (passenger) | .137* | .056 | 1.146 |
| (constant) | -1.078 | | |

N = 1,709

Chi-Square = 158.826

*** p < .001

** p < .01

* p < .05

As would be expected, the presence of an animal testing laboratory was the strongest predictor of fear of eco-terrorist groups. The odds ratio of 1.261 means that for every one-point increase in the animal testing laboratory proximity score, the likelihood of fearing eco-terrorists increased 1.3 times. This was the highest odds ratio of any pairing in any of the seven models.

The negative relationship with major financial or insurance targets is also noteworthy. The negative coefficient of .083 (p < .01), and odds ratio of .920, indicated less fear of eco-terrorists when major financial institutions are present. The final two

predictor variables, regional airports and commercial landmarks, were both positive and showed odds ratios of 1.1 ($p < .05$).

Overall, the model generated a chi-square statistic of 158.826 ($p < .001$) and a Nagelkerke R-square of .119. Both statistics indicate a statistically useful model, though the scores are low in comparison to the other models.

Anti-abortionists

Regression models using fear of anti-abortionists as the dependent variable showed two surprising relationships. Though it was intuitive to discover abortion clinics as significant predictors, it was somewhat surprising to find the predictive strengths of animal testing laboratories and sports/entertainment complexes. All three significant target categories are listed in Table X.X.

Table X.X: Logistic Regression of Fear of Anti-Abortionist Groups on Target Availability

| <i>Independent Variable (target)</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>s.e. of B</i> | <i>Exp(B)</i> |
|--|----------|------------------|---------------|
| Abortion Clinic | .189*** | .037 | 1.208 |
| Animal Testing Lab | .111*** | .032 | 1.118 |
| Sports/Entertainment Complex | .104** | .036 | 1.110 |
| (constant) | -1.455 | | |

N = 1,709

Chi-Square = 161.118

*** $p < .001$

* $p < .05$

Overall, the model was statistically useful, with a chi-square of 161.118 ($p < .001$) and a Nagelkerke R-square of .123. These measurements were roughly the average of the seven models.

As stated previously, anti-abortion clinics best predicted fear of anti-abortionists groups. The odds ratio for abortion clinics was 1.2 ($P < .001$), meaning as the score for the proximity of abortion clinics increased by 1, fear of anti-abortionists increased 1.2 times. While this relationship was not surprising, the significant relationship between fear of anti-abortionists and animal testing laboratories ($p < .001$) and sports and entertainment complexes ($p < .01$) was unexpected. The structure of the dataset does not allow for a definitive explanation of why these relationships exist, but it could be hypothesized that jurisdictions with one target type are likely to have all three, resulting in a strong relationship that is more coincidence than predictive.

Ethnic Supremacists

As presented in Table X.X, only the animal testing laboratory and sports and entertainment complex target categories predicted fear of ethnic supremacists. The most predictive target was sports and entertainment complexes, with a coefficient of .074 ($p < .001$) and odds ratio of 1.134. This score was among the lowest of any group fear-predictor target pairings. Proximity of animal testing laboratories also predicted fear of ethnic supremacists, with an odds ratio of 1.1.

Table X.X: Logistic Regression of Fear of Ethnic Supremacist Groups on Target Availability

| <i>Independent Variable (target)</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>s.e. of B</i> | <i>Exp(B)</i> |
|--|----------|------------------|---------------|
| Animal Testing Lab | .074* | .032 | 1.077 |
| Sports/Entertainment Complex | .126*** | .035 | 1.134 |
| (constant) | -1.339 | | |

N = 1,709

Chi-Square = 84.661

*** p < .001

* p < .05

The overall model statistics were also lowest of all seven models. The chi-square score of 84.661, though significant at $p < .001$, was the lowest of all models, as was the Nagelkerke R-square score of .067. Thus, even though the model was statistically valid, the usefulness of available targets in predicting fear of ethnic supremacist groups was much less than with other groups. Recall that this was also true in the group presence-group fear models earlier in this chapter, where ethnic supremacists had the lowest overall model strength of all groups.

This may be due to the general “average-ness” of the reported fear of ethnic supremacists. This group type is always in the middle of the pack as far as fear reporting frequency, and has low association scores in all regression models. There is clearly something unique about the reported fear of ethnic supremacists as compared to the other six group types, in that there are always so few significant predictors.

Foreign groups

The final target proximity regression model used fear of foreign groups as the dependent variable. The model generated five predictive target variables, presented in Table X.X. The chi-square value of 107.665 ($p < .001$) and Nagelkerke R-square of .159 were higher than the averages for the seven models.

Table X.X: Logistic Regression of Fear of Foreign Groups on Target Availability

| <i>Independent Variable (target)</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>s.e. of B</i> | <i>Exp(B)</i> |
|--|----------|------------------|---------------|
| International Airport | .199* | .091 | 1.220 |
| Commercial Landmark | .153* | .079 | 1.166 |
| Power Plant (non-nuclear) | .146* | .068 | 1.157 |
| Nuclear Power Plant | .176* | .077 | 1.192 |
| Seaport (passenger) | .368*** | .106 | 1.444 |
| (constant) | -3.503 | | |

N = 1,709

Chi-Square =

*** $p < .001$

* $p < .05$

Surprisingly, passenger seaports were most predictive of fear of foreign groups, with an odds ratio of 1.4 ($p < .001$). This finding was unexpected because passenger seaports are somewhat obscure targets that are heavily restricted by geography, making them much less prevalent than the majority of target categories. It is important to note here that international airports were also predictive of fear of foreign groups, though less than passenger seaports ($p < .05$, odds ratio 1.2). The fact these two target categories

were found to be predictive indicates a relationship between fear of foreign groups and transportation hubs.

The other three significant target categories- commercial landmarks and power plants (both nuclear and non-nuclear)- generated odds ratios of 1.2 ($p < .05$). This signifies that as the proximity of these targets increased, fear that foreign groups would act increased 1.2 times. Considering the ten-point proximity scale, these odds ratios indicate a strong predictive value.

Summary of Fear-Presence Regression

Summarized in Table X.X, the results of the regression equations measuring the effects of target availability on fear of terrorist groups showed significant relationships in every case, though the models were generally weaker than the relationship between group presence and group fear. It is important to note that fear of some groups is more easily predicted by target proximity than others.

Table X.X Nagelkerke R-square Values and Most Predictive Target Categories for Each Group Type

| <i>Fear of group ↓:</i> | <i># of sig targets</i> | <i>Nagelkerke R²</i> | <i>Most Predictive Target</i> | <i>Exp(B)</i> |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| <i>Left Wing</i> | 2 | .135 | Animal Testing Labs | 1.15 |
| <i>Right Wing</i> | 5 | .074 | Farmstead | 1.113 |
| <i>Islamist</i> | 7 | .201 | Nuclear Power Plants | 1.205 |
| <i>Anti-Abortionist</i> | 3 | .123 | Abortion Clinics | 1.208 |
| <i>Eco-Terrorist</i> | 5 | .119 | Animal Testing Labs | 1.261 |
| <i>Ethnic Supremacists</i> | 2 | .067 | Sport/entertainment Complex | 1.134 |
| <i>Foreign Groups</i> | 5 | .159 | Passenger Seaport | 1.444 |

Table X.X also illustrates variation in the R-square statistics, which shows how much available targets account for the variation on reported fear of specific terrorist groups. These statistics indicate that target availability has less predictive value for right wing groups and ethnic supremacists (respective R-square scores of .074 and .067) , but comparably high predictive value for Islamists (.201). However, though the ability of target proximity to predict group fear varies depending on the group, it is important to note that all seven models were statistically valid.

It is also important to note that each terrorist group type was associated with at least two specific target categories. Considering that there were twenty-four target categories listed in each regression model, this low number was somewhat surprising. Beyond that fact, individual target types predict fear of specific groups more than others, as reflected in Table X.X. From this overview data it is clear that local targets play a statistically significant role in predicting fear that a terrorist group will act.

3. Capable Guardians

The third and final element of the routine activity (RA) theory of crime is the absence of a capable guardian. According to RA theory, the absence of a capable guardian is a key element in determining whether a crime will occur. As explained in Chapter 3, in the study of terrorist violence the meaning of “capable guardian” must be evolved to emphasize the “capability” aspect. Stated differently, to affect whether a

terrorist event will take place the guardians have to be more than merely present. They must exhibit qualities that give them a deterrent effect.

The dataset being used for this study afforded several ways to examine the deterrent qualities of respondent agencies. This examination was accomplished by identifying variables that measured agency dynamics that in some way demonstrated capability, then employing these measures as the independent variables in regression models. These variables included agency size, agency training scores, special unit availability, and special equipment availability. To best understand the regression models, these variables must be explained individually and in detail.

First, agency size was used to see if fear of terrorist groups changed depending upon the number of officers available in a given organization. The survey instrument used a 4-point scale to capture this variable. Respondents reported the number of officers in their agency as either 25 or less, between 25 and 50, between 50 and 100, or over 100. Thus, when deciphering the regression tables, it is important to remember that the size of the respondent agency is a numerical variable with higher numbers representing a larger agency.

Next, five measures of agency training were used as independent variables. The first type reflected the respondent's objective assessment of his agency's anti-terrorism training, with scores ranging from a high of 1 to a low of 4. The second variable is a Likert scale response to the question "My agency is adequately trained in anti- and counter-terrorism." The response scale for this question is 1-5, with 1 signifying "strongly agree." For both of these categories it is important to note that lower numbers capture a higher level of capability, i.e. "1" means higher levels of training and "4" or "5"

signifies lower levels. Thus, if regression coefficients indicate a negative effect, it reflects a higher level of training.

The third measure of training was a measurement of how often the respondent's organization participates in terrorism prevention training, and the fourth was a measure of terrorism response exercise frequency. The scale for both of these variables was set up with "1" signifying monthly training, "2" every 1-6 months, "3" every 6-12 months, "4" every 1-3 years, "5" less than once every 3 years, and "6" never. Again, it is important to note that lower scores signify higher levels of training.

The fifth and final training variable was whether the respondent's agency conducted anti-terrorism training prior to September 11, 2001. This variable was set up as a 1=yes/2=no question.

The availability of a special unit, namely a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team, was another independent variable in the model. It was also set up as a yes/no question.

The final independent variable for the capable guardian model was special equipment availability. The survey instrument listed several kinds of anti-terrorism specific equipment, such as night observation devices and bio suits, and asked the respondent to identify which kinds of equipment his agency possessed. There was also an option to write in special equipment that was not included in the survey instrument. To combine these equipment lists into one variable, an index score was created that reflected the sum of all special equipment reported as on-hand. Thus, the higher the number, the more anti-terrorism equipment was possessed by the agency.

The previous sets of regression models used fear that a group would act as the dependent variable. This was also the case to test predictive values of the capable guardian element. There were seven logistic regression models, one for each terrorist group type, with each measuring the predictive values of agency dynamics on whether a group is forecasted to act. Each model was saturated with all agency variables at once, which controlled for relationships between independent variables. The result was a more rigorously tested model with more stringent statistical criteria for significance and predictive effects.

Overall, the regression models with agency characteristics as predictor variables were generally much weaker than previous models that tested group presence and local target effects. Although Nagelkerke R-square statistics were considerably lower, every model returned significant chi-square values, meaning they were statistically useful. All eight variables are included in each table, though only significant variables are discussed in detail.

Each model is presented below individually, followed by an overview section that provides consolidated findings and a snapshot of trends.

Left Wing

The regression model that used fear of left wing groups as the dependent variable returned a chi-square value of 50.151 ($p < .001$) and a Nagelkerke R-square of .060. Though significant, both of these statistics were small. The R-square value of .060 indicates that just 6% of the variance in left wing group fear is explained by agency

characteristics. Although 6% is not a large number for a R-square value, it is important to point out that it was the second highest of the seven models.

As displayed in table X.X, only one of the eight agency variables was significant, that being whether the respondent's agency conducted anti-terrorism training before 9-11-01. The negative coefficient of -.427 ($p < .01$) indicated that agencies that trained before the September 11th attacks were more likely to fear an attack by left wing groups. The odds ratio of .653 means that these respondents were .65 times more likely to fear left wing groups than respondents from agencies that did not conduct training.

Table X.X: Logistic Regression of Fear of Left Wing Groups on Agency Dynamics

| <i>Independent Variable (agency feature)</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>s.e. of B</i> | <i>Exp(B)</i> |
|--|----------------|------------------|---------------|
| Agency Size | .132 | .090 | 1.141 |
| Training Rate | -.108 | .123 | .898 |
| Likert Scale- Training | .167 | .097 | 1.182 |
| Equipment Index | .077 | .069 | 1.080 |
| SWAT Team | .309 | .219 | 1.362 |
| Training Frequency | -.124 | .083 | .883 |
| Disaster Response Training | -.166 | .089 | .847 |
| Training Pre-911 | -.427** | .153 | .653 |
| (constant) | -1.607 | | |

N = 1,596

Chi-Square = 50.151

** $p < .01$

Right Wing

The model using fear of right wing groups as the dependent variable was statistically the weakest of all regression models. The chi-square value of 16.167 was the lowest chi-square in any model in the entire study, and returned a probability level approaching insignificance ($p = .040$). The Nagelkerke R-square value of .014 means that only 1.4% of the variation in right wing group fear is caused by local agency dynamics, a very small value by any standard.

Despite these very low statistics for the overall model, the variable that measured the respondent's subjective opinion of his agency's anti-terrorism training was a significant predictor of fear of right wing groups. Shown in Table X.X, the coefficient of .166 ($p < .05$) and odds ratio of 1.181 showed that as assessment of anti-terrorism training decreased, fear that a right wing group will attack increased by a factor of 1.181. Considering that this training variable uses a 5-point Likert scale, this finding is important. It suggests that the lower one views his agency's competency in anti-terrorism, the more this one specific terrorist group type is feared.

Table X.X: Logistic Regression of Fear of Right Wing Groups on Agency Dynamics

| <i>Independent Variable (agency feature)</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>s.e. of B</i> | <i>Exp(B)</i> |
|--|--------------|------------------|---------------|
| Agency Size | -.050 | .062 | .952 |
| Training Rate | -.047 | .082 | .954 |
| Likert Scale- Training | .166* | .070 | 1.181 |
| Equipment Index | .016 | .049 | 1.016 |
| SWAT Team | -.270 | .149 | .763 |
| Training Frequency | -.085 | .055 | .919 |
| Disaster Response Training | -.047 | .060 | .954 |
| Training Pre-911 | -.029 | .108 | .972 |
| (constant) | -.393 | | |

N = 1,596

Chi-Square = 16.167

* p < .05

Islamists

The predictive value of agency dynamics on fear of Islamist groups was by far the strongest of all seven models. As shown in Table X.X, five variables significantly predicted fear in the model- agency size, training rate, the Likert training scale, equipment on-hand, and training frequency.

Table X.X: Logistic Regression of Fear of Islamist Groups on Agency Dynamics

| <i>Independent Variable (agency feature)</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>s.e. of B</i> | <i>Exp(B)</i> |
|--|----------------|------------------|---------------|
| Agency Size | .217*** | .058 | 1.242 |
| Training Rate | -.171* | .078 | .843 |
| Likert Scale- Training | .135* | .066 | 1.144 |
| Equipment Index | .113* | .046 | 1.119 |
| SWAT Team | .026 | .139 | 1.026 |
| Training Frequency | -.141** | .052 | .869 |
| Disaster Response Training | .047 | .057 | 1.048 |
| Training Pre-911 | -.194 | .101 | .823 |
| (constant) | -623 | | |

N = 1,596
 Chi-Square = 104.935
 *** p < .001
 ** p < .01
 * p < .05

The overall statistics were also much stronger than in any other model. The chi-square of 104.935 ($p < .001$) was largest of the seven models, as was the Nagelkerke R-square of .086. Though this R-square value indicated that just 8.6% of the variance in fear of Islamists was accounted for by agency features, it was considerably larger than any other model.

Also shown in Table X.X, the strongest predictor variable was agency size ($p < .001$), with a very high odds ratio of 1.2. This number means that as the agency's size increased, so did fear that an Islamist group would attempt an act of terrorist violence. The equipment index also showed predictive value in the model, specifically that the more equipment possessed by the agency, the more Islamist groups were feared.

The most notable finding in this specific model was the interaction of the training variables on fear of Islamists. First, the value of training rate in predicting fear of Islamists was significant. The negative coefficient of $-.171$ ($p < .05$) indicated that as the level of agency training increased, so did fear of Islamist groups (recall that the value of “1” was the highest score and “4” lowest for this variable). The training frequency variable was also significant with a negative coefficient, indicating that more frequent anti-terrorism training predicts increased fear that Islamists will act. These relationships can be hypothesized several ways. One opinion could be that high levels of training result in a greater understanding of terrorism, corresponding to a greater fear of Islamist groups. An alternative view would be that agencies increased training in response to its fear of an attack by an Islamist group. The exact nature of the relationship is worth further study.

The Likert training scale was also found to be a significant predictor ($p < .05$), with an odds ratio of 1.1. This finding was particularly intriguing, since it seemed to contradict the findings associated with the training rate and training frequency variables. Recall that the training rate variable captured the objective score of the amount of training received by the respondent agency, and the training frequency variable showed the objective measure of how often the agency trained in anti-terrorism tasks. The Likert training scale variable, however, indicated the subjective assessment of the respondent agency’s anti-terrorism competency.

The critical finding of the regression model lies in the fact that while the fear of Islamists increased with *higher* levels of agency training, it also increased with *lower*

levels of anti-terrorism competency. Thus, this model has shown that training amount and training worth are both predictors of Islamist group fear.

Eco-terrorists

The model using eco-terrorists as the dependent variable was the second of only two models to generate more than one predictive variable. As shown in Table X.X, agency size, the Likert training scale, equipment index, and training frequency variables were all found to be predictive of fear of eco-terrorist groups.

Table X.X: Logistic Regression of Fear of Eco-terrorists on Agency Dynamics

| <i>Independent Variable (agency feature)</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>s.e. of B</i> | <i>Exp(B)</i> |
|--|----------------|------------------|---------------|
| Agency Size | .126* | .056 | 1.135 |
| Training Rate | -.073 | .076 | .930 |
| Likert Scale- Training | .130* | .064 | 1.139 |
| Equipment Index | .115** | .045 | 1.122 |
| SWAT Team | .206 | .136 | 1.229 |
| Training Frequency | -.139** | .051 | .870 |
| Disaster Response Training | -.005 | .055 | .995 |
| Training Pre-911 | -.057 | .099 | .945 |
| (constant) | -780 | | |

N = 1,596

Chi-Square = 52.148

** p < .01

* p < .05

Overall model statistics were high compared to the others in this section, placing the eco-terrorist model as the third strongest of the seven models. The chi-square of 52.148 ($p < .001$) was very high. The Nagelkerke R-square of .043 was low for the measure generally but very high for this set of regression models.

The predictive relationships of agency variables on fear of eco-terrorists showed logical relationships without any unexpected features. The strongest odds ratio in the regression model was generated by the Likert scale training variable. The coefficient of .130 ($p < .05$) and odds ratio of 1.139 tell us that for every one-unit drop in the respondents opinion of his agency's anti-terrorism preparedness, there is an increased likelihood of 1.14 that eco-terrorists would be feared. Considering the Likert scale is a five-unit measurement, this odds ratio is very large.

Other findings that can be deduced by examining Table X.X are that fear of eco-terrorists increased as the size of an agency increased, as more equipment was present, and as the frequency of anti-terrorism training increased. From these relationships it may be deduced that larger, better equipped, and better-trained agencies are more likely to fear eco-terrorist groups.

Anti-abortionists

Though the overall model was statistically valid, not a single agency characteristic proved to be valid in predicting fear of anti-abortionists (see Table X.X). This is not surprising, as the Nagelkerke R-square score of .024 was among the lowest of any of the

seven models. The chi-square value of 27.882, though significant at the $p < .001$ level, was also very low in comparison to the other models.

Table X.X: Logistic Regression of Fear of Anti-abortionists on Agency Dynamics

| <i>Independent Variable (agency feature)</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>s.e. of B</i> | <i>Exp(B)</i> |
|--|----------|------------------|---------------|
| Agency Size | .084 | .058 | 1.088 |
| Training Rate | -.069 | .077 | .933 |
| Likert Scale- Training | .072 | .066 | 1.075 |
| Equipment Index | .076 | .046 | 1.079 |
| SWAT Team | .149 | .139 | 1.160 |
| Training Frequency | -.003 | .052 | .997 |
| Disaster Response Training | -.091 | .056 | .913 |
| Training Pre-911 | -.166 | .101 | .847 |
| (constant) | -.596 | | |

N = 1,596

Chi-Square = 27.882

Ethnic Supremacists

Presented in table X.X, the model that tested for predictors of fear of ethnic supremacists returned one significant predictor variable, the Likert training scale. In this instance, the coefficient of .166 ($p < .05$) indicates that the relationship was positive, meaning the less confident a respondent felt in his agency's anti-terrorism competency, the more likely he was to fear ethnic supremacists. The odds ratio shows us that the

likelihood of fearing ethnic groups increased 1.180 times for every one-unit drop in the Likert training scale. When recalling that this was a five-point scale, the large effect of this variable on group fear is made apparent.

Table X.X: Logistic Regression of Fear of Ethnic Supremacists on Agency Dynamics

| <i>Independent Variable (agency feature)</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>s.e. of B</i> | <i>Exp(B)</i> |
|--|--------------|------------------|---------------|
| Agency Size | .008 | .058 | 1.008 |
| Training Rate | -.022 | .078 | .979 |
| Likert Scale- Training | .166* | .067 | 1.180 |
| Equipment Index | .063 | .046 | 1.065 |
| SWAT Team | -.062 | .141 | .940 |
| Training Frequency | -.045 | .053 | .956 |
| Disaster Response Training | -.069 | .057 | .933 |
| Training Pre-911 | -.069 | .103 | .933 |
| (constant) | -.704 | | |

N = 1,596

Chi-Square = 16.783

* p < .05

Overall, the model was significant, but very weak. In fact the model testing for fear of ethnic supremacists was weaker than all other models other than the right wing group fear model. Besides the low chi-square value of 16.783 and low significance score of $p = .032$, the Nagelkerke R-square showed that agency features account for only 1.4% of the variation in fear of ethnic supremacists. Still, despite the general weaknesses of

the model, the statistics are strong enough to support the significant predictive relationship of agency characteristics on fear of ethnic supremacist terrorist groups.

Foreign groups

The final model measured the predictive value of agency features on fear of foreign terrorist groups. Only the agency size variable was found to be statistically significant, as reflected in Table X.X. With a positive coefficient and odds ratio of 1.246 ($p < .05$), the likelihood of fearing a foreign group increases by 1.25 for every one-unit increase in the agency size variable. Since the agency size variable is a made-up of four categories, this odds ratio reflects a sizable increase in fear.

Table X.X: Logistic Regression of Fear of Foreign Groups on Agency Dynamics

| <i>Independent Variable (agency feature)</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>s.e. of B</i> | <i>Exp(B)</i> |
|--|--------------|------------------|---------------|
| Agency Size | .220* | .115 | 1.246 |
| Training Rate | -.093 | .153 | .912 |
| Likert Scale- Training | .133 | .125 | 1.142 |
| Equipment Index | .043 | .088 | 1.044 |
| SWAT Team | .383 | .277 | 1.467 |
| Training Frequency | -.032 | .104 | .968 |
| Disaster Response Training | -.118 | .112 | .888 |
| Training Pre-911 | -.295 | .195 | .745 |
| (constant) | -3.096 | | |

N = 1,596

Chi-Square = 16.583

* $p < .05$

Overall, the fear of foreign groups model was of average strength for this section. Unfortunately, average in this section meant the model characteristics were not very strong. The chi-square of 16.583, low significance of $p = .035$, and Nagelkerke R-square of .027, are all very weak. Still, they are statistically significant, so it must be stated that agency characteristics are significant predictors of whether a foreign terrorist group is feared to attempt a terrorist act.

Summary of Fear-Guardian Regression

Overall, all seven models were statistically significant, meaning it can be postulated that agency dynamics are useful in predicting fear that a terrorist group will attack. As with the two previous regression sections measuring the value of group presence and target availability, specific predictor variables and model significance varied according to which type of terrorist group was used as the dependent variable.

Table X.X provides an overview of the seven regression models. It is important to note how few significant predictor variables existed in the models generally. Indeed, four of the seven models produced only one significant variable, while another (anti-abortionists) had no significant predictor variable at all. The two group types that had the strongest association with agency variables were Islamists and eco-terrorists, with six and four significant predictive variables, respectively.

Table X.X Nagelkerke R-square Values and Most Predictive Agency Features for Each Group Type

| <i>Fear of group:</i> | <i># of sig variables</i> | <i>Nagelkerke R²</i> | <i>Most Predictive Feature</i> | <i>Exp(B)</i> |
|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------|
| <i>Left Wing</i> | 1 | .060 | Pre-911 training | .653 |
| <i>Right Wing</i> | 1 | .014 | Training likert | 1.181 |
| <i>Islamist</i> | 6 | .086 | Agency size | 1.242 |
| <i>Eco-Terrorist</i> | 4 | .043 | Training likert | 1.139 |
| <i>Anti-Abortionist</i> | n/a | .024 | n/a | n/a |
| <i>Ethnic Supremacists</i> | 1 | .014 | Training likert | 1.180 |
| <i>Foreign Groups</i> | 1 | .027 | Agency size | 1.246 |

Table X.X also shows consistency in the area of which agency variables are most predictive of group fear. It is worth noting that the most predictive variable in three of the models was the training Likert scale, which captured the respondent's personal assessment of his agency's anti-terrorism capabilities. The strength of this variable is noteworthy especially when considering that it was just one of five measures of training used in each model. It is also worth noting that it was the only subjective measure. The objective measures of quality of anti-terrorism training, training frequency, pre-9/11 training, and disaster preparedness training frequency were not nearly as valuable in predicting group fear.

Finally, it must be emphasized that all models were significant. Though their statistical worth was not as strong as the group presence and target availability sections, these models showed that agency characteristics do predict fear of terrorist groups.

Spatial Analysis

As with the group presence data, ArcGIS 9 computer mapping software generated spatial representations of the reported fear that a terrorist group would act. Area codes were again linked to a map of the U.S., providing excellent visual representations of regional distributions of fear of attack and concentrations of responses. Complementing the data generated through the crosstabulation procedures earlier in this chapter, the mapping process added visual clarity to the relationship between regions and groups feared to attack. The spatial analyses showed a much higher level of regional detail and, for the first time, intra-region characteristics of the data.

There were of course limitations to applying spatial analysis to the analysis of fear of attack. First, area code zones that were not included in the study were of course not represented on the maps. Next, the large geography of some area codes visually suggest higher levels of reporting. To avoid this pitfall, the colors represented in the map legend should be consulted to better understand the data, with darker colors representing higher rates of reporting. The color of an area code zone is thus much more valuable when comparing larger area codes of less populated areas to the smaller zones in more heavily populated areas. Legends are provided on each map and indicate the raw numbers of respondents reporting.

Maps illustrating fear of each of the seven groups are presented in Figure 2, ordered from the national ranking of most feared to act to least. The analyses illustrate what was found in earlier tests; that there are clear regional affiliations with fear of attack by specific groups. Nowhere is this clearer than in the west region's fear of eco-terrorist attack. Beyond this regional characterization, the mapping process illustrated specifically


within the region where attacks were most feared. The entire state of Oregon; Sacramento and Fresno, California; and Salt Lake City, Utah, accounted for the majority of reported fear, though there was a pervasive fear of eco-terrorists throughout the west region. The map also illustrated the somewhat surprising concentration of fear of eco-terrorist attack in New Mexico, a data point that was lost in regional analyses earlier in this chapter.


The map illustrating fear of Islamists was the most surprising of the seven. Though respondents reported fear that an Islamist group would act at very high levels, spatial analysis suggests that this belief was thinly distributed. There were entire swatches of the country in the north, west, and along the borders of the midwest-south-northeast regions that has zero reported fear that Islamists would act. Considering the fact Islamists were feared overall as second most likely to attempt a terrorist act, this graphic is striking.

The map depicting fear of left wing attack also contained intriguing representations. Though an under-reported group relative to the others, fear of left wing attacks were concentrated in two cities; San Francisco and Washington D.C. This discovery was very surprising, as the two cities are so far apart both geographically and culturally. It is also very important to note that without the use of crime mapping software, this would not have been discovered.

The application of crime mapping to the dataset strongly complemented the more traditional statistical procedures presented earlier in the chapter. The mapping process also illustrated intra-region reporting of group fear, which is critical if a true picture of group fear is to be achieved.

Figure 2 Reported Fear that an Attack Will Occur





Chapter Summary

Statistical methods applied in this chapter showed clear relationships between fear of specific groups and individual regions. Regression models also showed the significant predictive qualities of all three elements of Routine Activity theory- the presence of terrorist groups, the proximity of possible targets, and characteristics of the respondent's agency.

Through crosstabulations and chi-square analyses, regions were shown to be significantly associated with fear that specific groups would act. Among these relationships, the strongest was by far the fear of eco-terrorists in the west region, though the almost universal fear of Islamists was also noteworthy.

Regional crosstabulations also seemed to indicate that group fear had little to do with whether groups were locally present. However, stringent regression models clearly showed that the presence of a terrorist group was always a significant predictor of whether that group was feared to act. The regression models also showed that the presence of some groups predicted fear of other groups. From these analyses it can be said that the presence of local actors were significant predictors of whether a group was feared to act.

The regression models that tested for predictive relationships with available targets were also significant. Some of these target-group associations were intuitive, such as anti-abortionists with abortion clinics and eco-terrorists with animal testing laboratories. Others were somewhat surprising, such as the association of seaports with eco-terrorists and right wing groups. The most important finding was that fear of each

type of group was predicted by the presence of at least two target categories, which supports the position that target availability affects whether a terrorist group was feared to act.

The third and final set of regression models tested the predictive value of law enforcement agency characteristics on group fear. Though these models were markedly weaker than the other two groups of regression models, it is critical to note that every one of the seven models were statistically significant. It is also worth noting that the most common agency variable that predicted fear of a terrorist group was the training Likert scale, which was also the only subjective measure of capability in the dataset. Since the purpose of the section was to test whether guardian capability predicts fear that a terrorist group will act, the predictive value of a variable that measured self-assessed capability cannot be overemphasized.

Finally, spatial analyses complemented earlier statistical tests by providing a graphic representation of respondent fear. The maps illustrated how closely group fear was tied to regions, and that group fear was best presented as a concentrated, intra-region phenomena.

A summary of all significant predictive variables from all three sets of models is presented in Table X.X. Besides illustrating the value of each of the Routine Activity Theory elements, the table shows how fear of each terrorist group related to the three sets of predictor variables. Just as crosstabulations illustrated distinctions in the distribution of where these groups were feared, Table X.X shows that there was clear variation among group types in their relation to what predicts their activities; in other words, it addresses why they are feared.

Table X.X Significant Variables from All Three Model groups

| | <i>Group Presence</i> | <i>Targets</i> | <i>Agency Feature</i> |
|-----------------------------------|---|--|---|
| <i>Left Wing</i> | Left Wing Eco-terrorist | Cultural Landmark Animal Testing Laboratory | Training Pre-911 |
| <i>Right Wing</i> | Right Wing | Farmstead Cultural Landmark Seaport (cargo) Sports/entertainment complex Water Reservoir | Likert Scale- Training |
| <i>Islamists</i> | Left Wing Islamist Eco-terrorist Anti-Abortionist | Abortion Clinic International Airport Farmstead Cultural Landmark Hospital Power Plant (non-nuclear) Nuclear Power Plant | Agency Size Training Rate Likert Scale- Training Equipment Index Training Frequency |
| <i>Eco-terrorists</i> | Right Wing Eco-terrorist Ethnic Supremacist | Regional Airport Commercial Landmark Animal Testing Lab Major Financial/Insurance Seaport (passenger) | Agency Size Likert Scale- Training Equipment Index Training Frequency |
| <i>Anti-abortionists</i> | Eco-terrorist Anti-Abortionist | Abortion Clinic Animal Testing Lab Sports/Entertainment Complex | |
| <i>Ethnic Supremacists</i> | Right Wing Islamist Eco-terrorist Anti-Abortionist Ethnic Supremacist | Animal Testing Lab Sports/Entertainment complex | Likert Scale- Training |
| <i>Foreign groups</i> | Foreign Groups | International Airport Commercial Landmark Power Plant (non-nuclear) Nuclear Power Plant Seaport (passenger) | Agency Size |

Chapter 7: Discussion

Summary of Findings

Terrorism is a local phenomenon. Analyses performed in the preceding chapters demonstrated this fact without exception. Among explanations for the presence of terrorist organizations and fear that they will act, the most useful were and will continue to be found at the local level. From the availability of suitable targets to the characteristics of agencies in charge of public security, variables collected from smaller spaces have the greatest potential to produce a true picture of the terrorist threat in the United States.

Statistical procedures and computer mapping applications generated conclusive responses to the research questions posed earlier in the study. First, the presence of terrorist groups and fear that they would act showed highly localized characteristics, a significant departure from past research. These findings were partly due to the structure of this study, which put such emphasis on the uniqueness of group types and the individualized perceptions of geographic areas. This unique framework was a significant departure from earlier studies of terrorism that did not account for terrorist group identities or local practitioner perceptions. These novel aspects of the study resulted in a wide range of significant findings.

The local characteristics of terrorist group presence contradicted the current paradigm of a national threat, as crosstabulation procedures uncovered unique attributes

of group presence in all six regions. Computer mapping software illustrated an even more localized effect, to the relatively detailed level of telephone area code zones. These analyses supported the hypotheses that viewed terrorist group presence as local phenomena, not a national universality.

Similar tests also revealed the highly localized distribution of group fear. Though crosstabulations and chi-squared analyses showed cross-region consistencies of group fear, each region was found to contain unique perceptions of fear that a specific terrorist group would act. These data showed without ambiguity that there was no national-level fear of any single group type. Computer-generated maps that clearly illustrated localized reporting of group fear reinforced this point.

Statistical analyses also found that the Routine Activity (RA) theory of crime was useful in predicting fear of terrorist activity. The isolation of the variables tied to RA theory's three elements generated interesting and conclusive results, primarily that all three elements- motivated offender, suitable target, and capable guardian- were found to significantly predict whether a group was feared to act. To discover the worth of RA theory in analyzing terrorism, the outcome of fear that an attack would occur was used in place of an actual criminal event. This was necessary because there are so few terrorist attacks available for analysis. The robust nature of this dataset was such that fear of attack was an appropriate outcome to test whether RA theory would prove predictive. All three elements did in fact predict terrorist attack forecasts, though with varying strengths.

The first test was whether the mere presence of a terrorist group was enough to predict fear of an attack. Through regression analysis, group presence was found to be

significant in every region and for every group type. Regression models also produced the unexpected finding that the presence of some groups predicted fear of other groups in addition to their own. This data was so interesting because it showed a conceptual linkage between the goals and tactics of terrorist group types.

Though not as strong, the presence of suitable targets also proved predictive of fear of attack. The regression models that tested target effects also demonstrated an association between certain targets and specific terrorist groups. The pairings of group types and targets were both intuitive, such as with abortion clinics and anti-abortionists, and complex, as demonstrated by the relationship between eco-terrorists and passenger seaports. This linkage between groups and targets further demonstrated the uniqueness of group types and the competency of respondents, two core concepts to this study.

Agency characteristics, the third and final element of RA theory, were also shown to be significant predictors of whether an attack was feared. Again, there were linkages between certain characteristics and group types, which indicated that the respondent population generally appreciated distinctions in terrorist group goals and tactics. This further supports the study's premise that local law enforcement are conceptually prepared to handle their homeland security tasks.

From these findings several concrete conclusions can be drawn. First, the level of understanding that local practitioners displayed in dealing with terrorism was repeatedly to be high. This was displayed mostly via their association of groups with targets and agency characteristics. It was a central theme of this study that local civilian police departments will be the agencies primarily responsible to deal with terrorism. From the data generated by this study, this position seems to be well founded. Finally, the study

showed RA theory's clear application to the field of terrorism. No fewer than twenty-one regression models were employed to test whether the elements of RA theory would predict fear of terrorism. The fact that all twenty-one models proved significant was extraordinary, and showed conclusively that RA theory can serve as a viable framework for the study of terrorism.

Policy Implications

This study developed the concepts that are critical in understanding the current terrorist threat in the Continental United States. This criticality is based on the recognition that identification of the local terrorist threat is the foundation of effective anti-terrorism strategy development, whether at the local, regional, or national level. Integral in this statement is the recognition that local strategy will likely be very different than regional strategy, which will in turn exhibit considerable differences from the national strategy. The central issue at all levels is to understand the threat against the population being served.

Regarding the issue of distinctive threats at the various levels of jurisdiction, the study showed without a doubt that terrorist group presence and forecasted activity varies widely across geographic areas. Frequency reports and crosstabulations showed that each region had a unique view of its terrorist threat. Through mapping software, these threats were shown to be even more area-specific, concentrated not in entire regions but in

specific areas of regions. These analyses indicated that there were clear and persistent local effects on terrorist group presence and fear of future attack.

The importance of these findings to policy development is illustrated through documents published to guide anti-terrorism strategy. As stated in the opening page of the Government Accounting Office's (GAO) Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources, "The first step in developing sound programs to combat terrorism is to develop a sound understanding of the terrorist threat" (GAO 2000:1). Among the pitfalls of ant-terrorism strategy development listed in the report is the use of improbable scenarios to develop programs. In other words, the GAO cautioned against the ineffectiveness of an anti-terrorism strategy based on a threat that is not present or likely to act.

The GAO also recommended that policymakers consider the local threat's "qualifications" during strategy development, including the local group's intentions weighed against capabilities, the targets they are likely to hit, and the resources available for groups to carry out an attack (GAO 2000:3). Data from the current study provides policymakers with much of this information at a level as detailed as a practitioner's telephone area code. Of course, the data is self-reported by law enforcement professionals that are assumed to know the criminal actors in their jurisdictions. Hence, information gained from this study is only as good as the respondents' level of knowledge.

Fortunately, the data indicated a high level of respondent comprehension. This was best illustrated by relationships between fear that a certain group would act and targets likely to be attacked. For example, the logical relationships between anti-

abortionists / abortion clinics and eco-terrorists / animal testing laboratories were found to be significant. Beyond these intuitive relationships there were significant group-target pairings that indicated a fairly sophisticated level of understanding. Among these pairings were eco-terrorists / passenger seaports and Islamists / nuclear power plants, neither of which would have been reported without respondent appreciation of terrorist group goals and tactics. From these and other data points discussed earlier, it can be concluded that civilian police practitioners are a viable population for executing anti-terrorism measures and serving as the base of future research.

Through a comparison with earlier studies, the current project indicated interesting trends in terrorist attack forecasting. Consider for example a 1993 mail-survey of police chiefs from 140 cities with a population over 100,000, in which respondents were asked to rank terrorist groups as the greatest threat to the United States for the next two-years. The study hypothesized that Middle Eastern groups and anti-abortionists would be heavily reported, since the first World Trade Center bombing had taken place soon before the survey and there were many acts by fringe anti-abortion groups that year. Not surprisingly, the two groups were ranked high, but only second and third of ten groups likely to be active. The unexpected most-feared group was white supremacists. Also noteworthy was the lumping of eco-terrorists into an “other” category that was reported as likely to act by just 13% of respondents (Carlson 1995).

A similar study administered during the same year by RAND surveyed a sample of law enforcement agencies in January 1993 (one-month before the first World Trade Center bombing). Respondents from this study reported right wing groups and issue-specific organizations as the most prominent threats (RAND 1995:24). The issue-

specific group aggregation included eco-terrorists and anti-abortionists, two groups that were disaggregated in the current survey. It is important to note that even individually these two groups were reported at rates as high or higher than when grouped together in the earlier study.

The Carlson and RAND studies were similar methodologically to the current project, but the findings contrast sharply. First, the almost dismissive importance of eco-terrorists in the other studies indicates that they were not considered much of a threat at the time. This is noteworthy because respondents in the current study identified eco-terrorists as the most feared group nationally, with some regions reporting their presence and likelihood to act at rates approximating 70%. Likewise, Islamists (identified in the previous two studies as “Middle Eastern” or “Foreign Terrorist Groups”) were reported as likely to act in the current study at rates far beyond those in earlier surveys.

Through evaluating the evolution of perception of these two groups alone, it must be acknowledged that the presence of terrorist groups and perceived likelihood that they will act has evolved significantly in the last ten years. This is true not just of eco-terrorists and Islamists, but of all groups used in this study’s typology. Clearly, the threat has shifted, making the data available through this study critical to policy makers who are formulating anti-terrorism plans at all levels of responsibility. The shift in local threats suggests that care must be taken when using data that is not current. Findings from this study are important now, but will require new data for comparison in the intermediate future if the information is to be used for policy development. Like all forms of crime, the threat of terrorism is fluid. It demands current data if it is to be understood and controlled.

The importance of hard, current data to anti-terrorism policy development is even more valuable when financial shortfalls in law enforcement are taken into account. Fiscal challenges are well illustrated through analysis of the three primary federal funding sources for local law enforcement; the Local Law Enforcement Block Grant (LLEBG), Edward Byrne Memorial Grant Program, and the Community Oriented Police Services (COPS) program. Since 2002, just as law enforcement agencies were taking on new homeland security tasks in the post-9/11 environment, these programs have been cut by \$1.24 billion, representing 50% of available funds. Evaluation of the one-year cuts in the individual programs suggests an even more harrowing picture; for example, the COPS program was allocated \$150 million less in 2005 than in 2004, a one-year decrease of 19.8%, and a 47% decrease since 2003 (Boyter 2004:8).

To counter the financial strains on local law enforcement, the availability of data from studies like the current one is increasingly important. Practitioners must have access to up-to-date information to better formulate their anti-terrorism strategy and disaster response plans. When tackling the issue of local terrorist threat identification, reliance on outdated data would result in a strategy built on false information. The stakes are simply too high to have to rely on old data.

Limitations

The limitations of this study primarily involve the selection and make-up of the respondent population. For example, since the survey instrument was posted on the internet, only respondents who had access to a computer were able to participate. Likewise, the most active recruitment method was via email solicitation, restricting the respondent population to police executives with email accounts.

The study population was made up mostly of members of professional organizations such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and National Sheriff's Association (NSA). This was generally the case since both organizations' membership databases were accessible and thus used as the basis for the email solicitations. This almost certainly missed a large segment of the population that is not a member of a professional organization and thus never heard about the study. While the solicitations and actual survey document encouraged peer referrals, it cannot be assumed that more than a few respondents actually took the initiative to forward solicitations to their contemporaries.

Even among the email addresses that were built using the IACP and NSA membership databases, not all addresses reached the intended recipients. For example, potential respondents with America Online (AOL) email accounts did not receive the solicitations since AOL identified the emails as "spam" and would not deliver the messages. This problem resulted in several dozen potential respondents never learning of the study.

There are also issues associated with the self-selection of respondents. Although it would intuitively seem unlikely that an executive with no local terrorism concerns would have participated in the study, the data indicated a fairly strong representation of respondents with no local group presence and no fear that a terrorist attack will occur. Specifically, of the 1,744 respondents, a surprising 288 (16.6%) reported they did not have any terrorist group present in their jurisdiction, and 381 (22%) did not believe an attack was forthcoming. These numbers indicate that the issue of self-selection bias leading to over-reporting of terrorism variables is less of a limitation than originally feared.

Because of the link between telephone area codes and population density, the use of area codes for the mapping portion of the study limited the value of the data. For example, in the northeast region the saturation of area codes allowed for a mapping process that showed how respondents reported critical variables in very small geographic areas. However, in regions like the central and southwest, where states are geographically large but have only one or two area codes due to small populations, the use of area codes for mapping was much less illustrative. For this reason the use of postal zip codes would have yielded much better map detail than telephone area codes. The decision to use area codes was made to guarantee the anonymity of respondents, since zip codes would allow for the identification of a specific agency. In retrospect it would have been more valuable to use zip codes, though there is no way to know how the resulting loss of anonymity would have affected response rates.

Finally, the study focused on law enforcement professionals as the population most qualified to answer questions on terrorist group presence and threat forecasting.

Among the population of police executives, the vast majority was from local law enforcement agencies. Though this was the goal of the study, it would also have been valuable to target local offices of federal agencies and non-law enforcement municipal leaders. These limitations are possibly best addressed by potential future research projects to provide more balance to the limited population that served as the core of this study.

Future Research

While the response rate for this study was very high, limitations associated with survey instruments generally can be addressed through complementary measures. For example, case studies could be used to gain more specific information from a sample of respondents. There are many areas of this study that would benefit from this focused attention that a case study would afford, chief among them being evaluation of targets available in a jurisdiction, local training procedures, and equipment availability.

Among the strongest features of this study is the ease with which it could be replicated. There are two forms of replication that should be considered for future research. First, a nearly identical instrument should be administered to collect data from city managers and other non-law enforcement local government officials. It would be very interesting to test whether the offices that oversee police operations actually agree with the perceptions of their law enforcement executives. Second, this study lends itself

well to an international focus. The survey instrument could be easily modified for use in any jurisdiction, including overseas locations. Other countries around the world have experienced terrorism, many of them on a scale much greater than the United States. It would be worthwhile to discover how the variables that predicted fear of certain groups in the United States compare to those found to be significant in other nations.

As mentioned earlier, the most important consideration for future research would be to conduct a similar study at points in the near and intermediate future. The perceived threat in the United States has changed considerably since comparable studies were conducted in the early 1990s. With the changing threat comes the need to evolve policy, which must be guided by sound empirical research. The terrorist threat must be monitored and policy updated to ensure countermeasures are in keeping with the current threat, not the threat as it existed years before.

Conclusion

This study set out to identify the presence of terrorist groups in the United States as perceived by law enforcement leaders, with the ancillary goal of identifying variables that predict fear of certain groups. The direct answer to the question, “So what are we afraid of,” is simply, “it depends where we are.” The meaning of this conclusion is critical to appreciate, since it challenges the current paradigm that there is a national threat.

While it is true that the findings of this study illustrate more than ever that the threat of terrorism does exist in the United States, the data also showed conclusively that which terrorists are feared is a function of location. The local effects of threat identification do not add up to a consolidated national picture. In other words, according to the professionals whom we trust to protect us, terrorism is a local phenomenon.

The view of practitioners is critical to countering threats at all levels. There is also increasing evidence that civilian government expects law enforcement to lead anti-terrorism efforts, as indicated by published expectations of reliable inputs. Consider the comments of the National Commission on Terrorism, which was charged by Congress in 1999 to evaluate anti-terrorism policies and practices nationwide. Among their findings was that “The law enforcement community is neither fully exploiting the growing amount of information it collects during the course of terrorism investigations nor distributing that information effectively to analysts and policymakers” (National Commission on Terrorism, 2000). Clearly, at least in the mind of the legislators, the onus is on the practitioner community to provide policymakers with the information needed to develop sound strategies and programs.

The question is of course whether policymakers will listen when the inputs are provided. There is no doubt that more and better information is needed, and this study is a means to the end of providing usable data to better inform policy. Among these usable data from the study were inputs gained through the final survey question, an open text field that asked if the respondent wanted to provide any additional information. Of the 1,744 respondents, a surprisingly high 459 (26%) voluntarily wrote comments. The most common inputs can be grouped into four main areas: funding, especially for smaller

agencies; the continuing problems if inter-agency cooperation; the need to field universally interoperable communications equipment; and information/intelligence sharing.

Most of the inputs on funding problems were very direct, such as, “It is very obvious that the homeland security grants are sucking up the law enforcement grants. We have saw [sic] our LE Grants drop over 70% and we have not been awarded any homeland security grants,” and the most alarming input of all 459 responses: “My Department was supposed to get a Grant for \$50,000, but the Governor gave the Local Mayor& Council the ability to divert funds for tax relief. Given that option I received no funding for equipment you have listed or the ability to send personnel to training.”

Frustration with vagueness in downward-directed policy mandates, such as the color-coded alert system, was fairly pervasive. As one respondent wrote, “We receive notices of color alerts, but no SPECIFIC instructions WHAT TO DO other than we are on "orange" alert, funny, it feels the same as yellow to me.” The speed with which information reaches “the street” is also a point of contention, as indicated in the input, “Briefings received from the federal government (Homeland Security and FBI) come from news sources. This is a waste of time, as I can read the news myself. I generally get the news from FOX, or CNN, before I get it from the FBI.”

The point to be taken from these comments is that the local law enforcement professionals surveyed in this study are trying to meet expectations to meet and defeat the various terrorist threats that have emerged in their jurisdictions. Clearly, the practitioners are speaking, but it is unclear whether anyone is listening. They have much to add to the debate. They know whom to fear, and know what needs to be done to protect their

citizens. What they need from academia is to have their concerns elevated and considered by policymakers who have the authority and ability to affect police operations. As one respondent put it, “The fact remains that the individual most likely to discover or interdict an active terrorist operation is a local street cop. Future funding, training and strategy should be directed with this in mind.” This advice holds the greatest potential for success.

Bibliography

- Auten, J.H. 1985. *Police Management in Illinois- 1983*, in Journal of Police Science and Administration. 13:325-337.
- Azar, B. 2000. *A Web of Research*. In Monitor on Psychology. 31(4):42-44.
- Barak, Gregg. 2003. Violence and Nonviolence, Pathways to Understanding. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Barkan, Steven E. and Lynne L. Snowden. 2001. Collective Violence. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.
- Berson, Ilene R., Michael J. Berson, and John Ferron. 2002. *Emerging Risks of Violence in the Digital Age: Lessons for Educators from an Online Study of Adolescent Girls in the United States*. In Journal of School Violence. 1(2):51-72.
- Boyster, Jennifer. 2004. *Congress Passes Omnibus Appropriations Bill; State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Funds Cut by 24 Percent*. In Police Chief, Vol. LXXI, No.12:8.
- Bridges, William. 1991. Managing Transitions: Making the Most of Change. New York: Harper Collins.
- Brooks, Laure Webber and Piquero, Nicole Leeper. 1998. *Police Stress: Does Department Size Matter?* in Policing-An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management. 21 (4): pp. 600-617.
- Cameron, Gavin and Jason Pate. 2001. *Covert Biological Weapons Attacks Against Agricultural Targets: Assessing the Impact Against US Agriculture*, in Terrorism and Political Violence. 13(3):61-82.
- Carlson, Joseph R. 1995. *The Future Terrorists in America*. In American Journal of Police. 14:71-91.
- Carlton, David. 1. *The Future of Political Substate Violence*. Pp. 201-230 in Terrorism: Theory and Practice. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Carter, David L. 1995. *Computer Crime Categories: How Techno-Criminals Operate*. The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. 21-26.
- Carter, David L. and Katz, Andrea J. 1996. *Computer Crime: An Emerging Challenge for Law Enforcement*. The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. 1-8.

- CERT Coordination Center. 1998. *Welcome to the CERT Coordination Center*. Online: <http://www.cert.org>. Accessed 23 Nov 1998.
- Chalecki, Elizabeth L. 2002. *A New Vigilance: Identifying and Reducing the Risks of Environmental Terrorism*, in Global Environmental Politics. 2(1):46-64.
- Clarke, R.V. 1992. "Introduction." In R.V. Clarke (ed.), *Situational Crime Prevention*. Albany, N.Y.: Harrow and Heston.
- Clarke, R.V. and Felson, M. 1993. Routine Activities and Rational Choice. Vol. 5 of *Advances in Criminological Thoery*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers.
- Coutorie, Larry E. 1995. The Future of High-Technology Crime: A Parallel Delphi Study. Journal of Criminal Justice. 23:13-27.
- Coid, Jeremy W., M.D., F.R.C.Psych. 1998. *Axis II Disorders and Motivation for Serious Criminal Behavior*. Pp. 53-94 in Psychopathology and Violent Crime, edited by Andrew E. Skodol, M.D. Washington D.C.: American Psychiatric Press, Inc.
- Coman, Greg and Evans, Barry. 1991. *Stressors Facing Australian Police in the 1990's*. Police Studies. 14 (4): pp. 153-165.
- Combs, Cindy C. 1997. Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Cooper, H.H.A. 1978. *Psychopath as Terrorist: A Psychological Perspective*. In Legal Medical Quarterly. 2:253-262.
- Cooper, H.H.A. 1977. *What is a Terrorist: A Psychological Perspective*. In Legal Medical Quarterly. 1:16-32.
- Corrado, Raymond R. 1982. *A Critique of the Mental Disorder Perspective of Political Terrorism*. In International Journal of Law and Psychiatry. 4:293-309.
- Corrado, Raymond R. 1983. *Ethnic and Ideological Terrorism in Western Europe*. Pp. 255-326 in The Politics of Terrorism, edited by Michael Stohl. New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc.
- Crenshaw, Martha. 1992. *Current Research on Terrorism: The Academic Perspective*. In Studies on Conflict and Terrorism. 15:1-11.
- Croxall, Kathy C. and Nancy E. Thompson. 2002. *The Use of the Internet for Conducting Research with Family and Consumer Sciences Professionals*. In Journal of Family and Consumer Sciences Education. 20(2).

- Das, Dilip K. 1990. *Impact of Antiterrorist Measures on Democratic Law Enforcement: The Italian Experience*. Terrorism. 13:89-98.
- Department of Justice. 1998. *Juvenile Hacker Cuts Off FAA Tower*. Online: <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/juvenilepld.htm>. Accessed 23 Nov 98.
- Dingley, James. 1997. *The Terrorist- Developing a Profile*. In International Journal of Risk, Security, and Crime Prevention. 2(1):25-37.
- DSS Research, Inc. 2000. Complementary Methodologies: Internet versus Mail Surveys. Accessed 3 March 2004. Available online: http://www.dssresearch.com/PDFs/internet_v_mail.pdf
- Electronic Frontier a. 1998. *Crime in Cyberspace*. Online: <http://law-www-server.law.strat...iglib/book/criminal/crim10.html>. Accessed 23 Nov 98.
- Electronic Frontier b. 1998. *Hacking, Cracking, or Committing Crime*. Online: <http://law-www-server.law.strat...iglib/book/criminal/crim9.html>. Accessed 23 Nov 98.
- Electronic Frontier c. 1998. *Conclusions*. Online: <http://law-www-server.law.strat...iglib/book/criminal/crim18.html>. Accessed 23 Nov 98.
- European Commission Legal Advisory Board a. 1998. *Computer Programmer Charged for Sabotage, Deleting Company Software*. Online: <http://www2.echo.lu/legal/en/news/9802/chapter3.html>. Accessed 23 Nov 98.
- European Commission Legal Advisory Board b. 1998. *Hackers Attack Yahoo Web Site*. Online: <http://www2.echo.lu/legal/en/news/9712/chapter3.html>. Accessed 23 Nov 98.
- Evans, R.H. 1989. *Terrorism and Subversion of the State: Italian Legal Responses*. Terrorism and Political Violence. 1/3:324-352.
- Ferracuti, Franco. 1982. *A Sociopsychiatric Interpretation of Terrorism*. Pp. 129-140 in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, edited by Marvin E. Wolfgang. London: Sage Publications.
- Felson, Marcus. 1998. Crime and Everyday Life, Second Edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.
- Felson, Marcus and Ronald V. Clarke. 1998. Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory for Crime Prevention. London: Research Development Statistics.
- Fuld, L. 1909. Police Administration. New York: Putnam's.

- Freilich, Joshua D. 2003. American Militias: State-Level Variations in Militia Activities. New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC.
- Ginges, Jeremy. 1997. *Deterring the Terrorist: A Psychological Evaluation of Different Strategies for Deterring Terrorism*. Terrorism and Political Violence. 9:170-185.
- Goertzel, Ted. 1988. *The Ethics of Terrorism and Revolution*. In Terrorism, an International Journal. 11:1-12.
- Goldstein, H. 1977. Policing a Free Society. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
- Goodman, Marc D. *Why the Police Don't Care About Computer Crime*. Harvard Journal of Law and Technology. 10(3):465-494.
- Hacker, Frederick. 1980. *Dialectic Interrelationships of Personal and Political Factors in Terrorism*. Pp. 19-31 in Perspectives on Terrorism, edited by Lawrence Zelic Freedman et al. Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc.
- Hafner, Katie and Markoff, John. 1991. Cyberpunk: Outlaws and Hackers on the Computer Frontier. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Hagan, Frank E. 1997. Political Crime: Ideology and Criminality. Needham Heights, MA Simon and Schuster.
- Heskin, K. 1980. Northern Ireland: A Psychological Analysis. Dublin: Gill and MacMillan.
- Home Office Statistical Bulletin. 1999. Statistics on the Operation of Prevention of Terrorism Legislation. Great Britain: The Government Statistical Service.
- Hubbard, D. 1978. *Terrorism and Protest*. In Legal Medical Quarterly. 2:188-197.
- Hudson, Rex. 1999. Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why: The 1999 Government Report on Profiling Terrorists. Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press.
- Jamieson, Alison. 1988. *The Italian Experience*. Pp. 113-154 in Combating the Terrorists: Democratic Responses to Political Violence. Ed. By H.H. Tucker. New York: Facts on File.
- Kissane, Thomas P. 1989. *A Reexamination of Hacker's Typology*. In International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice. 13(2):39-42.
- Knutson, Jeanne. 1980. *The Terrorists' Dilemmas: Some Implicit Rules of the Game*. In Terrorism: An International Journal. 4:195-222.

- Kushner, Harvey W. 1998. Terrorism in America: A Structured Approach to Understanding the Terrorist Threat. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, Ltd.
- Laqueur, Walter. 1999. The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Laufersweiler-Dwyer, Deborah L. and Dwyer, R. Gregg. 2000. *Profiling Those Impacted by Organizational Stressors at the Macro, Intermediate and Mirco Levels of Several Police Agencies*. Justice Professional. Vol 12 (4): pp. 443-469.
- Lazarsfeld, Paul F., Ann K. Pasanella, and Morris Rosenberg. Continuities in the Language of Social Research. New York: The Free Press.
- Lehman, Nicholas. 2001. *What the Terrorists Want*, in The New Yorker. 2001:10/29.
- Lockyer, Adam. 2003. *The Relationship Between the Media and Terrorism*. Accessed 23 March 2004. Available online: http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/sdsc/viewpoint/paper_030818.pdf
- Lodge, Juliet. 1988. *The European Community and Terrorism*. Pp. 45-74 in Combating the Terrorists: Democratic Responses to Political Violence, edited by H. H. Tucker. New York, NY: Facts on File.
- Martin, Gus. 2003. Understanding Terrorism. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
- McCrea, Brett A. 1994. *U.S. Counter-Terrorist Policy: A Proposed Strategy for a Non-Traditional Threat*. Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement. 3:493-508.
- McGuire, E.P. 1977. *The Terrorist and the Corporation*. In Across the Board. Pp. 11-19.
- Mickolus, Edward. 1983. *International Terrorism*, Pp. 221-254 in The Politics of Terrorism, ed. by Michael Stohl. New York: Marcel Dekker.
- National Commission on Terrorism. 2000. Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism, Report of the National Commission on Terrorism, Online: <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html>. Accessed 29 January 2005.
- National Laboratory for Tourism and eCommerce (NLTEC), University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 2002. Self-Selection Biases in the Internet Survey: A Case Study of Northern Indiana. Accessed 3 March 2004. Available online: <http://>
- Noblett, Michael G. 1993. *The Computer: High-Tech Instrument of Crime*. The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. :7-9.

- Oliverio, Annamarie. 1998. The State of Terror. New York: State University of New York Press.
- Oots, Kent Layne. 1986. A Political Organization Approach to Transnational Terrorism. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Paust, Jordan J. 1977. *A Definitional Focus*. Pp. 18-29 in Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, edited by Yonah Alexander and Seymour Maxwell Finger. New York: The John Jay Press.
- Pearce, K.I. 1977. *Police Negotiations*. In Canadian Psychiatric Association Journal. 22:171-174.
- Post, Jerrold M. 2001. *Terrorist Organizations and Motivation- The Mind of the Terrorist: Individual and Group Psychology of Terrorist Behavior*. Part of Senate Armed Services Committee Testimony of 15 Nov 01. Accessed online 28 Oct 03.
- RAND Corporation. 1995. Domestic Terrorism: A National Assessment of State and Local Preparedness. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
- Roberg, R. and J. Kuykendall. 1997. Police Management (second edition). Los Angeles: Roxbury.
- Rowe, Dennis. 1988. Considered Responses to Contemporary Terrorism in Democratic Societies. Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice.
- Schmallegger, Frank. 2002. Criminology Today. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Shoemaker, Donald L. 1996. Theories of Delinquency: An Examination of Explanations of Delinquent Behavior. 3d Ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sloan, Stephen. 1993. *U.S. Anti-Terrorism Policies: Lessons to be Learned to Meet an Enduring and Changing Threat*. Terrorism and Political Violence. 1:106-131.
- Storch, Jerome E. and Panzarella, Robert. 1996. *Police Stress: State Trait Anxiety in Relation to Occupational and Personal Stressors*. Journal of Criminal Justice. Vol. 24 (2): pp. 99-107
- Toch, Hans. Stress in Policing. American Psychological Association, Washington, D.C.: 2002.
- U.S. Report to the UN Counterterrorism Committee. 2001. *Report to the Counterterrorism Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001 Implementation of UNSCR 1373*. Online: <http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rpt/2001/6917.htm>. Accessed 28 January 2005.

- US General Accounting Office (GAO). 1999. *Combating Terrorism: Issues to be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism Operations*. GAO/NSIAD-99-135.
- US General Accounting Office (GAO). 2000. *Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources*. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-218.
- United States Attorney's Office. 1998. *Press Release March 26, 1998*. Online: <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/nypr.htm>. Accessed 23 Nov 98.
- Volanti, John M. and Aron, Fred. 1995. *Police Stressors: Variations in Perception Among Police Personnel*. Journal of Criminal Justice. Vol. 23 (3): pp. 287-294.
- White, Jonathan R. 1998. Terrorism: An Introduction. New York: West/Wadsworth Publishing Company.

Appendix XX

XXXX

VITA

Mark Christian Anarumo

| | |
|-----------|---|
| 1970 | Born in Bossier City, Louisiana |
| 1988 | Graduated from Middletown High School South, Middletown, New Jersey |
| 1988-90 | Tank Crewmember, United States Army |
| 1990-94 | Attended Rutgers College, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey |
| 1994 | B.S. in Administration of Justice |
| 1994-97 | Lieutenant, United States Air Force |
| 1997-99 | Excellence Fellowship, Rutgers School of Criminal Justice, Newark, New Jersey |
| 1999 | M.A. in Criminal Justice |
| 1999-2003 | Captain, United States Air Force |
| 1999-2001 | Adjunct Professor, Saint Leo University, Tidewater (Virginia) Campus |
| 2001 | Federal Bureau of Investigations National Academy, Quantico, Virginia |
| 2001-02 | Adjunct Professor, University of Maryland, Middle East Division |
| 2003-05 | Air Force Fellow, Rutgers School of Criminal Justice, Newark, New Jersey |
| 2005 | Ph.D. in Criminal Justice |